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Introduction:	  “Stalin	  had	  sanctioned	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  All-­‐Union	  Communist	  Party	  (Bolsheviks)	  the	  most	  brutal	  violation	  of	  socialist	  legality,	  torture	  and	  oppression,	  which	  led	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  to	  the	  slandering	  and	  to	  the	  self-­‐accusation	  of	  innocent	  people.”1	  This	  statement	  reflects	  the	  controversial	  1956	  speech	  given	  in	  front	  of	  the	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  by	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  the	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Khrushchev	  denounced	  the	  actions	  of	  Stalin,	  who	  used	  to	  be	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Communism.	  The	  rareness	  of	  betrayal	  within	  the	  party	  caused	  the	  world	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  United	  States	  to	  have	  questions.	  “Why	  did	  Nikita	  S.	  Khrushchev,	  Soviet	  Communist	  party	  leader,	  take	  the	  offensive	  to	  destroy	  the	  Stalin	  legend?”2	  In	  her	  New	  York	  Times	  article,	  “Capital	  Debates	  Motives,”	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt	  asked	  the	  question	  that	  everyone	  in	  the	  United	  States	  government	  was	  asking	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  in	  February	  1956.	  Within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1956	  was	  a	  crucial	  year	  for	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations.	  	  Starting	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  on	  February	  25,	  where	  he	  denounced	  Stalin’s	  crimes	  and	  ‘cult	  of	  personality,’	  the	  United	  States	  government	  began	  to	  reassess	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Nikita	  Khrushchev.3	  Then,	  with	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt	  and	  the	  Polish	  October,	  Washington	  continued	  to	  evaluate	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  help	  determine	  its	  policies	  against	  Communist	  Russia.	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nikita	  Sergeyevich	  Khrushchev,	  “Special	  Report	  to	  the	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  February	  24-­‐25,	  1956.	  2	  Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt,	  “Capital	  Debates	  Motives,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  20,	  1956.	  	  3	  Johanna	  Granville,	  “1956	  Reconsidered:	  Why	  Hungary	  and	  Not	  Poland?”	  The	  Slavonic	  and	  East	  European	  2 Dana	  Adams	  Schmidt,	  “Capital	  Debat s	  Motives,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  March	  20,	  1956.	  	  3	  Johanna	  Granville,	  “1956	  Reconsidered:	  Why	  Hungary	  and	  Not	  Poland?”	  The	  Slavonic	  and	  East	  European	  
Review	  vol.	  80	  no.	  4,	  (October	  2002):	  664.	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year	  ended	  with	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolution	  and	  its	  brutal	  suppression,	  causing	  the	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  makers	  to	  reevaluate	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Historians	  have	  thoroughly	  analyzed	  these	  events	  of	  1956.	  	  Before	  delving	  into	  my	  argument,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  lay	  out	  the	  arguments	  of	  other	  historians	  to	  see	  the	  historiographical	  discussions	  revolving	  this	  topic.	  By	  presenting	  the	  opinions	  of	  other	  historians	  on	  this	  topic,	  it	  will	  become	  clear	  that	  I	  am	  offering	  a	  fresh	  perspective.	  	  In	  Paul	  Lendvai’s	  book	  One	  Day	  That	  Shook	  the	  Communist	  World:	  The	  1956	  
Hungarian	  Uprising	  and	  its	  Legacy,	  he	  embodies	  his	  role	  as	  a	  Hungarian	  journalist,	  to	  take	  the	  position	  of	  zooming	  in	  on	  the	  specific	  day	  of	  October	  23,	  1956,	  the	  day	  the	  uprising	  in	  Hungary	  began.	  Through	  this	  decision,	  Lendvai	  assesses	  the	  situation	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  revolutionaries.	  He	  draws	  conclusions	  based	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  uprising	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  bigger	  picture	  of	  the	  situation.	  Lendvai	  acknowledges	  the	  disparity	  between	  the	  revolutionaries	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  government.	  Furthermore,	  Lendvai	  cites	  the	  miscommunication	  between	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  and	  the	  Soviet	  government,	  which	  he	  blames	  on	  Imre	  Nagy,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Hungary.	  Like	  many	  historians,	  Lendvai	  looks	  at	  the	  role	  of	  the	  United	  States	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  revolt,	  and	  criticizes	  their	  contradicting	  involvement.	  However,	  Lendvai	  believes	  that	  despite	  any	  potential	  United	  States	  involvement,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  have	  let	  Hungary	  be	  independent	  of	  Soviet	  control.	  Lendvai	  was	  one	  of	  many	  Hungarians	  who	  wrote	  about	  the	  revolt.	  	  Another	  Hungarian,	  Charles	  Gati,	  takes	  his	  personal	  experience	  of	  the	  revolt	  and	  pairs	  it	  with	  a	  historical	  perspective	  to	  create	  a	  fresh	  approach	  in	  Failed	  Illusions:	  Moscow,	  
Washington,	  Budapest,	  and	  the	  1956	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	  Gati’s	  proximity	  definitely	  motives	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him	  to	  question	  whether	  the	  revolution	  could	  have	  produced	  a	  different	  outcome	  if	  a	  few	  factors	  had	  been	  different.	  Gati	  looks	  at	  the	  revolutionaries,	  the	  Hungarian	  government,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  as	  the	  key	  components	  in	  analyzing	  the	  uprising.	  The	  lack	  of	  preparedness	  of	  the	  revolt,	  the	  divided	  government	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  astuteness	  of	  Imre	  Nagy,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Radio	  Free	  Europe	  broadcasts	  receive	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  revolution.	  Gati	  looks	  to	  the	  examples	  of	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Poland	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  to	  decrease	  Soviet	  influence	  in	  Hungary,	  if	  the	  revolt	  had	  gone	  properly.	  Gati	  and	  Lendvai	  both	  offer	  personal	  aspects.	  The	  other	  common	  approach	  is	  the	  reevaluation	  of	  the	  events	  after	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  archives	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Russia,	  thereby	  releasing	  more	  information.	  	  In	  the	  article,	  “The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  1956	  Crises	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland:	  Reassessments	  and	  New	  Findings,”	  Mark	  Kramer	  uses	  the	  newly	  accessible	  archive	  materials	  from	  Russia	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Kramer	  looks	  at	  the	  reactions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party	  to	  the	  Polish	  October	  in	  1956	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt,	  where	  he	  concludes	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  crisis	  was	  not	  as	  easy	  to	  diffuse	  as	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland.	  Kramer	  argues	  that	  tensions	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  reached	  its	  peak	  with	  the	  return	  of	  Władysław	  Gomułka	  to	  power	  in	  Poland.	  In	  immediate	  response,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  mobilized	  troops	  towards	  Warsaw,	  very	  slowly	  however.	  Despite	  the	  disappointment	  expressed	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  this	  change	  of	  power,	  Khrushchev	  was	  willing	  to	  meet	  with	  Gomułka.	  While	  Khrushchev	  ordered	  the	  mobilization	  of	  troops	  initially,	  it	  was	  merely	  a	  play	  for	  leverage	  within	  negotiations.	  In	  fact,	  “at	  a	  meeting	  on	  21	  October,	  the	  CPSU	  Presidium	  unanimously	  decided	  to	  ‘refrain	  from	  military	  intervention’	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and	  to	  ‘display	  patience’	  for	  the	  time	  being.”4	  As	  a	  result	  of	  negotiations	  between	  Khrushchev	  and	  Gomułka,	  paired	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  Gomułka	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  and	  to	  remain	  communist,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Poland	  worked	  to	  prevent	  a	  military	  outbreak.	  	  Kramer	  contrasts	  this	  incident	  in	  Poland	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  in	  1956.	  Unlike	  Poland,	  Hungary	  lacked	  a	  strong	  political	  leader	  that	  could	  negotiate	  the	  requests	  of	  the	  people	  with	  the	  CPSU	  Presidium	  and	  Nikita	  Khrushchev.	  Mátyás	  Rákosi	  was	  first	  in	  power	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  Not	  only	  was	  he	  greatly	  disliked	  by	  the	  Hungarian	  public,	  but	  also	  he	  was	  not	  a	  favorite	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  As	  a	  result,	  Ernő	  Gerő	  replaced	  Rákosi,	  and	  eventually	  Imre	  Nagy	  replaced	  Gerő.	  Neither	  had	  success	  with	  diffusing	  the	  situation.	  Kramer	  points	  to	  the	  request	  of	  Hungary	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  and	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  would	  spread	  to	  other	  Warsaw	  Pact	  countries	  as	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  military	  intervention.	  More	  specifically,	  Kramer	  cites	  the	  Suez	  crisis	  as	  a	  motivation	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  suppress	  the	  crisis	  in	  Hungary	  quickly.	  	  Johanna	  Granville’s	  book	  The	  First	  Domino:	  International	  Decision	  Making	  During	  the	  
Hungarian	  Crisis	  of	  1956,	  also	  utilizes	  the	  new	  archival	  collections	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  countries	  after	  the	  change	  of	  system	  in	  Hungary	  in	  1989.	  Rather	  than	  focusing	  on	  internal	  factors,	  like	  Charles	  Gati	  and	  Paul	  Lendvai,	  Granville	  focuses	  on	  the	  international	  factors	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  Granville	  looks	  at	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Yugoslavia,	  Poland	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  place	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolution	  of	  1956	  in	  historical	  perspective.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Mark	  Kramer,	  “The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  1956	  Crises	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland:	  Reassessments	  and	  New	  Findings,”	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  History	  vol.	  33	  no.	  2	  (1998),	  171.	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Granville	  points	  out	  that	  Hungary	  was	  the	  first	  satellite	  to	  challenge	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  directly.5	  Furthermore,	  Granville	  argues	  that	  the	  events	  in	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Poland	  influenced	  the	  revolutionaries	  in	  Hungary.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Hungary,	  she	  argues	  that	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Poland	  were	  “two	  of	  the	  most	  independent	  ‘revisionist’	  communist	  states	  that	  had	  each	  weathered	  their	  own	  battles	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  survived.”6	  Their	  prior	  independence	  and	  the	  weak	  Hungarian	  government	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  different	  outcomes	  between	  Hungary	  and	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Poland.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolution,	  Granville	  looks	  to	  the	  ‘Solarium’	  study,	  which	  was	  conducted	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1953	  to	  help	  explain	  their	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union.7	  Granville	  argues	  that	  there	  were	  three	  task	  forces:	  Task	  Force	  ‘A’,	  led	  by	  George	  Kennan,	  argued	  for	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  containment	  policy,	  relying	  on	  economic	  aid;	  Task	  Force	  ‘B,’	  led	  by	  Admiral	  Radford	  espoused	  containment,	  albeit	  with	  a	  heavier	  reliance	  on	  the	  nuclear	  deterrent;	  and	  Task	  Force	  ‘C,’	  led	  by	  C.D.	  Jackson	  proposed	  the	  conduct	  of	  psychological	  warfare.	  This	  ‘rollback’	  approach	  was	  designed	  to	  ‘increase	  efforts	  to	  disturb	  and	  weaken	  the	  Soviet	  bloc,’	  overtly	  and	  covertly	  attacking	  the	  communist	  apparatus,	  and	  missing	  no	  opportunities	  ‘to	  confuse	  and	  unbalance’	  the	  enemy.	  President	  Eisenhower	  decided	  to	  mix	  elements	  from	  all	  three	  task	  forces,	  i.e.,	  to	  continue	  the	  containment	  policy	  but	  increase	  reliance	  on	  covert	  action	  and	  the	  nuclear	  deterrent.8	  	  Granville	  further	  argues	  that	  Charles	  Bohlen,	  who	  was	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  to	  the	  USSR	  in	  1956,	  believed	  that	  Khrushchev	  could	  be	  trusted,	  thereby	  allowing	  him	  to	  deem	  the	  containment	  policy	  sufficient.9	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Granville	  recognizes	  that	  the	  United	  States	  probably	  had	  zero	  intention	  of	  intervening	  militarily,	  but	  rather	  their	  strategy	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Johanna	  C.	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino:	  International	  decision	  Making	  During	  the	  Hungarian	  Crisis	  of	  1956,	  (College	  Station:	  Texas	  A&M	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  3.	  	  6	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  38.	  	  7	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  158.	  	  8	  Ibid.	  	  9	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  160.	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purely	  psychological	  with	  their	  Radio	  Free	  Europe	  broadcasts.10	  In	  fact,	  Granville	  states,	  “in	  any	  case,	  just	  as	  Washington	  lacked	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  should	  Stalin	  die,	  so	  also	  it	  lacked	  a	  concrete	  plan	  of	  response	  should	  a	  satellite	  try	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  and	  appeal	  for	  U.S.	  aid.”11	  Johanna	  Granville	  demonstrates	  her	  thorough	  knowledge	  of	  the	  1956	  events	  through	  her	  journal	  articles	  as	  well.	  	  The	  preceding	  chapter	  lays	  out	  the	  historiographical	  background,	  in	  other	  words	  prior	  discussions	  about	  the	  events	  of	  1956	  and	  more	  specifically	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  of	  1956.	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  prior	  discussions,	  it	  helps	  to	  present	  the	  hopeful	  uniqueness	  of	  the	  argument	  laid	  out	  in	  this	  chapter.	  The	  trend	  revolving	  the	  discussion	  of	  these	  events	  are	  to	  discuss	  them	  through	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  the	  victimized	  country,	  for	  example	  Hungary.	  However,	  I	  wish	  to	  look	  at	  these	  events	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy.	  	  By	  looking	  at	  the	  internal	  discussions,	  memos,	  letters,	  reports	  and	  more	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  agencies	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  United	  States	  government	  interpreted	  these	  events.	  Unlike	  newspaper	  articles	  that	  are	  opinion	  pieces	  of	  reporters,	  these	  documents	  speak	  to	  the	  opinion	  of	  government	  officials.	  Government	  officials	  not	  only	  make	  policies,	  but	  also	  have	  access	  to	  different	  information	  than	  the	  general	  public,	  therefore	  making	  their	  opinions	  more	  interesting.	  Furthermore,	  previous	  historians	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  newly	  opened	  archives	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  their	  main	  primary	  sources.	  Therefore,	  not	  only	  is	  my	  perspective	  fresh	  but	  the	  documents	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  have	  yet	  to	  have	  been	  applied	  in	  the	  manner	  I	  intend	  to	  use	  them.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  181.	  	  11	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  194.	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All	  of	  these	  historians	  analyze	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  and	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  events	  of	  1956,	  however,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Hungary	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  plan	  to	  examine	  these	  events	  through	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  wish	  to	  see	  how	  the	  United	  States	  government’s	  perceptions	  of	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  communism	  evolved	  through	  the	  year	  of	  1956.	  I	  plan	  to	  analyze	  the	  presidential	  papers	  of	  Dwight	  David	  Eisenhower,	  United	  States	  Foreign	  Relations	  documents,	  which	  include	  memorandums,	  reports,	  and	  telegrams,	  and	  lastly	  personal	  testimonies	  from	  Hungarian	  refugees	  from	  Columbia	  University’s	  Oral	  History	  Project.	  Unlike	  the	  approaches	  by	  the	  historians	  presented	  above,	  by	  looking	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  I	  wish	  to	  offer	  a	  fresh	  perspective	  on	  the	  events	  of	  1956	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Through	  the	  analysis	  of	  these	  sources,	  I	  wish	  to	  analyze	  the	  United	  States’	  understanding	  and	  reactions	  of	  the	  dramatic	  events	  of	  1956.	  Furthermore,	  after	  all	  of	  these	  events,	  did	  the	  United	  States	  perception	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev,	  and	  communism	  evolve?	  If	  so,	  is	  this	  reflected	  within	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  to	  what	  degree	  is	  their	  evolution	  in	  the	  United	  States	  policy?	  What	  does	  this	  say	  about	  the	  United	  States’	  willingness	  to	  understand	  communism?	  	  By	  answering	  these	  questions	  a	  narrative	  is	  developed	  about	  the	  United	  States’	  foreign	  policy	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  even	  larger,	  communism.	  The	  analysis	  of	  whether	  the	  United	  States	  Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy	  evolved	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  events	  of	  1956	  helps	  reveal	  the	  adaptability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  government	  and	  their	  policies	  in	  general,	  not	  just	  their	  Cold	  War	  foreign	  policy.	  By	  examining	  the	  intelligence	  and	  knowledge	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  had	  access	  to	  alongside	  the	  policies	  created	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at	  this	  time,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  adaptability	  and	  efficiency	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  look	  first	  at	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech,	  next	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt,	  then	  the	  return	  of	  Władysław	  Gomułka,	  and	  finally	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  of	  1956.	  	  As	  of	  November	  3,	  1956,	  “Soviet	  tanks	  sealed	  the	  main	  crossings	  of	  the	  Austrian-­‐Hungarian	  border	  Friday.	  This	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  preliminary	  to	  dealing	  sternly	  with	  the	  insurgents.”12	  In	  response	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  denouncing	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact	  and	  thereby	  proclaiming	  Hungary	  a	  neutral	  state,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  increased	  the	  militarization	  of	  the	  borders.	  How	  did	  a	  year	  that	  started	  with	  such	  promise	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  close	  with	  a	  Stalinist	  style	  of	  suppression	  of	  Hungarian	  insurgents?	  The	  following	  chapters	  wish	  to	  answer	  this	  and	  where	  the	  United	  States	  stood	  throughout	  it	  all.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  John	  MacCormac,	  “Premier	  Asks	  that	  U.N.	  Defend	  Neutrality	  of	  Hungary,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  3,	  1956.	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Chapter	  1:	  Do	  As	  I	  Say	  Not	  As	  I	  Do:	  Nikita	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  	  	   On	  the	  night	  of	  the	  last	  day	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  February	  24,	  1956,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  convened	  the	  Congress	  for	  a	  closed	  session.	  Without	  forewarning	  of	  what	  his	  speech	  would	  entail,	  the	  Congress	  waited	  anxiously.	  In	  the	  wee	  hours	  of	  the	  night	  and	  into	  the	  next	  day,	  Khrushchev	  spoke	  to	  a	  captive	  audience	  for	  four	  hours.	  No	  one	  was	  prepared	  to	  hear	  what	  he	  had	  to	  say.	  Most	  were	  silent;	  some	  fainted.13	  	  	   Khrushchev’s	  speech	  unprecedentedly	  pushed	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  With	  his	  speech,	  Khrushchev	  meant	  to	  accomplish	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  direction	  divergent	  from	  Joseph	  Stalin	  and	  to	  reestablish	  a	  socialist	  legality.	  However,	  the	  unintended	  effects	  were	  confusion,	  the	  emergence	  of	  vulnerabilities	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  discussion.	  He	  presented	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  Stalin’s	  repressive	  nature	  as	  a	  leader,	  his	  arrest	  orders,	  his	  sanctioned	  murders,	  and	  the	  terror	  that	  he	  instilled	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Khrushchev	  did	  not	  stop	  there.	  He	  condemned	  Stalin	  for	  his	  handling	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  harshly	  criticized	  every	  aspect	  of	  Stalin’s	  reign	  before	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  Khrushchev	  tactically	  limited	  his	  attack	  to	  Stalin,	  never	  once	  attacking	  the	  Communist	  system	  or	  Party.	  Instead,	  he	  placed	  all	  of	  the	  blame	  personally	  on	  Stalin	  and	  presented	  the	  Party	  as	  a	  victim	  to	  Stalin’s	  ruthless	  reign.14	  	  	   Without	  hesitation,	  Khrushchev	  started	  his	  speech	  by	  immediately	  denouncing	  Stalin.	  Khrushchev	  acknowledged	  that	  Stalin	  portrayed	  himself	  as	  a	  godlike	  figure.	  Rather	  than	  giving	  a	  narrative	  of	  Stalin’s	  reign,	  Khrushchev	  critiqued	  Stalin’s	  specific	  actions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Aleksandr	  Pyzhikov	  V.,	  “The	  Cult	  of	  Personality	  During	  the	  Khrushchev	  Thaw,”	  Russian	  Studies	  in	  History	  50,	  no.	  3	  (Winter	  	  /2012	  2011):	  11,	  doi:December	  2011.	  14	  Karl	  E.	  Loewenstein,	  “Re-­‐Emergence	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  Khrushchev	  and	  Responses	  to	  the	  Secret	  Speech,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  58,	  no.	  8	  (December	  1,	  2006):	  1329–1345.	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Khrushchev	  first	  raised	  concern	  for	  the	  “cult	  of	  the	  person	  of	  Stalin.”15	  He	  claimed	  that	  this	  evolved	  into	  the	  ‘cult	  of	  the	  individual,’	  which	  directly	  conflicted	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  communism.	  He	  attributed	  the	  cult’s	  creation	  to	  Stalin,	  thereby	  opening	  the	  door	  for	  criticism.	  Khrushchev	  tried	  to	  establish	  a	  distinction	  between	  Stalin’s	  actions	  and	  proper	  communist	  ideology,	  limiting	  his	  attack	  to	  just	  Stalin.	  	  	   Khrushchev	  turned	  to	  the	  ideologies	  of	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  Vladimir	  Lenin	  as	  leaders	  who	  denounced	  the	  ‘cult	  of	  the	  individual’	  to	  strengthen	  his	  critique.	  Quoting	  Lenin,	  he	  stated,	  “‘Only	  he	  who	  believes	  in	  the	  people,	  [he]	  who	  submerges	  himself	  in	  the	  fountain	  of	  the	  living	  creativeness	  of	  the	  people,	  will	  win	  and	  retain	  power.’”16	  Khrushchev	  disapproved	  of	  Stalin’s	  philosophy	  and	  wanted	  to	  replace	  it	  with	  Leninist	  ideology	  instead.	  By	  further	  contrasting	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Lenin	  and	  the	  reign	  of	  Stalin,	  Khrushchev	  presented	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Party	  as	  a	  unit.	  According	  to	  Khrushchev,	  Stalin	  diminished	  the	  Party’s	  power	  as	  a	  way	  to	  increase	  his	  own.	  Khrushchev	  portrayed	  Stalin	  as	  a	  dictator	  whose	  hunger	  for	  power	  corrupted	  him	  and	  caused	  him	  to	  distort	  the	  ideology	  of	  communism.17	  Despite	  this	  criticism	  on	  Stalin’s	  repressive	  nature,	  Khrushchev	  carefully	  avoided	  denouncing	  actions	  consistent	  with	  communist	  ideology,	  for	  example,	  collectivization	  and	  the	  five-­‐year	  plan.	  	  	  	   To	  further	  support	  his	  critique,	  Khrushchev	  referred	  to	  Lenin’s	  testament	  and	  characterization	  of	  Stalin:	  	  Stalin	   is	   excessively	   rude,	   and	   this	   defect,	  which	   can	   be	   freely	   tolerated	   in	  our	  midst	   and	   in	   contacts	   among	   us	   Communists,	   becomes	   a	   defect	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Nikita,	  Khrushchev,	  “Speech	  to	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  C.P.S.U.,”	  Speech,	  February	  24,	  1956,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  Reference	  Archive,	  Soviet	  Government	  Documents,	  http://www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm.	  	  16	  Ibid.	  17	  Ibid.	  
	   15	  
cannot	  be	  tolerated	  in	  one	  holding	  the	  position	  of	  General	  Secretary.	  Because	  of	   this,	   I	   propose	   that	   the	   comrades	   consider	   the	   method	   by	   which	   Stalin	  would	  be	   removed	   from	   this	  position	  and	  by	  which	  another	  man	  would	  be	  selected	   for	   it,	   a	  man	  who,	   above	   all,	   would	   differ	   from	   Stalin	   in	   only	   one	  quality,	  namely,	  greater	  tolerance,	  greater	  loyalty,	  greater	  kindness	  and	  more	  considerate	  attitude	  toward	  the	  comrades,	  a	  less	  capricious	  temper,	  etc.18	  	  Despite	  this	  warning,	  Stalin	  retained	  his	  position.	  The	  pairing	  of	  this	  cautionary	  advice	  with	  Stalin’s	  reign	  of	  terror,	  Khrushchev	  provided	  a	  basis	  for	  his	  argument,	  without	  losing	  the	  Congress	  and	  the	  Party.	  	   Moving	  away	  from	  Lenin’s	  warnings	  of	  Stalin,	  Khrushchev	  allowed	  his	  own	  negative	  opinion	  of	  Stalin	  to	  shine	  through.	  He	  condemned	  Stalin	  for	  acting	  as	  a	  dictator	  who	  expected	  absolute	  obedience	  from	  not	  only	  the	  Congress	  but	  from	  every	  citizen	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  instead	  of	  acting	  as	  a	  leader	  of	  the	  Party.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  submissiveness,	  Stalin	  instilled	  fear	  throughout	  the	  Union.	  Any	  form	  of	  defiance	  to	  Stalin	  could	  result	  in	  death,	  thereby	  preventing	  people	  from	  disobeying	  the	  orders	  of	  Stalin.	  Khrushchev	  reprobated	  this	  form	  of	  tyrannical	  rule.	  Khrushchev	  further	  denounced	  Stalin	  for	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘enemy	  of	  the	  people.’	  	  According	  to	  Khrushchev,	  this	  designation	  allowed	  Stalin	  to	  abuse	  his	  power,	  by	  repressing	  any	  person	  within	  the	  Union	  by	  calling	  him	  an	  ‘enemy	  of	  the	  people.’	  Khrushchev	  continued	  to	  criticize	  that	  this	  process	  of	  persecution	  was	  never	  just	  and	  was	  always	  cruel.	  Stalin’s	  persecutions	  at	  their	  worst,	  “led	  to	  glaring	  violations	  of	  revolutionary	  legality	  and	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  entirely	  innocent	  individuals—[persons]	  who	  in	  the	  past	  had	  defended	  the	  Party	  line—became	  victims.”19	  Khrushchev’s	  denouncement	  of	  the	  murders	  placed	  him	  in	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Khrushchev,	  “Speech	  to	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  C.P.S.U.”	  19	  Ibid.	  
	   16	  
vulnerable	  position.	  By	  disagreeing	  with	  Stalin’s	  policy,	  he	  implied	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  new	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  opposition	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  yet	  he	  never	  clarified	  this.	  	  	  Khrushchev	  strategically	  ended	  his	  speech	  on	  a	  positive	  note.	  He	  contrasted	  his	  critique	  of	  Stalin	  against	  the	  optimism	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union;	  Comrades!	   The	   20th	   Congress	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  has	  manifested	  with	   a	   new	   strength	   the	   unshakable	   unity	   of	   our	   Party,	   its	  cohesiveness	  around	   the	  Central	  Committee,	   its	   resolute	  will	   to	  accomplish	  the	  great	  task	  of	  building	  communism.20	  	  	  Khrushchev	  tactfully	  separated	  himself	  from	  Stalin	  while	  still	  supporting	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  Furthermore,	  he	  purposely	  concluded	  the	  speech	  with	  how	  the	  Party	  should	  move	  forward	  to	  re-­‐establish	  his	  support	  of	  Communism	  and	  the	  Party.	  	  Khrushchev	  explained	  his	  strategic	  decision	  to	  have	  an	  unpublicized	  session	  and	  expressed	  his	  desire	  to	  keep	  the	  speech	  secret	  for	  as	  long	  as	  possible;	  We	  can	  not	  allow	  this	  question	  to	  leave	  party	  circles,	  especially	  to	  the	  press.	  That	  is	  why	  we	  discuss	  it	  here,	  at	  a	  closed	  meeting	  of	  the	  congress.	  We	  should	  know	  the	  limits,	  we	  should	  not	  give	  weapons	  to	  our	  enemies;	  we	  should	  not	  air	  our	  dirty	   laundry	   in	   front	  of	   their	  eyes.	   I	   think	   that	   the	  delegates	   to	   the	  congress	  understand	  and	  properly	  value	  of	  all	  these	  suggestions.21	  	  The	  Congress	  responded	  with	  intense	  applause.	  Khrushchev	  understood	  that	  while	  his	  speech	  was	  a	  denouncement	  of	  Stalin	  and	  not	  a	  denouncement	  of	  the	  communist	  system,	  non-­‐Communist	  countries	  like	  the	  United	  States	  could	  manipulate	  his	  speech.	  Fearful	  that	  his	  delicate	  critique	  might	  be	  used	  against	  him,	  Khrushchev	  tried	  to	  keep	  it	  a	  secret	  among	  the	  Communist	  Party	  for	  as	  long	  as	  he	  could.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Khrushchev,	  “Speech	  to	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  C.P.S.U.”	  21	  Karl	  E.	  Loewenstein,	  “Re-­‐Emergence	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  Khrushchev	  and	  Responses	  to	  the	  Secret	  Speech,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  58,	  no.	  8	  (December	  1,	  2006):	  1334.	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   Khrushchev	  stunned	  the	  20th	  Congress	  with	  his	  four-­‐hour	  speech.	  Despite	  their	  shock,	  the	  Party	  rallied	  behind	  him.	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  speaks	  to	  his	  astuteness	  as	  a	  leader.	  Throughout	  he	  highlighted	  the	  mistakes	  Stalin	  made	  during	  his	  reign	  and	  never	  once	  criticized	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  By	  portraying	  the	  Party	  as	  a	  victim,	  it	  justified	  Khrushchev’s	  attempt	  to	  refocus	  the	  Party.	  Khrushchev	  recognized	  the	  transitional	  state	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  capitalized	  on	  the	  opportunity	  to	  guide	  the	  Party	  away	  from	  Stalinist	  ideology	  and	  towards	  Leninist	  principles.	  	  	   However,	  the	  speech	  created	  problems	  for	  Khrushchev.	  He	  wanted	  to	  guide	  the	  party	  in	  a	  new	  direction,	  but	  instead	  he	  created	  confusion.	  The	  denigration	  of	  Stalin	  shocked	  the	  Party.	  Despite	  Khrushchev’s	  skillful	  separation	  of	  Stalin’s	  actions	  from	  Communist	  ideology,	  Party	  members	  and	  followers	  still	  struggled	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  two	  could	  exist	  separately.	  For	  as	  long	  as	  Stalin	  was	  the	  dictator	  of	  Soviet	  Union,	  communists	  believed	  that	  he	  embodied	  and	  enacted	  the	  ideologies	  of	  communism.	  But	  Khrushchev	  was	  saying	  otherwise,	  thereby	  creating	  confusion	  within	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  The	  speech	  neglected	  to	  create	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  direction	  for	  the	  Party,	  but	  rather	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  discussion	  among	  the	  Party.	  To	  provide	  people	  opportunities	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  the	  “new”	  communist	  system,	  the	  Party	  held	  forums	  to	  discuss	  the	  speech.22	  In	  this	  manner,	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  failed.	  Rather	  than	  simply	  focus	  on	  Leninism,	  Khrushchev	  inadvertently	  created	  a	  dialogue	  to	  revise	  communist	  ideology.	  	  	   In	  addition	  to	  complicating	  communist	  ideology,	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  presented	  a	  weakness.	  He	  clearly	  did	  not	  want	  to	  continue	  Stalin’s	  legacy,	  but	  was	  never	  explicit	  about	  his	  policy’s	  direction	  outside	  of	  a	  return	  to	  Leninism.	  De-­‐Stalinization	  would	  affect	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Loewenstein,	  “Re-­‐Emergence	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  1330.	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Soviet	  Union’s	  future	  and	  Khrushchev’s	  actions,	  but	  he	  addressed	  neither	  issue.	  The	  new	  regime	  limited	  him	  in	  his	  reactions	  to	  problems	  of	  dissent,	  inadvertently	  creating	  the	  problem	  of	  governing	  Eastern	  Europe.	  	  The	  speech	  suggested	  that	  it	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  acceptable	  to	  use	  force	  and	  terror	  to	  solve	  these	  potential	  problems	  of	  conflict.	  Instead,	  Khrushchev	  would	  need	  to	  be	  more	  open	  to	  diplomatic	  negotiations.	  He	  clearly	  did	  not	  anticipate	  the	  events	  in	  Poland	  or	  Hungary	  later	  that	  year.	  The	  speech	  also	  implied	  that	  Khrushchev	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  transform	  its	  policy	  so	  abruptly.	  	  Furthermore,	  denouncing	  Stalin	  meant	  disrupting	  the	  status	  quo.	  Stalinists	  ruled	  many	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Europe	  governments.	  The	  dissolution	  of	  Stalinism	  created	  points	  of	  vulnerability	  in	  the	  Communist	  bloc.	  He	  never	  addressed	  the	  problem	  of	  Stalinist	  rulers	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  and	  how	  that	  would	  affect	  their	  relations.	  By	  making	  the	  distinction	  between	  Stalin’s	  actions	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  Khrushchev	  undermined	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  satellite	  countries’	  governments.	  He	  opened	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  changing	  of	  rulers	  within	  the	  Bloc	  and	  therefore	  reform	  within	  the	  satellite	  governments.	  The	  Eastern	  European	  governments	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  that	  opportunity.	  	  	  Most	  importantly,	  Khrushchev	  insinuated	  that	  there	  was	  a	  socialist	  legality.	  If	  Stalin	  and	  his	  actions	  were	  wrong,	  then	  there	  must	  be	  a	  standard	  of	  socialist	  legitimacy.	  As	  a	  result,	  each	  socialist	  state	  would	  therefore	  have	  a	  legal	  responsibility	  and	  be	  required	  to	  answer	  for	  its	  actions.	  Once	  again,	  Khrushchev	  disrupted	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  sent	  shockwaves	  through	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  Rumors	  swirled	  around	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  about	  the	  future	  of	  their	  communist	  reigns.	  The	  absence	  of	  Bolesław	  Bierut,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo,	  from	  Poland	  strained	  communication	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  fueling	  rumors.	  Bierut	  could	  not	  leave	  the	  Soviet	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Union	  due	  to	  his	  poor	  health.	  On	  March	  12,	  two	  weeks	  after	  the	  speech,	  Bierut	  died.	  One	  rumor	  supposed	  that	  Bierut	  had	  a	  heart	  attack	  because	  of	  shock	  from	  the	  speech.23	  The	  death	  came	  as	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  Poles	  because	  his	  deteriorating	  health	  was	  kept	  a	  secret,	  probably	  because	  the	  image	  of	  a	  sick	  leader	  is	  an	  image	  of	  a	  weak	  leader,	  which	  would	  allow	  people	  to	  believe	  even	  more	  that	  reform	  was	  possible.	  Bierut’s	  death	  helped	  to	  change	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Polish	  government.	  Unlikely	  candidates	  presented	  themselves	  as	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo.	  The	  absence	  of	  Bierut	  in	  the	  Politburo	  triggered	  discussion	  about	  redirecting	  of	  Polish	  politics.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  quiet	  the	  rumors	  about	  Bierut,	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  told	  Poland	  that	  they	  would	  send	  speakers	  to	  explain	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  to	  clear	  up	  any	  confusion.	  The	  confusion	  that	  presented	  itself	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Poland	  emerged	  in	  Hungary	  as	  well.	  In	  fact,	  Khrushchev’s	  denouncement	  drew	  a	  further	  wedge	  between	  Hungary’s	  dominant	  party,	  the	  Stalinist	  Muscovites,	  and	  the	  lesser	  communist	  party.24	  Politics	  in	  Hungary	  had	  begun	  to	  change.	  Just	  before	  Khrushchev	  made	  his	  Secret	  Speech,	  the	  Petofi	  Circle	  had	  been	  reinstated	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Petofi	  Circle	  united	  intellectuals	  and	  workers,	  while	  also	  providing	  a	  forum	  to	  discuss	  their	  grievances.	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  spurred	  a	  meeting	  in	  May	  1956	  by	  the	  Petofi	  Circle	  with	  the	  title,	  “The	  Twentieth	  Soviet	  Party	  Congress	  and	  the	  Problems	  of	  Hungarian	  Political	  Economy.”	  The	  meeting	  evolved	  from	  a	  discussion	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  into	  an	  “all-­‐out	  denunciation	  of	  Rákosi’s	  megalomania.”25	  The	  Petofi	  Circle	  convened	  again	  in	  July,	  to	  discuss	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  but	  again	  things	  quickly	  escalated.	  The	  meeting	  erupted	  into	  chants	  calling	  for	  the	  removal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Kemp-­‐Welch,	  “Khrushchev’s	  ‘Secret	  Speech’	  and	  Polish	  Politics,”	  186.	  24	  Granville,	  “Reactions	  to	  the	  Events	  of	  1956,”	  269.	  25	  Anne	  Applebaum,	  Iron	  Curtain:	  The	  Crushing	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  1944-­‐1956	  (London:	  Penguin	  Group,	  2012),	  482.	  	  
	   20	  






























	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Applebaum,	  Iron	  Curtain,	  483.	  	  
	   21	  
Chapter	  2:	  The	  Eastern	  Bloc	  Begins	  to	  Crack:	  Poznań	  Revolt	  and	  Polish	  October	  	  	   Bolesław	  Bierut,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Polish	  United	  Worker’s	  Party	  (PZPR),	  attended	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  Bierut	  ruled	  with	  two	  other	  leaders,	  Hilary	  Minc	  and	  Jakub	  Berman,	  known	  as	  the	  ruling	  troika	  of	  Poland.	  The	  speech	  puzzled	  the	  Stalinist	  triumvirate.	  Despite	  Bierut’s	  failing	  health,	  he	  reported	  back	  to	  Poland	  about	  the	  speech	  and	  the	  developments	  surrounding	  it.	  The	  Polish	  party	  struggled	  to	  formally	  govern	  without	  Bierut	  in	  Poland.	  Instead	  of	  hosting	  a	  formal	  plenum,	  the	  Central	  Committee	  planned	  an	  unofficial	  one,	  where	  they	  were	  briefed	  on	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.27	  Edward	  Osóbka-­‐Morawski,	  who	  had	  been	  the	  first	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Communist	  Poland,	  delivered	  the	  report,	  claiming,	  	  “The	  XX	  Congress	  was	  a	  unique	  chance	  to	  revive	  Polish	  communism,	  picking	  up	  the	  threads	  that	  had	  been	  dropped	  after	  the	  Third	  Plenum.”28	  In	  other	  words,	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  impelled	  an	  evaluation	  of	  Poland’s	  past	  and	  future.	  The	  Polish	  government	  began	  to	  question	  the	  country’s	  new	  direction.	  	  The	  death	  of	  Bierut,	  on	  March	  12,	  stalled	  discussions	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Poland.	  Khrushchev	  stayed	  in	  Poland	  after	  Bierut’s	  funeral,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  influencing	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  elections.	  The	  division	  in	  Poland	  between	  the	  Stalinist	  Muscovites	  and	  the	  home	  communists	  was	  deepened	  by	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  The	  Muscovites	  were	  the	  communist	  leaders	  within	  the	  satellite	  countries	  who	  remained	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  while	  the	  home	  communists	  were	  those	  who	  were	  in	  prison	  at	  home	  during	  Stalin’s	  rule.	  Khrushchev’s	  denunciation	  of	  Stalin	  undermined	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Tony	  Kemp-­‐Welch,	  “Khrushchev’s	  ‘Secret	  Speech’	  and	  Polish	  Politics:	  The	  Spring	  of	  1956,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  
Studies	  48,	  no.	  2	  (March	  1,	  1996):	  183.	  28	  Ibid.	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Muscovites,	  which	  gave	  way	  to	  dominance	  of	  the	  home	  communists.29	  No	  longer	  did	  the	  triumvirate	  of	  Bolesław	  Bierut,	  Minc,	  and	  Berman	  control	  Polish	  politics,	  which	  placed	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  upon	  Polish	  politics	  into	  question.	  	  On	  March	  20,	  the	  Sixth	  Plenum	  of	  the	  PZPR	  convened.	  Khrushchev	  delivered	  a	  speech	  assuring	  the	  plenum	  that	  the	  years	  of	  Stalinist	  repression	  were	  over.30	  The	  meeting	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Plenum	  ended	  with	  the	  election	  of	  new	  members	  with	  reformist	  tendencies.	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Politburo,	  Edward	  Ochab	  was	  elected	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Polish	  United	  Worker’s	  Party.31	  The	  change	  in	  leadership	  complicated	  Soviet-­‐Polish	  relations.	  No	  longer	  were	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Polish	  government	  appointed	  by	  Soviet	  leaders	  but	  rather	  elected	  within	  the	  Polish	  government	  themselves,	  despite	  Khrushchev’s	  attempt	  to	  influence	  the	  election.	  	  	   The	  Twentieth	  Congress	  distributed	  original	  copies	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  to	  the	  members	  and	  attendees,	  contrary	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  desire	  for	  secrecy.	  Bierut	  received	  one	  of	  the	  copies	  before	  his	  death.	  These	  copies	  were	  originally	  made	  to	  help	  regional	  and	  local	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (CPSU)	  organizations	  brief	  their	  membership.	  The	  Polish	  United	  Workers’	  Party	  (PZPR)	  circulated	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  throughout	  Poland	  intending	  to	  inform	  the	  inner	  party.32	  The	  distribution	  of	  the	  speech	  raised	  even	  more	  questions	  in	  Poland.	  Much	  of	  the	  confusion	  derived	  from	  the	  implausibility	  of	  Stalin	  acting	  alone.	  While	  Khrushchev	  tried	  to	  alienated	  Stalin	  from	  the	  Party,	  Polish	  communists	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  believe	  that	  Stalin	  could	  act	  alone.	  33	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  members	  were	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confused	  how	  the	  Party	  could	  have	  allowed	  Stalin	  to	  deviate	  from	  communist	  ideology	  so	  much.	  The	  dubious	  account	  made	  Polish	  leaders	  question	  the	  governing	  members	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   The	  student	  population	  and	  the	  workers	  in	  Poland	  also	  reacted.	  The	  PZPR	  set	  out	  to	  inform	  the	  party	  membership	  of	  the	  speech	  and	  its	  potential	  implications,	  which	  included	  visiting	  the	  universities.	  For	  example,	  on	  March	  26,	  forty	  party	  members	  convened	  at	  the	  Szczecin	  Technical	  University.	  Disgruntled	  party	  members	  shouted	  questions	  about	  Soviet	  domination	  within	  Polish	  society,	  such	  as,	  “Why	  are	  90%	  of	  generals	  in	  the	  Polish	  Army	  Russians?”	  or	  “Why	  did	  Khrushchev	  stay	  on	  in	  Warsaw	  after	  Comrade	  Bierut’s	  funeral:	  didn’t	  he	  select	  our	  Central	  Committee	  First	  Secretary?”34	  Soviet	  suspicion	  began	  to	  brew	  among	  the	  Party	  membership.	  	  The	  freedom	  granted	  to	  discuss	  and	  explain	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  opened	  the	  floodgates	  for	  reevaluation	  about	  the	  past	  and	  questions	  about	  the	  future.	  The	  workers	  interpreted	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  as	  a	  move	  towards	  greater	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  but	  that	  was	  not	  the	  intention.35	  	  In	  order	  to	  suppress	  open	  political	  dialogue,	  both	  the	  PZPR	  and	  the	  CPSU	  tried	  to	  end	  discussions	  about	  the	  speech.36	  The	  dissent	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  speech	  developed	  into	  a	  more	  general	  opposition	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  An	  uprising	  began	  to	  develop	  within	  Poland.	  The	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  evolved	  into	  a	  Poland	  nationalist	  movement,	  with	  “calls	  for	  the	  ‘return	  to	  Poland,’”	  across	  the	  country.	  37	  	  The	  youth	  was	  the	  powerful	  fuel	  behind	  this	  movement.	  Po	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protest.”38	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  youth	  riot,	  a	  federation	  of	  ‘youth	  discussion	  clubs’	  was	  created,	  which	  encouraged	  more	  political	  involvement;	  Groups	   from	   Krakow,	   Poznań,	   Rzeszow	   and	   elsewhere	   empowered	   the	  Warsaw	   Club	   of	   Catholic	   Intelligentsia	   (KIK)	   to	   act	   as	   Secretary:	   	   (1)	   to	  organize	   and	   support	   existing	   groups	   and	   help	   new	   ones	   arise;	   (2)	   to	  represent	   their	   interests	   to	   the	   authorities	   and	   institutions	   (particularly	  where	   local	   authorities	  were	  being	  obstructive);	   (3)	   to	   further	   cooperation	  between	  clubs,	  exchanging	  experience	  and	  information.39	  	  	  While	  these	  discussion	  groups	  evolved	  out	  of	  the	  political	  uproar	  in	  response	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  they	  also	  became	  places	  for	  discussions	  about	  apolitical	  topics	  such	  as	  music	  as	  well.40	  The	  development	  of	  discussion	  clubs	  led	  to	  a	  politically	  engaged	  and	  outspoken	  Polish	  population.	  With	  a	  newly	  politically	  engaged	  society	  and	  new	  forums,	  like	  the	  discussion	  clubs’,	  people	  began	  to	  openly	  express	  opinions.	  While	  the	  intelligentsia	  dominated	  this	  newfound	  interest	  in	  meetings	  and	  freely	  discussing	  their	  opinions,	  it	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  them.	  Polish	  workers	  also	  began	  to	  meet	  as	  a	  way	  to	  express	  their	  discontent	  with	  industrial	  conditions,	  such	  as	  “arbitrary	  raising	  of	  production	  norms,	  poor	  organization	  of	  work	  which	  reduced	  their	  earnings,	  an	  unjust	  and	  (in	  their	  estimation)	  irrational	  tax	  system	  and	  poor	  working	  conditions.”41	  Despite	  the	  change	  in	  government	  after	  Bierut’s	  death,	  the	  new	  balance	  of	  members	  within	  the	  party	  did	  not	  make	  any	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  economic	  situation.	  They	  planned	  to	  continue	  the	  Five	  Year	  Plan	  despite	  de-­‐Stalinization	  efforts	  in	  Poland.	  	  Industrial	  areas	  were	  the	  first	  to	  experience	  the	  hardships	  of	  the	  poor	  economic	  conditions	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of	  Poland.42	  Following	  this	  new	  trend,	  the	  workers	  of	  the	  Poznań	  Stalin	  Works	  (Zaklady	  
Imieniem	  Stalina	  Poznań,	  or	  ZISPO)	  locomotive	  plant	  in	  met	  on	  Saturday,	  June	  23,	  to	  discuss	  their	  complaints	  about	  the	  poor	  working	  conditions.43	  	  After	  consolidating	  their	  complaints	  into	  five	  demands,	  including	  a	  twenty	  percent	  wage	  increase,	  bonuses	  and	  repayment	  of	  taxes,	  they	  decided	  to	  send	  these	  complaints,	  along	  with	  a	  delegation	  from	  the	  locomotive	  plant	  in	  Poznań,	  to	  the	  central	  authorities	  in	  Warsaw.44	  	   While	  the	  workers	  were	  anxiously	  waiting	  to	  hear	  from	  the	  delegation,	  rumors	  began	  to	  spread	  about	  what	  happened	  to	  the	  members	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  Warsaw.	  With	  more	  silence,	  came	  more	  confusion.	  Finally,	  after	  five	  days	  of	  waiting,	  on	  June	  28,	  the	  workers	  decided	  to	  organize	  a	  demonstration,	  later	  known	  as	  “Black	  Thursday.”	  The	  day	  and	  night	  shift	  workers	  came	  together	  to	  total	  roughly	  12,000.	  Ordinary	  citizens	  joined	  the	  strikers,	  creating	  an	  even	  larger	  demonstration.	  The	  rumor	  that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  delegation	  had	  been	  arrested	  added	  to	  the	  collective	  unrest	  among	  the	  workers.45	  The	  demonstration	  quickly	  became	  violent.	  The	  enraged	  ZISPO	  workers	  first	  stormed	  the	  city	  jail,	  following	  the	  rumors	  that	  the	  delegation	  had	  been	  arrested.	  Overwhelming	  the	  guards	  with	  their	  numbers,	  the	  workers	  succeeded	  in	  freeing	  all	  the	  prisoners.	  However,	  the	  strikers	  remained	  unsatisfied.	  Following	  their	  impassioned	  emotions,	  the	  workers	  seized	  the	  guards’	  weapons,	  and	  thus	  dramatically	  changed	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  demonstration.46	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   After	  failing	  to	  find	  their	  delegates	  at	  the	  jail,	  the	  workers	  charged	  on	  to	  the	  radio	  station,	  angry	  that	  they	  were	  blocking	  Western	  broadcasts.	  There	  were	  Westerners	  on	  the	  ground	  who	  were	  covering	  the	  story,	  yet	  the	  radio	  programmers	  were	  not	  broadcasting	  their	  reports.	  The	  Poznań	  workers	  wanted	  to	  capitalize	  on	  this	  publicity	  opportunity	  to	  explain	  why	  they	  attacked	  the	  radio	  station.47	  From	  there,	  the	  workers	  then	  stormed	  the	  building	  of	  the	  District	  Office	  of	  Security,	  still	  frantically	  looking	  for	  the	  ZISPO	  delegates.	  Here,	  emotions	  and	  violence	  escalated	  even	  further.	  The	  first	  shots	  were	  fired	  at	  the	  District	  Office	  of	  Security.	  The	  demonstration	  evolved	  into	  a	  violent	  antigovernment	  riot	  that	  spread	  from	  Poznań	  into	  other	  Polish	  cities.48	  Beginning	  with	  economic	  demands,	  the	  rioters	  changed	  their	  tune	  to	  more	  nationalistic	  demands	  such	  as,	  “Down	  with	  the	  Bloodsuckers,”	  “Down	  with	  the	  Communists,”	  and	  “Down	  with	  the	  Red	  Bourgeoisie.”49	  All	  across	  Poland	  demonstrators	  raided	  government	  buildings,	  attacked	  symbols	  of	  the	  Party,	  and	  destroyed	  any	  physical	  symbol	  of	  the	  Party	  such	  as	  flags	  and	  propaganda.50	  	  	   Reports	  of	  the	  riots	  reached	  the	  PZPR	  Central	  Committee	  in	  Warsaw	  almost	  immediately.	  The	  committee	  called	  an	  emergency	  session.	  The	  PZPR	  had	  to	  decide	  how	  to	  calm	  the	  riots	  and	  maintain	  order	  throughout	  the	  country.	  If	  played	  incorrectly,	  the	  PZPR	  knew	  that	  these	  riots	  could	  evolve	  into	  a	  political	  coup.	  They	  decided	  to	  make	  use	  of	  the	  Citizens’	  Militia	  (Milicja	  Obywatelska,	  or	  MO)	  and	  the	  Internal	  Security	  Corps	  (Kropus	  Bezpieczenstwa	  Wewnetrznego	  or	  KBW).	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  there	  were	  only	  329	  soldiers,	  including	  62	  officers	  of	  the	  KBW,	  stationed	  in	  Poznań.	  These	  forces	  were	  busy	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  Granville,	  “To	  Invade	  or	  Not	  to	  Invade?”	  442.	  48	  Granville,	  “1956	  Reconsidered,”	  660.	  49	  Machcewicz,	  “Intellectuals	  and	  Mass	  Movements.	  The	  Study	  of	  Political	  Dissent	  in	  Poland	  in	  1956,”	  363.	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  Ibid.	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protecting	  the	  key	  points	  of	  Poznań.51	  Despite	  very	  strong	  opposition	  in	  the	  PZPR	  to	  call	  in	  reinforcements	  from	  outside	  the	  city,	  the	  PZPR	  finally	  called	  upon	  the	  Polish	  Army	  to	  crush	  the	  riot.52	  	  	   The	  Polish	  army,	  paired	  with	  the	  MO	  units,	  marched	  into	  Poznań	  on	  June	  28	  and	  29	  to	  suppress	  the	  protesters.	  The	  riots	  were	  suppressed	  in	  a	  day.	  The	  local	  police	  did	  little	  to	  help	  the	  military	  in	  part	  because	  the	  rioters	  seized	  their	  weapons	  preventing	  them	  from	  being	  able	  to	  support	  the	  suppression.	  However,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  police	  did	  not	  want	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  MO	  troops	  for	  other	  reasons.	  Most	  of	  the	  officers	  in	  the	  MO	  units	  followed	  orders	  to	  fire	  at	  the	  insurgents	  with	  minimal	  resistance.53	  The	  Polish	  casualties	  amounted	  to	  around	  100	  deaths	  and	  300	  injured.54	  	   The	  Poznań	  Revolt	  started	  as	  a	  demonstration	  of	  disgruntled	  workers	  reacting	  to	  economic	  distress,	  but	  escalated	  into	  an	  anti-­‐governmental	  riot	  across	  Poland.	  In	  reaction	  to	  the	  events	  that	  occurred	  in	  Poznań,	  Secretary	  Edward	  Ochab	  and	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  sent	  their	  own	  delegation	  consisting	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  Jósef	  Cyrankiewicz	  and	  Central	  Committee	  secretaries	  Jerzy	  Morawski,55	  Edward	  Gierek,56	  and	  Wiktor	  Klosiewicz57.58	  The	  Polish	  government	  took	  the	  revolt	  seriously,	  working	  very	  carefully	  to	  assuage	  the	  workers	  and	  not	  to	  belittle	  the	  Poznań	  workers.	  Under	  close	  supervision	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  Poles	  reacted	  quickly	  to	  prevent	  unwanted	  Soviet	  assistance.59	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  Granville,	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  to	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  Granville,	  “To	  Invade	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  Ibid.	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   Economic	  distress	  was	  the	  driving	  factor	  of	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt.	  The	  main	  demand	  from	  the	  Poznań	  workers	  was	  for	  an	  increase	  in	  pay.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  demands	  and	  the	  careful	  handling	  of	  the	  demands	  made	  it	  easier	  for	  the	  Polish	  government	  to	  calm	  the	  workers.	  While	  demands	  did	  evolve	  to	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiment,	  the	  Polish	  government	  could	  appease	  the	  protestors	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  economic	  reforms.	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  workers	  and	  under	  the	  watchful	  eye	  of	  the	  Soviets,	  Ochab	  and	  the	  PZPR	  carefully	  suppressed	  the	  revolt	  with	  minimal	  casualties.	  Ochab	  proved	  to	  the	  Soviets	  that	  the	  Polish	  government	  could	  manage	  their	  own	  internal	  affairs,	  which	  gave	  the	  Soviets	  confidence	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  to	  interfere.	  	  The	  Poznań	  Revolt	  forced	  another	  reevaluation	  of	  the	  Polish	  government	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1956.	  Workers	  began	  to	  routinely	  voice	  their	  concerns	  through	  party	  and	  trade	  union	  independent	  worker	  councils.	  Threatened	  by	  the	  workers	  councils	  and	  the	  revolt,	  the	  Party	  was	  forced	  to	  reform	  the	  government.	  The	  Polish	  Politburo	  decided	  to	  rethink	  its	  relationship	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.60	  	  The	  Polish	  Politburo	  convened	  the	  Seventh	  Plenary	  Meeting	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  in	  July.	  The	  meeting	  concluded	  with	  a	  liberal	  victory	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  not	  implement	  harsh	  punishments	  against	  the	  imprisoned	  Poznań	  rebels	  and	  to	  discuss	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Party.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  sufficient.61	  The	  PZPR	  furthered	  the	  de-­‐Stalinization	  campaign	  by	  dismissing	  Stalinist	  officials	  and	  focusing	  on	  fixing	  the	  economic	  failures.62	  Despite	  appeasing	  the	  workers	  in	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt,	  the	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  Bromke,	  “Background	  of	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  October	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  Bromke,	  “Background	  of	  the	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  October	  Revolution,”	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  Granville,	  “Reactions	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  Events	  of	  1956,”	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majority	  of	  Poland	  remained	  unsatisfied.	  Drastic	  change	  would	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  appease	  the	  Polish	  population.	  	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1956,	  Władysław	  Gomułka	  was	  resting	  in	  his	  home	  after	  his	  1954	  release	  from	  prison.63	  Gomułka’s	  history	  made	  him	  an	  attractive	  candidate	  for	  the	  Polish	  Politburo.	  Despite	  his	  lack	  of	  formal	  education,	  in	  1926,	  Gomułka	  was	  admitted	  into	  the	  secret	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Poland.	  In	  1930,	  he	  was	  elected	  as	  national	  secretary	  of	  the	  Chemical	  Worker’s	  Union.	  Unlike	  Bierut,	  Gomułka	  was	  a	  “home”	  communist,	  which	  caused	  problems	  for	  him	  under	  Stalin’s	  reign.	  Gomułka	  was	  infamous	  in	  Poland	  for	  his	  revolutionary	  actions,	  which	  routinely	  landed	  him	  in	  jail.64	  In	  fact,	  he	  was	  imprisoned	  four	  times.	  First	  in	  1926	  for	  “revolutionary	  activity.”	  Again	  in	  1932	  for	  organizing	  a	  textile	  strike	  in	  Lodz.	  In	  1936,	  he	  was	  arrested	  for	  “revolutionary	  activity”	  in	  Silesia.	  Finally,	  in	  July	  1951,	  Gomułka	  was	  arrested	  for	  nationalist	  deviationist	  crimes,	  including	  his	  opposition	  to	  the	  Cominform	  in	  September	  1947.65	  The	  de-­‐Stalinization	  campaign	  helped	  Gomułka	  rehabilitate	  his	  political	  career,	  priming	  him	  for	  the	  summer	  of	  1956.	  His	  history	  made	  him	  a	  popular	  candidate	  to	  appease	  the	  workers	  and	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitude	  of	  the	  Poles	  at	  this	  point	  in	  time.	  	  After	  the	  Seventh	  Plenum,	  in	  popular	  response	  to	  repeated	  calls,	  Ochab	  arranged	  a	  meeting	  with	  Gomułka.66	  Conscious	  of	  both	  the	  problems	  in	  Poland	  and	  the	  PZPR’s	  need	  for	  his	  return,	  Gomułka	  negotiated	  the	  terms	  of	  his	  return.	  Gomułka	  agreed	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Party	  if	  Khrushchev	  completed	  his	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  officers	  and	  advisers	  from	  the	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  Granville,	  “To	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  Granville,	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Polish	  Armed	  Forces	  and	  security	  apparatus,	  and	  if	  Soviet	  Marshal	  Konstanty	  Rokossowski	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo.67	  With	  the	  agreement	  of	  these	  conditions	  Władysław	  Gomułka	  returned	  to	  the	  Party	  in	  August,	  continuing	  Poland’s	  de-­‐Stalinization.	  	  While	  Gomułka	  was	  re-­‐admitted	  to	  the	  Party	  in	  August,	  he	  was	  not	  elected	  to	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  until	  October.	  To	  prepare	  the	  Party	  for	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka,	  the	  Politburo	  explained	  the	  problems	  within	  the	  Party	  at	  the	  Politburo	  meeting	  of	  October	  8	  and	  10.68	  The	  issues	  were:	  1)	   a	   lack	   of	   unity	   in	   the	   Politburo;	   2)	   a	   lack	   of	   connections	   between	   the	  leadership	   and	   the	   Party	   activists;	   3)	   a	   lack	   of	   authority	   among	   the	  leadership;	  4)	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  spreading	  of	  anti-­‐Soviet	  tendencies	  there	  is,	  aside	  from	  the	  propaganda	  of	  the	  enemy,	  an	  unfair	  situation	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  PPR	  [Polish	  People’s	  Republic]	  and	  USSR	  (such	  as	  the	  question	  concerning	  the	  price	  of	  coal,	   the	  highest	  officer	  cadres	   in	  the	  army	  often	  do	  not	  know	  the	  Polish	  language,	  do	  not	  have	  Polish	  citizenship,	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  interferes	  in	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  the	  country.69	  	  The	  PZPR	  Politburo	  hoped	  that	  Gomułka’s	  reinstatement	  to	  the	  Party	  would	  help	  to	  unify	  the	  Party	  as	  well	  as	  connect	  the	  Politburo	  with	  the	  workers	  better,	  thereby	  eliminating	  many	  of	  the	  problems.	  With	  the	  scene	  set,	  Gomułka	  attended	  his	  first	  official	  Politburo	  meeting	  on	  October	  12,	  ready	  to	  guide	  Poland	  in	  its	  new	  direction.	  	  	  	   Gomułka	  continued	  his	  tense	  return	  by	  immediately	  criticizing	  the	  relationship	  between	  Poland	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Pointing	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  Soviet	  advisers	  within	  the	  Polish	  security	  field	  and	  Soviet	  officers	  within	  the	  Polish	  army,	  Gomułka	  declared	  Polish-­‐Soviet	  relations	  as	  “not	  an	  example	  of	  normal	  relations,”	  and	  an	  issue	  that	  needed	  to	  be	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“normalized.”70	  Obviously,	  this	  statement	  caused	  Gomułka	  to	  clash	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Marshal	  Rokossowski,	  and	  further	  isolated	  Rokossowski	  within	  the	  Politburo.	  	  	   With	  Rokossowski	  out	  of	  the	  way,	  Gomułka	  could	  speak	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  uniting	  the	  party	  under	  his	  leadership.	  Gomułka	  boldly	  asked	  for	  the	  leadership’s	  recommendation	  to	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo.	  As	  agreed	  upon,	  Ochab	  nominated	  Gomułka,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  other	  members,	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  Politburo	  at	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum.71	  Ochab	  recognized	  that	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  his	  political	  power	  he	  would	  need	  to	  support	  Gomułka’s	  rise	  to	  leadership.	  	  The	  Politburo	  met	  privately	  before	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum	  convened,	  agreeing	  to	  not	  only	  add	  Gomułka	  but	  also	  his	  allies,	  Marian	  Spychalski,	  Zenon	  Kliszko,	  and	  Ignacy	  Logasowinski,	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  PZPR.	  To	  help	  secure	  Gomułka’s	  position,	  the	  Politburo	  decided	  to	  publicly	  announce	  his	  return.72	  In	  preparation	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  the	  Politburo	  held	  elections	  for	  the	  Politburo	  and	  Secretariat	  membership.	  The	  elections	  demonstrated	  the	  division	  between	  Rokossowski	  and	  Gomułka	  within	  the	  Politburo.73	  Gomułka	  and	  three	  other	  Politburo	  members,	  Józef	  Cyrankiewicz,74	  Aleksander	  Zawadski,75	  and	  Edward	  Ochab,76	  were	  the	  last	  candidates.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  special	  election	  commission	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  38.	  	  71	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  39.	  	  72	  Ibid.	  	  73	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  47.	  	  74	  He	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  PZPR	  Central	  Committee	  and	  Politburo	  since	  1948,	  was	  Prime	  Minister	  from	  1947-­‐1952	  and	  1954-­‐1970,	  and	  was	  deputy	  premier	  from	  1952-­‐1954.	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  47.	  75	  He	  had	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Politburo	  since	  1943,	  was	  the	  deputy	  chief	  political	  officer	  of	  the	  Polish	  Army	  from	  1943-­‐1944,	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Central	  Council	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  from	  1949-­‐1951,	  was	  deputy	  premier	  from	  1951-­‐1952,	  and	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  State	  from	  1952-­‐1964.	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  47.	  	  76	  Ochab’s	  history	  consisted	  of	  first	  deputy	  defense	  minister	  and	  chief	  political	  officer	  of	  the	  Polish	  Armed	  forces	  from	  1949-­‐1950,	  was	  currently	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  PZPR.	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  47.	  	  
	   32	  
was	  to	  not	  only	  elect	  the	  Secretariat	  of	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  but	  also	  all	  the	  new	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo	  and	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Ministers.77	  	  The	  day	  before	  the	  scheduled	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  Ochab	  convened	  the	  special	  election	  commission	  to	  present	  the	  proposals	  that	  needed	  approval	  by	  the	  members.	  	  The	  proposals	  were:	   1)	   the	   Politburo	   would	   be	   limited	   to	   nine	  members;	   2)	   the	   new	   Politburo	  would	   include	   Gomułka,	   Zawadski,	   Cyrankiewicz,	   Loga-­‐Sowinski,	   Roman	  Zambrowski,	   Adam	   Rapacki,	   Jerzy	   Morawski,	   Stefan	   Jedrychowski,	   and	  Ochab;	   3)	   the	   Secretariat	   would	   include	   Gomułka,	   Zambrowski	   (who	   was	  removed	  form	  the	  Secretariat	  by	  Khrushchev	  at	  the	  6th	  PUWP	  [PZPR]	  Plenum	  of	  March	  1956,)	  Edward	  Gierek,	  Witold	  Jaronsinski,	  and	  Ochab78	  	  	  Rokossowski	  opposed	  all	  of	  the	  proposals,	  despite	  the	  majority	  approving	  them.	  The	  only	  change	  made	  to	  these	  proposals	  was	  the	  addition	  of	  Jerry	  Albrecht	  and	  Władysław	  Matwin	  to	  the	  list	  of	  candidates.	  Purposely,	  the	  commission	  did	  not	  include	  in	  the	  list	  of	  candidates	  former	  members	  of	  the	  Politburo	  who	  had	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.79	  Despite	  opposition	  from	  Rokossowski,	  the	  Politburo	  abided	  Gomułka’s	  request,	  and	  Rokossowski	  was	  removed	  from	  the	  Politburo.	  The	  need	  for	  Gomułka’s	  re-­‐admittance	  was	  too	  powerful.	  	  	   The	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  and	  the	  expulsion	  of	  the	  pro-­‐Soviet	  members	  from	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  raised	  immediate	  concerns	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Reacting	  quickly,	  the	  CPSU	  Politburo	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  Poland	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo.	  The	  day	  before	  the	  planned	  meeting	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  October	  18,	  Panteleimon	  K.	  Ponomarenko,	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  in	  Warsaw,	  informed	  Ochab	  that	  a	  Soviet	  delegation	  had	  been	  sent.	  Ponomarenko	  warned	  Ochab	  that	  current	  political	  conditions	  and	  actions	  within	  Poland	  had	  been	  causing	  anxiety	  among	  the	  CPSU	  Politburo.	  Ochab	  reacted	  just	  as	  quickly	  by	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gathering	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  at	  the	  Central	  Committee	  to	  discuss	  the	  potential	  options	  with	  Ponomarenko	  present.	  The	  PZPR	  Politburo	  decided	  that	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  should	  be	  invited	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  but	  not	  on	  the	  first	  day.	  However,	  Rokossowski	  disagreed.	  Ponomarenko,	  a	  Soviet	  ambassador	  agreed	  with	  Rokossowski	  that	  the	  CPSU	  delegation	  should	  meet	  before	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  clearly	  advocating	  Soviet	  interests.80	  	  	   The	  CPSU	  delegation	  arrived	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  originally	  planned	  PZPR	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  October	  19.	  The	  delegation	  consisted	  of	  Khrushchev,	  Lazar	  Kaganovich,	  Anastas	  Mikoyan,	  Molotov,	  Defense	  Minister,	  Marshal	  I.	  S.	  Zhukov,	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  Marshal	  Konev,	  and	  the	  Chief	  of	  the	  Soviet	  general	  Staff,	  General	  Antonov.81	  Khrushchev’s	  memoirs	  reveal	  the	  motivation	  and	  intention	  of	  the	  delegation	  visiting	  Poland,	  “’We	  decided	  to	  send	  a	  delegation	  to	  Poland	  and	  have	  a	  talk	  with	  the	  Polish	  leadership.	  They	  recommended	  that	  we	  not	  come.	  Their	  reluctance	  to	  meet	  with	  us	  heightened	  our	  concern	  even	  more.	  So	  we	  decided	  to	  go	  there	  in	  a	  large	  delegation.’”82	  Taking	  the	  offensive,	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  met	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  at	  the	  airport	  upon	  their	  arrival.	  The	  Soviets	  greeted	  the	  Poles	  with	  hostility	  due	  to	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Polish	  government	  and	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  within	  Poland.	  Despite	  the	  harsh	  accusations	  proposed	  by	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka	  responded	  calmly	  by	  stating;	  “We	  do	  not	  want	  to	  break	  the	  alliance	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.”83	  Gomułka	  boldly	  asserted	  to	  Khrushchev,	  “I	  understand	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  talk	  in	  an	  aggressive	  tone,	  but	  if	  you	  talk	  with	  a	  revolver	  on	  the	  table	  you	  don’t	  have	  an	  even-­‐handed	  discussion.	  I	  cannot	  continue	  the	  discussions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  39.	  81	  Ibid.	  82	  Ibid.	  83	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  40.	  	  
	   34	  
under	  these	  circumstances.”84	  Strategically,	  Gomułka	  ended	  the	  heated	  discussion	  by	  reaffirming	  that	  he	  “didn’t	  want	  to	  break	  off	  Polish-­‐Soviet	  friendship.	  I	  believe	  what	  we	  propose	  will	  strengthen	  the	  friendship.”85	  Immediately	  after	  meeting	  the	  CPSU	  delegation,	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  convened	  the	  first	  installment	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum	  on	  October	  19	  at	  10:00	  am.	  	  Secretary	  Ochab	  started	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum	  by	  presenting	  the	  changes	  to	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  and	  a	  recap	  of	  the	  initial	  early	  morning	  meeting	  with	  the	  CPSU	  delegation.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  PZPR	  supported	  Gomułka’s	  handling	  of	  the	  aggressive	  tone	  of	  the	  Soviets.	  Rokossowski	  was	  the	  only	  member	  to	  defend	  the	  Soviets	  when	  he	  refuted,	  “but	  you	  can	  see	  that	  there	  are	  reasons	  why	  the	  Soviet	  comrades	  talk	  like	  this,	  and	  why	  comrade	  Khrushchev	  vehemently	  exploded.	  I	  am	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  four	  comrades	  should	  go	  to	  the	  discussions	  and	  listen	  to	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  Soviet	  comrades.	  More	  cold	  bloodedness.	  It	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  aggravate	  the	  situation.”86	  Rokossowski	  only	  received	  support	  from	  one	  of	  his	  allies,	  Witold	  Jozwiak.	  Rokossowski’s	  other	  ally,	  Zenon	  Nowak,	  remarked,	  “I	  agree	  with	  comrade	  Gomułka.	  Let	  the	  Soviet	  comrades	  calmly	  explain	  what	  they	  want.”87	  Politburo	  member,	  Adam	  Rapacki,	  added,	  “We	  cannot	  continue	  talks	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  intervention	  and	  under	  the	  charge	  that	  we	  are	  less	  worthy	  than	  those	  comrades	  from	  the	  old	  leadership	  who	  were	  not	  selected	  to	  form	  the	  new	  composition.	  I	  am	  for	  maintaining	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  Politburo.”88	  The	  new	  Politburo	  clearly	  did	  not	  have	  the	  previous	  blind	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  40.	  85	  Ibid.	  86	  Ibid.	  87	  Ibid.	  88	  Ibid.	  
	   35	  
There	  appeared	  to	  be	  confusion	  between	  Ochab	  and	  Rokossowski	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  meeting	  of	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum.	  Ochab	  requested	  an	  explanation	  about	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  army	  towards	  Warsaw.	  Rokossowski	  shadily	  replied,	  “I	  simply	  ordered,	  in	  any	  case	  with	  the	  agreement	  of	  comrade	  Ochab,	  that	  one	  military	  battalion	  from	  Legionowo	  be	  put	  on	  alert	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  security,	  from	  possible	  enemy	  provocation,	  for	  the	  unexpected	  arrival	  of	  the	  Soviet	  delegation.”89	  However,	  the	  reality	  was	  that	  on	  October	  19,	  many	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Northern	  Army	  Group	  stationed	  in	  Poland	  mobilized	  towards	  Warsaw.90	  The	  meeting	  ended	  with	  a	  unanimous	  acceptance	  of	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  Gomułka	  as	  leader	  of	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  and	  postponed	  the	  meeting	  until	  later	  that	  day,	  after	  the	  Politburo	  and	  Gomułka	  discussed	  with	  the	  Soviet	  delegation.	  	  While	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  convened	  their	  Eighth	  Plenum,	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  had	  their	  own	  private	  meeting.	  The	  delegation	  confirmed	  that	  Rokossowski’s	  loyalty	  remained	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	  that	  his	  influence	  was	  dwindling.	  Khrushchev	  bluntly	  acknowledged,	  “of	  course,	  our	  own	  armed	  strength	  far	  exceeded	  that	  of	  Poland,	  but	  we	  didn’t	  want	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  use	  of	  our	  own	  troops.”91	  After	  the	  initial	  meeting	  with	  the	  Polish	  leadership,	  Khrushchev	  recognized	  Gomułka’s	  ability	  to	  lead.	  More	  importantly,	  Khrushchev	  was	  comforted	  that	  Gomułka	  did	  not	  have	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  mentality.	  Khrushchev	  reflected,	  “Here	  was	  a	  man	  who	  had	  come	  to	  power	  on	  the	  crest	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  wave,	  yet	  who	  could	  now	  speak	  forcefully	  about	  the	  need	  to	  preserve	  Poland’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  40.	  90	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  47.	  	  91	  Gluchowski,	  “Poland,	  1956:	  Khrushchev,	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  ‘Polish	  October,’”	  41.	  	  
	   36	  
friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Communist	  Party.”92	  Gomułka	  shrewdly	  negated	  Khrushchev’s	  fear	  of	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  rebel	  leading	  the	  Polish	  Politburo.	  	  Khrushchev’s	  confidence	  of	  Gomułka	  increased	  in	  the	  second	  meeting	  when	  Gomułka	  asserted,	  “Poland	  needs	  friendships	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  more	  than	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  needs	  friendship	  with	  Poland.	  Can	  it	  be	  that	  we	  failed	  to	  understand	  our	  situation?	  Without	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  we	  cannot	  maintain	  our	  borders	  with	  the	  West.	  We	  are	  dealing	  with	  our	  internal	  problems,	  our	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  will	  remain	  unchanged.	  We	  will	  still	  be	  friends	  and	  allies.”93	  Gomułka	  quieted	  Khrushchev’s	  anxieties	  of	  Poland	  deviating	  from	  communism	  and	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact.	  As	  a	  result,	  Khrushchev	  stopped	  the	  mobilization	  of	  troops	  and	  allowed	  the	  removal	  of	  Rokossowski.94	  In	  fact,	  Khrushchev	  gave	  specific	  instructions	  to	  Rokossowski	  to	  command	  Marshal	  Konev	  of	  the	  Northern	  Army	  Group	  to	  stop	  his	  mobilization	  towards	  Warsaw.95	  After	  diplomatically	  dissolving	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland,	  the	  CPSU	  delegation	  returned	  to	  Moscow	  on	  October	  20.	  	  With	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  CPSU	  delegation,	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum	  returned	  to	  their	  sessions.	  Gomułka	  spoke	  as	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  the	  Polish	  United	  Workers’	  Party	  (PZPR).	  Echoing	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  the	  de-­‐Stalinization	  process,	  Gomułka	  denounced	  Stalinism	  and	  the	  effects	  it	  incurred	  on	  Poland’s	  politics	  and	  economy.	  Gomułka	  pushed	  this	  further	  by	  presenting	  the	  “Polish	  road	  to	  socialism.”	  The	  new	  path	  allowed	  the	  PZPR	  to	  separate	  itself	  from	  Stalinism	  and	  redefine	  yet	  maintain	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Gomułka	  wished	  to	  achieve	  a	  more	  equal	  relationship	  between	  Poland	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and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  one	  of	  collaboration	  instead	  of	  oppression.96	  The	  new	  tone	  of	  the	  Polish	  government	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  Eighth	  Plenum.	  The	  plenum	  concluded	  with	  elections	  of	  the	  Politburo.	  The	  results	  for	  the	  members	  elected	  to	  the	  Politburo	  by	  the	  Central	  Committee	  were:	  Cyrankiewicz,	  Gomułka,	  Jedrychowski,	  Loga-­‐Sowinski,	  Morawski,	  Ochab,	  Rapacki,	  Zambrowski,	  and	  Zawadski.	  Rokossowski	  did	  not	  get	  elected.	  The	  new	  members	  of	  the	  Secretariat	  were:	  Albrecht,	  Gierek,	  Gomułka,	  Jarosinski,	  Matwin,	  Ochab,	  and	  Zambrowski.	  Openly	  and	  unanimously,	  Gomułka	  was	  elected	  as	  the	  First	  Secretary.97	  	  Two	  days	  after	  being	  elected,	  on	  October	  22,	  Gomułka	  received	  a	  response	  from	  Khrushchev	  regarding	  his	  request	  to	  remove	  Soviet	  officers	  from	  the	  Polish	  Army.	  Khrushchev	  formally	  wrote,	  “In	  connection	  with	  this,	  the	  Presidium	  of	  the	  CC	  CPSU	  has	  decided	  to	  recall	  all	  Soviet	  advisers	  that	  have	  been	  sent,	  at	  the	  time	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  Polish	  Government,	  to	  assist	  the	  work	  of	  the	  PPR	  organs	  of	  security.”98	  Khrushchev’s	  actions	  demonstrate	  Gomułka’s	  success	  at	  calming	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  nerves	  and	  securing	  the	  relationship	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
	   The	  Poznań	  Revolt	  and	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  were	  the	  first	  problems	  of	  dissent	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  forced	  to	  confront	  after	  his	  speech.	  The	  quick	  response	  of	  the	  Polish	  government	  in	  reaction	  to	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt	  prevented	  Soviet	  intervention.	  Furthermore,	  the	  sharpness	  of	  Gomułka	  as	  a	  leader,	  allowed	  him	  to	  negotiate	  with	  Khrushchev	  to	  achieve	  some	  concessions.	  More	  importantly,	  Gomułka	  understood	  his	  limitations.	  He	  knew	  that	  Poland	  independence	  was	  not	  an	  option,	  thereby	  constraining	  his	  requests	  to	  improving	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Chapter	  3:	  Khrushchev	  Goes	  Back	  on	  His	  Word:	  The	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  of	  1956	  	  	   The	  events	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1956	  help	  to	  track	  the	  path	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	  However,	  it	  is	  also	  essential	  to	  take	  a	  brief	  look	  at	  the	  history	  of	  the	  situation	  within	  Hungary	  prior	  to	  the	  revolt	  to	  further	  understand	  the	  events	  that	  took	  place	  in	  October.	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  always	  have	  the	  best	  relationship.	  In	  fact,	  a	  strong	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitude	  was	  embedded	  in	  the	  history	  of	  their	  relationship.99	  To	  understand	  the	  reactions	  of	  both	  the	  Hungarians	  and	  the	  Soviets	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  comprehend	  that	  tension	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  revolt	  in	  1956.	  	  	   A	  source	  of	  tension	  lay	  in	  the	  appointment	  and	  removal	  of	  Imre	  Nagy	  as	  the	  prime	  minister	  of	  Hungary	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  essentially	  had	  control	  of	  the	  fate	  of	  Hungary’s	  government.	  In	  1953,	  Imre	  Nagy	  was	  selected	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Hungary	  with	  the	  agenda	  to	  implement	  the	  “New	  Course,”	  which	  was	  a	  result	  of	  Stalin’s	  death.100	  While	  Nagy	  was	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  Mátyás	  Rákosi	  was	  the	  General	  Secretary.	  The	  joint	  power	  led	  to:	  “two	   institutionalized	   centers	   of	   power:	   Nagy—heading	   the	   government	  apparatus	  in	  1953-­‐5,	  implemented	  changes	  in	  agriculture	  and	  in	  the	  justice	  system,	   and	   appealed	   to	   the	   nonparty	   attentive	   public	   for	   support,	   and	  Rákosi—in	  charge	  of	   the	  party	  apparatus,	  managed	   to	  undermine	  much	  of	  what	  Nagy	  had	  been	  instructed	  to	  do	  both	  by	  the	  Kremlin	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  party’s	  (then	  unpublished)	  June	  27,	  1953,	  resolution.”101	  	  It	  was	  very	  clear	  that	  Rákosi’s	  loyalty	  lay	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  over	  Hungary.	  Nagy,	  meanwhile,	  placed	  Hungarian	  interests	  over	  those	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	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Rákosi’s	  desire	  to	  be	  Prime	  Minister	  created	  constant	  tension	  between	  Nagy	  and	  Rákosi.	  Rákosi	  constantly	  interfered	  with	  Nagy	  and	  his	  policies.	  102	  	  This	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  made	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  Nagy	  to	  be	  effective.	  Due	  to	  his	  ineffectiveness,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  dismissed	  Nagy	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  turned	  to	  Rákosi	  to	  govern	  Hungary	  in	  November	  1955.103	  	  	   Rákosi’s	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  helped	  his	  rise	  to	  power	  within	  Hungary.	  Even	  though	  Nagy	  was	  not	  removed	  from	  power	  until	  November	  1955,	  Rákosi	  began	  taking	  over	  control	  as	  early	  as	  April	  1955.	  Pressured	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Rákosi	  repealed	  many	  of	  Nagy’s	  progressive	  policies.	  Where	  Nagy	  opened	  opportunities	  for	  expression,	  Rákosi	  closed	  them	  by	  increasing	  censorship,	  limiting	  public	  discussions	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  problems,	  and	  putting	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  rehabilitation	  of	  political	  prisoners.104	  Rákosi	  immediately	  reversed	  the	  few	  reforms	  that	  Nagy	  was	  able	  to	  accomplish.	  Despite	  this	  reversal,	  Nagy	  had	  already	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  this	  world	  and	  there	  was	  no	  turning	  back;	  	  By	   supporting	   and	   then	   dropping	   Nagy,	   the	   Soviet	   leaders	   awakened	  Hungary’s	  intellectual	  elite	  and	  united	  it	  against	  Stalinism,	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  furious	  challenge	  to	  the	  Soviet	  empire.	  By	  stifling	  within	  system	  reform,	  the	  Kremlin	  made	  revolution	  all	  but	   inevitable;	  by	   removing	  Nagy	   from	  power,	  the	   Kremlin	   made	   him	   the	   coming	   revolt’s	   only	   conceivable,	   if	   altogether	  unlikely,	  inadvertent,	  and—sad	  to	  say—ill-­‐equipped	  leader.105	  	  	  While	  Rákosi	  gained	  popularity	  with	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  his	  popularity	  in	  Hungary	  was	  very	  low,	  creating	  unrest	  within	  the	  Hungarian	  population.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  12.	  	  103	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  13.	  	  104	  Granville,	  The	  First	  Domino,	  14.	  	  105	  Gati,	  Failed	  Illusions,	  67.	  
	   41	  
The	  day	  before	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt,	  the	  Petofi	  Circle	  of	  Hungary	  had	  a	  public	  debate.	  This	  debate	  became	  known	  as	  an	  “ideological	  Poznań	  without	  gunshots.”106	  Rákosi	  banned	  the	  Petofi	  Circle,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  suppress	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitude	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  any	  potential	  reactions	  to	  Poznań.107	  The	  Petofi	  Circle	  debate	  caused	  Rákosi	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  all	  anti-­‐party	  views.	  The	  Poznań	  Revolt	  and	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  stirred	  up	  discussions	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  repression	  of	  these	  discussions	  caused	  Hungarians	  hatred	  of	  Rákosi	  to	  deepen.108	  In	  fact,	  this	  animosity	  was	  expressed	  towards	  all	  four	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Communist	  leaders:	  Mátyás	  Rákosi,	  Mihaly	  Farkas,	  Jozsef	  Revai,	  and	  Ernő	  Gerő.109	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  discontent	  among	  the	  Hungarian	  population,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  again	  forced	  to	  replace	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  government	  in	  July.	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  relied	  on	  the	  Soviet	  ambassador	  in	  Budapest,	  Yurii	  Andropov,	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Presidium,	  Anastas	  Mikoyan,	  to	  restore	  unity	  within	  Hungarian	  politics.	  Andropov	  and	  Mikoyan	  advocated	  for	  the	  replacement	  of	  Rákosi.	  Mikoyan	  elected	  Ernő	  Gerő	  as	  the	  successor,	  who	  received	  support	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  Workers	  Party	  (HWP)	  Politburo	  as	  the	  new	  First	  Secretary.110	  However,	  Gerő	  was	  just	  as	  unpopular	  with	  the	  general	  public	  in	  Hungary	  as	  Rákosi,	  displaying	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.111	  The	  appointment	  of	  Gerő	  did	  not	  ease	  any	  tensions	  within	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  a	  desperate	  attempt	  to	  appease	  disgruntled	  Hungarians,	  the	  HWP	  Politburo	  readmitted	  Imre	  Nagy	  into	  the	  party	  on	  October	  13,	  1956.112	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   While	  Andropov	  and	  Mikoyan	  were	  busy	  convincing	  Rákosi	  to	  step	  down,	  Soviet	  officers	  visited	  Hungary	  in	  July	  to	  inspect	  Soviet	  forces	  that	  were	  based	  in	  Hungary.	  During	  this	  time	  the	  Soviet	  officers	  organized	  a	  “Plan	  of	  Operations	  for	  the	  Special	  Corps	  to	  Restore	  Public	  Order	  on	  the	  Territory	  of	  Hungary.”	  The	  plan,	  which	  became	  nicknamed	  “Volna,”	  prepared	  thousands	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  to	  be	  mobilized	  at	  short	  notice	  to	  restore	  order	  in	  Hungary.	  This	  plan	  insinuates	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  anticipated	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  unrest	  in	  Hungary	  could	  explode	  into	  violence	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  want	  to	  separate.	  The	  political	  upheaval	  in	  Hungary,	  paired	  with	  the	  events	  across	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  created	  a	  perfect	  foundation	  for	  a	  revolt.	  While	  the	  violence	  started	  on	  October	  23,	  the	  ideology	  behind	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  began	  with	  students	  on	  October	  16.	  At	  the	  University	  of	  Szeged,	  students	  reinstated	  a	  banned	  organization	  called	  the	  Association	  of	  Hungarian	  University	  Students,	  or	  otherwise	  known	  as	  MEFESZ.113	  This	  independent	  organization	  allowed	  for	  free	  speech	  and	  expression	  of	  ideas	  that	  conflicted	  with	  the	  Soviet	  interests.	  However,	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  censoring	  much	  of	  society,	  making	  MEFESZ	  a	  controversial	  organization.	  The	  empowering	  student	  movement	  spread	  rapidly	  throughout	  the	  country.114	  A	  second	  meeting	  convened	  at	  the	  Budapest	  Technical	  University	  on	  the	  afternoon	  of	  October	  22.	  A	  student	  in	  attendance	  reported	  that	  one	  student	  asked,	  “‘Why	  are	  the	  Russians	  still	  in	  Hungary?’	  This	  question	  caused	  a	  great	  uproar.	  From	  then	  on	  the	  meeting	  was	  revolutionary	  in	  character.	  The	  students	  demanded	  that	  Imre	  Nagy	  come	  and	  speak	  to	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  Revolution:	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  in	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them.”115	  While	  these	  meetings	  were	  only	  discussions,	  they	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  tone	  of	  the	  official	  demonstration.	  At	  the	  meeting	  of	  October	  22,	  Hungarian	  students	  of	  the	  MESFESZ	  prepared	  the	  “Sixteen	  Points,”	  or	  complaints	  and	  demands	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  government.116	  The	  reestablishment	  of	  MESFESZ	  promoted	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  public	  to	  express	  their	  own	  opinions.	  When	  the	  news	  of	  the	  events	  in	  Poland	  infiltrated	  Hungary,	  it	  inspired	  Hungarians	  to	  reassess	  their	  situation	  and	  sparked	  a	  response	  in	  Hungary.	  For	  Hungarians,	  Gomułka	  symbolized	  de-­‐Stalinization,	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  a	  form	  of	  defiance	  and	  independence	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  His	  return	  motivated	  Hungarians	  to	  vocalize	  their	  complaints	  in	  regards	  to	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Stalinism.	  117	  	  Hungarians	  organized	  a	  march	  scheduled	  for	  October	  23,	  to	  express	  their	  support	  of	  Poland.	  On	  the	  days	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  demonstration,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  in	  Belgrade	  meeting	  with	  the	  Yugoslav	  President	  Josep	  Tito.	  Ernő	  Gerő,	  joined	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  András	  Hegedüs	  and	  Minister	  of	  State	  János	  Kádár,	  returned	  to	  Hungary	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  action.	  Upon	  return,	  Gerő	  called	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  HWP	  Political	  Committee	  to	  present	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  negotiations.	  After	  the	  summary,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Political	  Committee	  informed	  the	  leadership	  about	  the	  planned	  student	  demonstration	  for	  that	  afternoon,	  which	  led	  to	  intense	  discussion.	  The	  government	  decided	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to	  ban	  the	  demonstration,	  while	  also	  agreeing	  to	  not	  authorize	  deadly	  force	  to	  be	  used	  in	  the	  instance	  of	  defiance.118	  The	  Hungarian	  government	  announced	  the	  cancelling	  of	  the	  demonstration	  over	  the	  radio.119	  In	  response,	  student	  delegations	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Interior	  with	  hopes	  of	  reversing	  the	  decision.	  The	  students	  also	  decided	  to	  ignore	  the	  ban	  and	  to	  meet	  at	  the	  Petofi	  statue	  at	  3	  PM.120	  A	  giant	  crowd	  convened	  at	  the	  statue,	  consisting	  of	  mostly	  students.	  From	  the	  Petofi	  statue,	  the	  crowd	  marched	  to	  the	  Stalin	  statue,	  where	  they	  tore	  the	  statue	  down.121	  En	  route	  to	  the	  statues	  witnesses	  “saw	  students	  tearing	  up	  the	  Russian	  books.	  At	  the	  ____	  now	  called	  Stalin	  street,	  we	  stopped	  at	  every	  building	  in	  which	  Russians	  lived	  and	  shouted	  slogan,	  ‘out	  with	  you	  Russians.’	  ‘We	  want	  Imre	  Nagy’	  and	  such	  like.”122	  The	  demonstration	  developed	  a	  very	  nationalistic	  tone,	  with	  demonstrators	  only	  carrying	  the	  Hungarian	  flag	  with	  the	  Kossuth	  crest	  or	  removing	  the	  Communist	  crest	  out	  of	  other	  Hungarian	  flags.123	  The	  nationalistic	  tone	  evolved	  into	  anti-­‐Soviet	  expression,	  with	  slogans	  like	  “‘Put	  out	  the	  Hungarian	  flags,’	  Russians	  go	  home,’	  ‘We	  want	  freedom	  and	  independence.’”124	  By	  sunset	  the	  demonstrations	  had	  grown	  with	  workers	  and	  other	  Hungarian	  citizens.	  The	  student-­‐based	  demonstration	  marched	  from	  the	  Kossuth	  statue	  to	  the	  Rokus	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section	  of	  Budapest,	  where	  workers	  joined	  the	  students.125	  From	  here	  the	  students	  and	  workers	  continued	  to	  the	  theater	  in	  Szeged,	  where	  actors	  and	  theater	  attendees	  left	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  show	  to	  enthusiastically	  join	  the	  demonstration,	  further	  increasing	  the	  crowd.126	  At	  the	  theater,	  the	  actor	  playing	  the	  character	  of	  St.	  Joan	  recited	  Petofi’s	  famous	  poem	  about	  Hungarian	  freedom,	  from	  the	  balcony	  of	  the	  theater.	  Invigorated	  by	  the	  poem,	  the	  demonstrators	  gathered	  lit	  torches	  and	  headed	  to	  Kossuth	  Square,	  where	  the	  St.	  Joan	  actor	  performed	  the	  poem	  again.	  The	  demonstrators	  also	  declared	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  MESFESZ.	  Impulsively,	  a	  worker	  displayed	  a	  moment	  of	  passion	  by	  making	  an	  unprepared	  speech	  about	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  workers.127	  The	  demands	  of	  the	  revolution	  derived	  from	  the	  October	  22	  MEFESZ	  meeting.	  The	  main	  basis	  of	  the	  demands	  consisted	  of	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  troops,	  free	  elections,	  and	  replacing	  the	  political	  system.128	  A	  young	  woman	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  revolt	  expressed	  that;	  	  The	   main	   things	   we	   wanted	   from	   the	   government	   were	   first,	   freedom	   of	  speech	  and	  press,	  second,	  the	  Russians	  must	  go	  home,	  third,	  an	  economy	  free	  and	   independent	   and	   otherwise	   complete	   independence	   from	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	   Also,	   we	   wanted	   to	   have	   back	   the	   Hungarian	   uranium	  mines.	   They	  were	  exploited	  and	  worked	  by	  the	  Russians.	  We	  also	  wanted	  the	  majority	  of	  politicians	  to	  be	  purged	  from	  the	  government.129	  	  Another	  young	  student	  demonstrator	  further	  traced	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  demands	  as	  the	  situation	  escalated;	  When	   the	   demonstrations	   started	   our	   original	   demands	  were	   not	   identical	  with	  the	  demands	  which	  were	  late	  read	  over	  the	  radio.	  Our	  original	  demands	  did	  not	  go	   so	   far.	  But	  we	  did	  demand	  a	   change	   in	  our	  government,	  namely	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that	   Imre	   Nagy	   take	   over.	   We	   also	   demanded	   that	   teaching	   of	   Marxism,	  Leninism,	   and	   Russuan[Russian]	   language	   be	   abolished	   in	   all	   schools,	   that	  Hungarian	  flags	  and	  uniforms	  be	  resorted;	  and	  that	  foreign	  trade	  with	  Russia	  be	  conducted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  equality.130	  	  These	  demands	  embodied	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitude	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  public.	  	  Word	  spread	  that	  the	  fighting	  had	  started	  at	  the	  radio	  building,	  causing	  people	  to	  flock	  there	  to	  witness	  the	  scene.	  One	  witness	  recalled;	  	  “We	  arrived	  there	  with	  the	  truck	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  shooting	  started.	  The	  crowd	  got	  bigger	  and	  bigger.	  They	  were	  very	  angry	  and	  called	  for	  arms.	  We	  went,	  with	   the	   truck,	   to	   the	  Killian	  barracks	   to	   fetch	  arms.	  Here,	   at	   the	  barracks,	  the	  soldiers	  were	  looking	  out	  of	  the	  windows.	  We	  wanted	  to	  enter	  and	  couldn’t	  at	  first.	  We	  started	  shouting	  to	  the	  soldiers,	  ‘Come	  out!	  Help	  us!’	  Finally,	  the	  crowd	  broke	  down	  the	  door	  and	  entered	  the	  building.	  The	  officer	  in	  charge	  denied	  that	  he	  had	  any	  arms	  in	  the	  building.	  We	  were	  told	  that	  only	  so-­‐called	  labor	  brigades	  were	  stationed	  there.”131	  	  	  Demonstrators	  frantically	  traveled	  from	  barrack	  to	  barrack	  desperately	  looking	  for	  arms	  and	  ammunition.	  Equipped	  with	  weapons,	  the	  demonstrators	  returned	  to	  the	  city	  to	  continue	  their	  fight.132	  	  The	  demonstrations	  spread	  throughout	  the	  country,	  also	  demanding	  a	  change	  in	  the	  government.133	  	  Tensions	  intensified	  when	  the	  Hungarian	  State	  Security	  (Államvédelmi	  Hatóság,	  AVH)	  forces	  openly	  shot	  at	  the	  rebels	  storming	  the	  main	  radio	  station.	  These	  forces	  acted	  on	  their	  own	  merit,	  without	  the	  commands	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government.	  While	  the	  rebels	  were	  enraged,	  they	  were	  unarmed.	  The	  rebels	  just	  wanted	  to	  broadcast	  their	  demands	  over	  the	  radio.134	  This	  unwarranted	  attack	  further	  impassioned	  the	  revolt.	  Rapidly,	  the	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demonstration	  escalated	  into	  a	  revolt.	  The	  revolt	  evolved	  into	  chaos	  too	  large	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  security	  forces	  to	  manage	  on	  their	  own,	  causing	  more	  panic	  and	  chaos.135	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  minimize	  the	  causalities,	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  issued	  a	  curfew	  at	  4:30	  AM	  on	  October	  24.	  Broadcasted	  over	  the	  radio,	  Hungarian	  citizens	  were	  instructed	  to	  stay	  off	  the	  streets,	  only	  allowed	  between	  the	  hours	  of	  10:00	  AM	  and	  2:00	  PM.	  Later	  that	  day,	  at	  4:24	  PM	  on	  October	  24,	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  instructed	  citizens	  to	  remain	  in	  their	  homes	  between	  the	  hours	  of	  6:00AM	  and	  6:00PM	  of	  the	  following	  day,	  October	  25.	  The	  morning	  of	  October	  25,	  the	  government	  pleaded	  that	  all	  citizens	  return	  to	  work.136	  Budapest	  was	  in	  a	  state	  of	  chaos.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  control	  forced	  the	  Soviets	  to	  take	  action.	  The	  Soviet	  Volna	  plan	  was	  put	  in	  place	  for	  this	  exact	  reason.	  Prepared	  to	  act	  on	  extremely	  short	  notice,	  the	  Soviet	  troops	  mobilized	  on	  the	  night	  of	  October	  23,	  to	  Budapest.	  Soviet	  soldiers	  infiltrated	  Budapest	  in	  the	  early	  hours	  of	  October	  24,	  immediately	  setting	  up	  a	  command	  center	  at	  the	  Hungarian	  National	  Defense	  Ministry.	  Rumors	  swirled	  the	  city	  about	  the	  arrival	  of	  Soviet	  troops.	  One	  demonstrator	  remembered,	  “The	  people	  decided	  that	  they	  would	  hold	  silent	  demonstrations	  by	  lining	  up	  along	  the	  routes	  that	  the	  Russian	  troops	  were	  supposed	  to	  come	  by.”137	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  mobilized	  troops	  based	  in	  other	  satellite	  countries,	  like	  Romania	  and	  the	  Ukraine.138	  Soviet	  forces	  amounted	  to	  31,500	  troops,	  1,130	  tanks	  and	  self-­‐propelled	  artillery,	  380	  armored	  personal	  carriers,	  185	  air	  defense	  guns,	  and	  other	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weapons.139	  The	  force	  behind	  the	  Soviet	  military	  action	  was	  disproportionate	  to	  the	  chaos	  evolving	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  unnecessary	  size	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  exemplified	  their	  panic	  that	  the	  revolt	  created.	  Despite	  the	  shocking	  invasion	  of	  excessive	  Soviet	  forces,	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  had	  called	  upon	  their	  help.140	  The	  arrival	  of	  the	  Soviet	  troops	  changed	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  demonstration	  and	  escalated	  the	  violence.	  Demonstrators	  became	  rebels.	  The	  goal	  evolved	  from	  political	  reform,	  to	  attacking	  Soviet	  troops	  and	  defending	  Budapest.	  Desperate	  to	  force	  the	  Soviets	  out,	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  attacked	  with	  Molotov	  cocktails	  and	  any	  weapons	  they	  could	  find	  or	  devise.	  When	  they	  did	  not	  have	  weapons,	  the	  rebels	  would	  attack	  with	  whatever	  they	  could	  find,	  such	  as	  frying	  pans.141	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  demonstrations	  were	  not	  secluded	  to	  Budapest,	  but	  rather	  infiltrated	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  Hungarians	  expressed	  their	  anger	  through	  demonstrations,	  strikes,	  and	  violence.142	  	  Despite	  the	  immense	  number	  of	  forces	  and	  weapons,	  the	  Soviets	  lacked	  cooperation	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  security	  forces,	  police,	  and	  army.	  Instead,	  the	  Hungarian	  forces	  either	  refused	  to	  offer	  support	  or	  worse,	  helped	  the	  demonstrators.	  The	  lack	  of	  organization	  between	  Hungarian	  and	  Soviet	  forces	  and	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  Soviet	  forces	  only	  intensified	  the	  fighting.	  Only	  twenty-­‐four	  hours	  into	  the	  revolt,	  by	  the	  afternoon	  of	  October	  24,	  the	  casualties	  totaled	  to	  25	  dead	  protestors	  and	  more	  than	  200	  wounded.143	  	  The	  Hungarian	  Working	  People’s	  Party	  (Magyar	  Dolgozók	  Pártja,	  MDP)	  Central	  Leadership	  convened	  on	  October	  25,	  to	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  the	  current	  situation	  in	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leader,	  Ference	  Nezval,	  expressed	  his	  outraged	  at	  the	  government	  urging	  the	  public	  to	  return	  to	  work,	  citing	  that	  it	  further	  fueled	  fighting	  and	  only	  put	  more	  people	  in	  danger,	  “Did	  the	  Political	  Committee	  know	  what	  the	  situation	  was	  like	  this	  morning	  when	  it	  informed	  people	  they	  could	  go	  to	  work?	  Fighting	  began	  after	  that!”144	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  October	  25,	  25,000	  unarmed	  Hungarians	  congregated	  outside	  the	  Parliament	  building	  demanding	  that	  Ernő	  Gerő	  be	  ousted	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  government.	  Panicked	  and	  unsure	  of	  what	  to	  do,	  Hungarian	  Secret	  Police	  (Államvédelmi	  Osztaly,	  AVO)	  forces	  began	  shooting	  at	  these	  enraged	  demonstrators.	  Within	  forty	  to	  forty-­‐five	  minutes,	  the	  AVO	  forces	  had	  killed	  234	  Hungarian	  citizens,	  quickly	  dispersing	  the	  crowd.145	  	  Upon	  Soviet	  instructions,	  Gerő,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government,	  was	  forced	  to	  step	  down	  as	  First	  Secretary	  of	  Hungary.	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  replaced	  Gerő	  with	  János	  Kádár,	  hoping	  to	  appease	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  revolutionaries.	  Kádár	  was	  an	  intelligent	  choice,	  seeing	  as	  he	  was	  neither	  an	  enemy	  of	  the	  revolt	  but	  also	  not	  a	  reformer.146	  Despite	  this	  desperate	  attempt,	  the	  Hungarians	  were	  not	  satisfied.	  Hungarian	  rebels	  across	  the	  country	  continued	  to	  challenge	  the	  local	  authority.147	  	  Kádár,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Nagy,	  worked	  tirelessly	  with	  the	  Central	  Committee	  and	  Political	  Committee	  to	  establish	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  government.	  The	  decisions	  made	  in	  the	  meetings	  of	  October	  26	  and	  October	  27	  exemplified	  the	  continuous	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  Eventually,	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  realized	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  were	  not	  going	  to	  be	  satisfied	  with	  shallow	  reforms.148	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In	  response	  to	  the	  outrage	  and	  demands	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  public,	  Nagy	  was	  elected	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  Hungary.149	  Acting	  quickly,	  Nagy	  proposed	  radical	  reforms	  and	  threatened	  to	  resign	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  if	  he	  did	  not	  receive	  approval	  from	  the	  Hungarian	  leadership.150	  His	  radical	  reforms	  included	  the	  demand	  that	  Soviet	  troops	  withdraw	  from	  Hungary	  on	  October	  28.	  Nagy’s	  government	  also	  implemented	  a	  cease-­‐fire,	  a	  rise	  in	  salaries	  and	  pensions,	  a	  promise	  to	  suspend	  the	  AVO,	  and	  amnesty	  for	  the	  rebels,	  on	  October	  28.151	  Nagy	  and	  Kádár	  both	  tried	  to	  convince	  the	  Soviet	  diplomats,	  Mikoyan	  and	  Suslov,	  of	  the	  desperate	  necessity	  of	  these	  reforms,	  which	  further	  fueled	  the	  anxiety	  of	  the	  Soviet	  leadership.152	  Nagy	  broadcasted	  his	  reforms	  over	  the	  Hungarian	  radio.	  In	  addition	  to	  stating	  the	  reforms,	  Nagy	  declared	  the	  events	  a	  national	  democratic	  movement,	  rather	  than	  a	  counterrevolution.	  The	  reforms	  and	  the	  declaration	  raised	  serious	  concerns	  in	  the	  government	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.153	  While	  the	  reforms	  worried	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  the	  reforms	  ignored	  the	  two	  main	  points	  of	  the	  demonstrators:	  a	  free	  multi-­‐party	  system	  and	  Soviet	  troop	  withdrawal.	  Furthermore,	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  failed	  to	  be	  enforced	  and	  violent	  outbreaks	  between	  Soviet	  troops	  and	  Hungarian	  civilians	  continued	  to	  exist.154	  	  Due	  to	  the	  failed	  cease-­‐fire	  and	  abandonment	  of	  reforms,	  the	  Hungarian	  demonstrators	  formed	  their	  own	  group.	  On	  October	  30,	  the	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Intelligentsia	  was	  founded.	  This	  revolutionary	  organization	  incorporated	  many	  smaller	  organizations	  that	  emerged	  across	  the	  country.	  The	  Revolutionary	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Committee	  accepted	  Nagy’s	  reforms	  from	  October	  28;	  however,	  it	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  failed	  to	  push	  its	  reforms	  far	  enough.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  claimed	  that	  reconciliation	  was	  only	  possible	  by	  acceding	  to	  all	  of	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  demonstrators.155	  The	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  refused	  to	  recognize	  the	  present	  government,	  creating	  a	  giant	  obstacle	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  leadership.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Intelligentsia	  forced	  the	  police	  and	  security	  forces	  of	  Hungary	  to	  discuss	  the	  current	  situation.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels,	  the	  Preparatory	  Committee	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  Committee	  was	  established.156	  The	  formation	  of	  this	  committee	  symbolized	  the	  official	  police	  support	  of	  the	  revolt.	  In	  accordance	  with	  Nagy’s	  reform	  to	  abolish	  the	  Hungarian	  secret	  forces,	  the	  Preparatory	  Committee	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  Committee’s	  goal	  was	  to	  create	  a	  National	  Guard,	  which	  would	  be	  a	  branch	  of	  Hungarian	  security	  forces.157	  This	  new	  rogue	  government	  left	  the	  members	  of	  the	  old	  government	  vulnerable.	  	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  many	  Hungarian	  leaders	  had	  fled	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  such	  as	  Gerő,	  or	  had	  gone	  into	  hiding.158	  In	  hopes	  to	  appease	  the	  Revolutionary	  Committee,	  on	  October	  30,	  Nagy	  and	  Kádár	  returned	  Hungary	  to	  a	  multi-­‐party	  state,	  which	  included	  the	  Smallholders	  Party,	  the	  National	  Peasant	  Party,	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party,	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  Formerly	  banned	  political	  parties	  were	  now	  legal	  and	  welcomed	  in	  the	  political	  realm.	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In	  addition	  to	  the	  multi-­‐party	  system,	  an	  “inner	  cabinet”	  was	  established,	  which	  consisted	  of	  Zoltan	  Tildy,	  Bela	  Kovacs,	  Ferenc	  Erdei,	  János	  Kádár,	  Geza	  Losonczy,	  Ann	  Kethly,	  and	  Imre	  Nagy	  himself.159	  The	  new	  members	  of	  the	  inner	  cabinet	  consisted	  of	  representatives	  from	  the	  newly	  legalized	  political	  parties.	  However,	  these	  representatives	  were	  not	  the	  leaders	  and	  had	  tainted	  their	  reputation	  within	  their	  corresponding	  parties	  by	  associating	  with	  the	  communist	  party	  back	  in	  1945-­‐48.	  This	  new	  inner	  cabinet	  became	  the	  center	  for	  decision-­‐making	  within	  the	  Hungarian	  government.160	  	  Even	  with	  Nagy’s	  dramatic	  reforms	  the	  violence	  continued.	  Slowly,	  on	  October	  30,	  both	  Soviet	  and	  Hungarian	  military	  forces	  began	  their	  withdrawal	  from	  Budapest.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  the	  Hungarian	  secret	  forces,	  was	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  dissolved,	  which	  presented	  Hungary	  with	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  vulnerability.	  Armed	  protestors	  exploited	  the	  lack	  of	  defense	  to	  siege	  of	  the	  HWP	  Budapest	  Committee	  building.	  This	  aggressive	  force	  compelled	  Hungarian	  officials	  to	  call	  upon	  the	  Soviet	  tanks	  and	  troops.	  With	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  inside,	  the	  Soviet	  forces	  fired	  upon	  them,	  forcing	  many	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  to	  surrender.	  Three	  participating	  protestors	  were	  dubbed	  as	  negotiators:	  two	  army	  colonels	  and	  Imre	  Mezo	  (a	  secretary	  of	  the	  party	  committee	  who	  favored	  Nagy).	  The	  three	  negotiators	  were	  seized	  by	  the	  opposing	  forces	  and	  executed,	  enraging	  the	  crowded	  protestors	  to	  overtake	  the	  building	  again.	  However,	  this	  time	  the	  Hungarian	  protestors	  forced	  everyone	  outside	  of	  the	  building	  and	  into	  Koztarsasag	  Square	  where	  they	  proceeded	  to	  hang	  some	  of	  the	  people	  who	  were	  previously	  inside	  the	  building.	  More	  rational	  protestors	  interrupted	  the	  executions,	  but	  not	  until	  the	  death	  toll	  had	  already	  amounted	  to	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23.161	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  revolutionary	  organizations	  tried	  to	  create	  distance	  from	  this	  unorganized,	  mob	  violence,	  in	  hopes	  to	  maintain	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  revolt.162	  Continuing	  with	  the	  dramatic	  tone	  of	  events,	  the	  Hungarian	  Workers	  Party	  was	  disbanded	  and	  replaced	  by	  the	  Hungarian	  Socialist	  Workers’	  Party	  (Magyar	  Szocialista	  Munkáspárt,	  MSzMP).	  Interestingly,	  the	  Soviet	  diplomats,	  Mikoyan	  and	  Suslov,	  were	  in	  support	  of	  this	  reform-­‐oriented	  government.	  However,	  their	  opinion	  did	  not	  match	  with	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  leadership.	  With	  the	  new	  Hungarian	  party,	  previous	  reforms	  were	  revived.	  The	  Revolutionary	  National	  Defense	  Commission	  was	  also	  set	  up	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defense.	  Many	  officers	  of	  defense	  were	  dismissed	  because	  Rákosi	  had	  appointed	  them.	  In	  addition,	  protestors	  were	  allowed	  to	  be	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Guard.	  All	  of	  these	  reforms	  helped	  to	  unify	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  and	  official	  Hungarian	  forces.163	  However,	  it	  did	  not	  stop	  the	  continued	  fighting	  with	  the	  Soviet	  troops.	  Nagy	  hoped	  to	  negotiate	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  with	  the	  Soviet	  leadership.	  The	  Kremlin	  let	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  believe	  that	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  discuss	  this	  option.	  However,	  despite	  popular	  belief,	  the	  Malin	  notes	  revealed	  that	  the	  Soviets	  had	  decided	  to	  invade	  for	  the	  second	  time	  on	  October	  31,	  the	  day	  before	  Nagy	  proclaimed	  neutrality.164	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  Kremlin,	  Nagy	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  informed	  of	  the	  mobilization	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  towards	  Budapest.	  When	  Nagy	  confronted	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  Andropov	  about	  the	  troops,	  Andropov	  lied	  and	  said	  that	  the	  troops	  were	  merely	  to	  act	  as	  protection	  for	  the	  troops	  being	  withdrawn.	  The	  Hungarian	  leadership	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decided	  to	  appeal	  to	  Andropov	  to	  call	  off	  the	  troops.	  While	  Andropov	  continued	  to	  lie,	  Nagy	  decided	  to	  call	  for	  neutrality	  and	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  both	  unprecedented	  acts	  within	  the	  Soviet	  bloc.	  Furthermore,	  Nagy	  appealed	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  for	  support.165	  In	  addition	  to	  intervention,	  the	  Kremlin	  decided	  that	  Imre	  Nagy	  needed	  to	  be	  replaced.	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  discussed	  two	  options:	  János	  Kádár	  and	  Ferenc	  Münnich.	  Both	  of	  these	  candidates	  met	  secretly	  with	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  Andropov,	  and	  then	  were	  secretly	  flown	  to	  Moscow.	  Neither	  told	  any	  of	  their	  colleagues	  where	  they	  were	  going,	  making	  them	  wonder	  about	  their	  mysterious	  disappearance.	  While	  in	  Moscow,	  Kádár	  discussed	  with	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  the	  plan	  to	  implement	  the	  new	  regime.	  He	  argued	  for	  a	  peaceful	  solution.	  However,	  Khrushchev	  was	  adamant	  about	  invading	  Hungary	  and	  worked	  to	  convince	  Kádár	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  invasion.	  Khrushchev	  left	  Kádár	  with	  two	  choices:	  accept	  his	  plan	  and	  retain	  his	  position	  of	  power,	  or	  take	  his	  chances	  with	  the	  Nagy	  government	  and	  Hungarian	  rebels.	  Kádár	  decided	  to	  keep	  his	  position	  of	  power.166	  	  	   The	  Hungarian	  government	  sent	  a	  formal	  request	  to	  Moscow,	  asking	  the	  Soviets	  to	  refrain	  from	  militarily	  intervention	  on	  November	  2.	  While	  waiting	  for	  a	  response,	  the	  cabinet	  continued	  working	  and	  assigning	  tasks	  regarding	  their	  removal	  from	  the	  Warsaw	  Pact,	  their	  appeals	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  Soviet	  troop	  withdrawal.	  As	  the	  government	  continued	  their	  efforts,	  the	  public	  began	  to	  resume	  to	  normal.167	  Unaware	  of	  what	  the	  future	  held,	  the	  Hungarians	  continued	  to	  recuperate	  after	  the	  damage	  from	  the	  revolt.	  Negotiations	  regarding	  Soviet	  troop	  withdrawal	  continued	  in	  Parliament.	  It	  was	  decided	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that	  Soviet	  troops	  who	  were	  mobilized	  after	  October	  23	  would	  be	  ordered	  to	  leave	  Hungary	  by	  December	  31.	  In	  regards	  to	  Soviet	  troops	  stationed	  in	  Hungary	  prior	  to	  the	  revolt,	  the	  discussion	  reached	  a	  stalemate	  and	  decided	  to	  postpone	  this	  decision.168	  	  	   While	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  discussing	  troop	  withdrawal,	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  busy	  moving	  towards	  Budapest.	  As	  of	  November	  3,	  Soviet	  troops	  had	  control	  of	  the	  airfields,	  the	  borders	  of	  large	  cities,	  main	  roads	  and	  the	  Western	  frontier.	  Exploiting	  the	  strategy	  of	  surprise,	  the	  Soviet	  troops	  awoke	  Budapest	  with	  the	  noise	  of	  gunshots	  and	  tanks	  mobilizing	  at	  4:15	  AM.	  Kádár	  added	  to	  the	  shock	  factor	  by	  announcing	  over	  the	  radio	  at	  5:00	  AM	  to	  Hungarians	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolutionary	  Workers’	  and	  Peasants’	  Government	  and	  his	  placement	  as	  the	  new	  first	  secretary.	  Kádár	  claimed	  that	  the	  revolt	  had	  evolved	  into	  a	  fascist	  uprising,	  which	  needed	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  Soviet	  military.169	  	  	  Reacting	  to	  Kádár’s	  announcement,	  Nagy	  made	  a	  speech	  over	  the	  radio	  denying	  that	  he	  invited	  the	  Soviet	  troops.	  Unsure	  of	  how	  to	  read	  the	  events	  unfolding,	  Nagy	  quickly	  lost	  control	  of	  the	  situation.	  Realizing	  his	  dire	  situation,	  Nagy	  decided	  to	  take	  asylum	  in	  the	  Yugoslav	  Embassy.	  As	  his	  first	  point	  of	  order,	  Kádár	  commanded	  the	  Russian	  Committee	  for	  State	  Security	  (KGB)	  to	  arrest	  Nagy	  and	  the	  others	  at	  first	  opportunity.170	  With	  Nagy	  and	  his	  supporters	  taking	  refuge	  in	  the	  Yugoslav	  Embassy,	  Kádár	  and	  his	  government	  took	  official	  control	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  on	  November	  7.171	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Kádár	  had	  a	  daunting	  task	  set	  forth	  for	  him	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  second	  Soviet	  invasion	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  public	  still	  armed	  and	  fighting.172	  First	  and	  foremost,	  Kádár	  needed	  to	  focus	  on	  suppressing	  the	  armed	  forces.	  However,	  Kádár	  did	  not	  have	  strong	  support	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  public.	  In	  order	  to	  defeat	  the	  armed	  insurgents,	  Kádár	  called	  upon	  the	  small	  pro-­‐Kádár	  forces	  in	  the	  Hungarian	  forces,	  the	  Red	  Army,	  and	  the	  KGB.	  After	  two	  days	  of	  brutal	  fighting,	  Soviet	  forces	  were	  able	  to	  disarm	  the	  Hungarian	  National	  Guard	  and	  Hungarian	  Army,	  thereby	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  the	  violent	  uprising.	  Many	  of	  the	  insurgents	  reacted	  by	  either	  hiding	  or	  finding	  refuge	  in	  Western	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States.173	  	  With	  the	  help	  of	  Soviet	  forces,	  Kádár	  was	  successful	  in	  ending	  the	  violence.	  Kádár	  had	  the	  difficult	  burden	  of	  both	  re-­‐establishing	  communist	  authority	  in	  Hungary	  and	  rebuilding	  a	  broken	  economy.	  However,	  many	  members	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  public	  still	  resisted	  the	  Kádár	  government	  through	  nonviolent	  actions	  such	  as	  demonstrations,	  strikes,	  work	  slowdowns,	  and	  sabotage.	  These	  demonstrations	  consumed	  the	  Kádár	  government	  for	  months	  after	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  violence.	  The	  Soviet	  forces	  and	  Kádár	  government	  provided	  a	  unifying	  hate	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  public,	  and	  continued	  their	  motivation	  to	  rebel.174	  	  	  Despite	  Kádár	  taking	  power	  on	  November	  7,	  he	  did	  not	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  act	  independently.	  Rather,	  the	  Kremlin	  kept	  their	  hold	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  through	  the	  three	  Soviet	  members	  who	  they	  sent	  to	  oversee	  the	  government	  transition:	  Georgii	  Malenkov,	  Mikhail	  Suslov,	  and	  Averki	  Aristov.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  KGB,	  Ivan	  Serov,	  and	  the	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Soviet	  Ambassador	  Andropov	  also	  carefully	  watched	  over	  Kádár.	  	  These	  five	  worked	  to	  guide	  Hungary	  through	  their	  first	  stage	  of	  post-­‐Stalin	  “normalization.”	  In	  fact,	  Kádár	  did	  not	  have	  independent	  power	  until	  the	  end	  of	  December	  1956.175	  	  The	  Hungarian	  public	  still	  resisted	  the	  new	  reign	  of	  power,	  in	  which	  they	  created	  the	  Central	  Workers’	  Council	  of	  Greater	  Budapest	  (KMT)	  on	  November	  14.	  Although	  the	  KMT	  potentially	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  the	  Kádár	  regime,	  Kádár	  was	  forced	  to	  negotiate	  because	  he	  needed	  to	  rally	  the	  workers	  in	  order	  to	  revamp	  the	  economy.	  Kádár	  was	  forced	  to	  make	  several	  concessions	  in	  regard	  to	  economic	  reform.	  However,	  he	  drew	  the	  line	  at	  political	  demands	  and	  when	  the	  KMT	  formally	  threatened	  his	  power	  by	  establishing	  a	  National	  Workers’	  Council.	  In	  response,	  Kádár	  used	  force	  to	  prevent	  the	  KMT	  from	  meeting	  and	  arrested	  many	  of	  the	  labor	  organizers.	  Furthermore,	  Kádár	  banned	  the	  Workers’	  Council	  and	  declared	  martial	  law.	  Martial	  law	  allowed	  Kádár	  to	  make	  large-­‐scale	  arrests	  and	  even	  execute	  Hungarian	  citizens,	  once	  again	  creating	  a	  state	  of	  chaos	  in	  Hungary	  and	  fueling	  resentment.176	  	  Another	  unifying	  point	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  public	  was	  Imre	  Nagy.	  The	  Yugoslav	  Embassy	  created	  a	  challenge	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Kádár	  government	  by	  granting	  asylum	  to	  Nagy	  and	  his	  supporters.	  Nagy	  continued	  to	  undermine	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Kádár	  government	  by	  refusing	  to	  recognize	  the	  Kádár	  regime.	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  Josep	  Broz	  Tito,	  the	  President	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  only	  further	  aggravated	  the	  situation	  by	  not	  releasing	  Nagy	  but	  also	  condemning	  the	  Soviet	  invasion	  and	  brutality	  exhibited	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  insurgents.177	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After	  lots	  of	  discussions	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Yugoslavia,	  Kádár’s	  Hungary,	  and	  even	  Romania,	  Nagy	  remained	  an	  obstacle	  for	  the	  new	  Hungarian	  government.	  The	  Soviet	  delegation	  of	  Georgii	  Malenkov,	  Mikhail	  Suslov,	  and	  Averki	  Aristov,	  convinced	  Kádár	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  was	  to	  trick	  Nagy	  out	  of	  the	  Embassy	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  arrest	  him	  and	  force	  him	  to	  recognize	  the	  new	  Hungarian	  government.	  On	  November	  22,	  Nagy	  and	  eight	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  including	  their	  families,	  left	  the	  Yugoslav	  Embassy	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  were	  being	  taken	  to	  their	  homes	  to	  be	  left	  unharmed.	  However,	  once	  on	  board	  of	  the	  bus,	  Soviet	  People’s	  Commissariat	  for	  Internal	  Affairs	  (NKVD)	  forces	  arrested	  the	  group	  and	  brought	  them	  to	  an	  unknown	  location.	  While	  in	  captivity,	  the	  Soviet	  forces	  tried	  to	  force	  Nagy	  to	  make	  a	  statement	  recognizing	  the	  Kádár	  government.	  However,	  Nagy	  refused.	  In	  response	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  success,	  the	  Soviets	  transported	  Nagy	  and	  his	  colleagues	  to	  Romania	  were	  they	  were	  placed	  in	  isolation.178	  Kádár	  faced	  an	  unexpected	  amount	  of	  resistance	  among	  the	  Hungarian	  public.	  While	  he	  tried	  to	  compromise	  and	  negotiate	  with	  the	  resisters,	  he	  was	  compelled	  to	  suppress	  them	  and	  force	  their	  support.	  In	  fact,	  the	  lack	  of	  support	  behind	  Kádár	  led	  him	  to	  accept	  former	  Stalinist	  members	  to	  Kádár’s	  new	  HSWP,	  as	  they	  were	  the	  only	  members	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  society	  willing	  to	  uphold	  Kádár’s	  government.	  With	  time	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  Nagy,	  Kádár	  was	  able	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power.	  179	  	  The	  Soviet	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  left	  the	  world	  stunned.	  After	  the	  incident	  in	  Poznań,	  the	  world	  gained	  confidence	  in	  Khrushchev’s	  claimed	  new	  direction.	  Khrushchev	  offered	  optimism	  for	  the	  “free	  world”	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1956,	  yet	  ended	  the	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year	  by	  reverting	  back	  to	  Stalinistic	  violence.	  The	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  proved	  that	  the	  socialist	  legality	  could	  never	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  communist	  ideology.	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Chapter	  4:	  Can	  Someone	  Please	  Turn	  on	  the	  Lights?	  It’s	  Dark	  in	  Here:	  United	  States	  
Reactions	  to	  the	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  	   In	  the	  wake	  of	  Joseph	  Stalin’s	  death	  in	  1953,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  did	  not	  have	  a	  concrete	  leader.	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  shrewdly	  secured	  his	  position	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  change	  of	  leadership	  opened	  up	  the	  possibility	  for	  renegotiating	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Uncertain	  of	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  Khrushchev	  would	  guide	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism,	  the	  U.S.	  anxiously	  waited	  to	  see	  what	  the	  future	  would	  bring.	  	  	  On	  February	  25,	  1956,	  Nikita	  Khrushchev	  informed	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  direction	  he	  wanted	  to	  take	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  mid	  March	  that	  the	  U.S.	  even	  heard	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  As	  of	  March	  30,	  the	  United	  States	  still	  did	  not	  have	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech,	  only	  the	  information	  that	  United	  States	  Ambassador	  Charles	  E.	  Bohlen	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  relaying	  to	  them.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Soviet	  press	  was	  releasing	  minimal	  information	  about	  the	  speech,	  making	  it	  hard	  to	  gleam	  much	  about	  the	  Secret	  Speech	  from	  the	  Soviet	  press,	  this	  forced	  the	  U.S.	  to	  look	  to	  other	  sources,	  such	  as	  Israeli	  Intelligence.	  The	  intelligence	  was	  coming	  from	  reports	  about	  the	  speech	  and	  not	  the	  actual	  text,	  which	  handicapped	  the	  United	  States’	  interpretations.180	  It	  was	  not	  until	  May	  1956	  that	  the	  United	  States	  obtained	  a	  copy	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.181	  	  	   As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  attempting	  to	  craft	  a	  policy	  about	  something	  that	  they	  did	  not	  even	  fully	  understand	  because	  they	  lacked	  primary	  information.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  in	  the	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dark	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  forcing	  them	  to	  desperately	  grapple	  to	  obtain	  more	  information	  regarding	  what	  was	  said	  in	  the	  speech	  by	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  world’s	  second	  superpower.	  Due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  information,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unable	  to	  formulate	  an	  accurate	  policy	  and	  to	  fully	  comprehend	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  lack	  of	  information	  disabled	  the	  U.S.	  from	  creating	  a	  precise	  opinion	  about	  Khrushchev	  and	  his	  new	  vision	  for	  communism.	  Even	  worse,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  did	  obtain	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  interpret	  it	  because	  of	  the	  their	  traditional	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism.	  	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  change	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  a	  report	  was	  produced	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  about	  the	  “Exploitation	  of	  Soviet	  and	  European	  Satellite	  Vulnerabilities,”	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  policies	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Eastern	  European	  Bloc	  as	  of	  January	  31,	  1955.	  The	  council	  conveyed	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policies	  was	  to	  further	  U.S.	  security	  interests.	  In	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  communist	  bloc,	  the	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  prevent	  further	  communist	  aggression	  or	  expansion	  and	  to	  prevent	  another	  total	  war.	  In	  addition	  to	  creating	  these	  preventative	  policies,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  announced	  that	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  included	  providing	  alternative	  options	  to	  communism	  and	  making	  these	  options	  more	  attractive.	  Lastly,	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  included	  exploiting	  the	  tensions	  and	  discontent	  regarding,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  intense	  police	  state,	  low	  standards	  of	  living,	  and	  interference	  with	  religion.182	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  “National	  Security	  Council	  Report:	  Exploitation	  of	  Soviet	  and	  European	  Satellite	  Vulnerabilities,	  Washington,	  January	  31,	  1955,”	  in	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Soviet	  Union;	  Eastern	  
Mediterranean,	  volume	  XXIV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1990),	  20.	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Before	  any	  of	  the	  dramatic	  events	  took	  place,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles183	  and	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower	  had	  a	  conference	  where	  they	  discussed	  the	  progress	  of	  their	  foreign	  policy	  since	  1953.	  Eisenhower	  wrote	  that	  the	  U.S.’s	  policy	  was	  to	  promote	  peace	  through	  disarmament.	  Contrastingly,	  Eisenhower	  also	  commented	  that,	  “in	  the	  meantime,	  and	  pending	  some	  advance	  in	  this	  direction,	  we	  must	  stay	  strong,	  particularly	  in	  that	  type	  of	  power	  that	  the	  Russians	  are	  compelled	  to	  respect—namely,	  destructive	  power	  that	  can	  be	  carried	  suddenly	  and	  en	  masse	  directly	  against	  the	  Russian	  economic	  structure.”184	  While	  Eisenhower	  does	  not	  clarify	  what	  this	  “destructive	  power”	  was,	  it	  can	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  he	  was	  referring	  to	  nuclear	  power.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  publicly	  promoting	  disarmament,	  but	  clearly	  wanted	  to	  continue	  its	  nuclear	  race	  to	  maintain	  its	  role	  as	  a	  nuclear	  threat	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Eisenhower	  wanted	  the	  security	  of	  being	  the	  stronger	  nuclear	  force	  if	  the	  Cold	  War	  ever	  changed	  to	  an	  actual	  war.	  	  Despite	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  nuclear	  preparation,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1956,	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  very	  passive	  and	  non-­‐invasive.	  The	  U.S.	  feared	  any	  active	  involvement	  could	  likely	  lead	  to	  a	  large-­‐scale	  war,	  which	  they	  wanted	  to	  avoid.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  see	  any	  promising	  change	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  control	  of	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  U.S.	  did	  not	  want	  to	  exert	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  time	  and	  energy	  on	  a	  perceived	  uphill	  struggle,	  yet	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  was	  the	  grandson	  of	  John	  Watson	  Foster,	  who	  was	  the	  Secretary	  of	  state	  under	  President	  Benjamin	  Harrison.	  John	  graduated	  from	  Princeton	  University	  and	  then	  earned	  his	  law	  degree	  from	  George	  Washington	  University.	  He	  then	  became	  a	  lawyer	  in	  New	  York,	  specializing	  in	  international	  law.	  In	  1918,	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  appointed	  him	  as	  the	  legal	  counsel	  for	  the	  U.S.	  delegation	  to	  the	  Versailles	  Peace	  Conference.	  After	  his	  role	  in	  that	  delegation,	  John	  became	  a	  member	  of	  the	  War	  Reparations	  Committee.	  In	  the	  years	  1946,	  1947,	  and	  1950,	  John	  was	  the	  U.S.	  delegate	  at	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.	  He	  was	  responsible	  for	  helping	  build	  up	  the	  North	  American	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO),	  as	  a	  defense	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  John	  was	  also	  responsible	  for	  the	  construct	  of	  the	  Southeast	  Asia	  Treaty	  Organization	  (SEATO)	  in	  1954.	  John	  was	  appointed	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  under	  President	  Eisenhower.	  For	  more	  see:	  “John	  Foster	  Dulles,”	  Spartacus	  Educational,	  last	  modified	  June	  2013,	  http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAdulles.htm?menu=ColdWar.	  	  184	  Dwight	  David	  Eisenhower,	  “Diary,	  Secret,	  January	  10,	  1956,”	  in	  The	  Papers	  of	  Dwight	  David	  Eisenhower:	  
The	  Presidency:	  The	  Middle	  Way,	  volume	  XVI,	  (Baltimore:	  The	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  1947.	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closely	  monitored	  the	  situation	  and	  constantly	  reconvened	  and	  reassessed	  the	  status	  quo.	  As	  of	  January	  1955,	  the	  outlook	  was	  not	  positive.	  Therefore,	  their	  reoccurring	  strategies	  were	  mostly	  psychological.	  This	  is	  the	  point	  where	  the	  U.S.	  approached	  the	  dramatic	  year	  of	  1956.	  	   A	  month	  and	  a	  half	  before	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  on	  January	  11,	  1956,	  the	  Division	  of	  Research	  for	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  Intelligence	  Research	  prepared	  a	  paper	  analyzing	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  paper	  acknowledged	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  the	  new	  leader	  and	  that	  he	  had	  secured	  a	  very	  strong	  power	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Party	  officials.	  While	  the	  United	  States	  clearly	  understood	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  the	  singular	  leader	  of	  the	  party,	  they	  did	  not	  anticipate	  him	  to	  be	  another	  Joseph	  Stalin.	  The	  United	  States	  relied	  on	  the	  ideology	  of	  communism	  and	  “collective	  leadership”	  to	  keep	  Khrushchev	  in	  check.	  The	  division	  believed:	  	  The	   rise	   of	   Khrushchevism	   influence	   does	   not	   mean,	   however,	   that	  ‘collective	   leadership’	   has	   lost	   all	   significance.	   ‘Collective	   leadership’	   never	  involved,	  and	  of	  course	  does	  not	  now	  involve,	  the	  equal	  sharing	  of	  power	  at	  the	  top	  level.	  Appreciation	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  superior	  position	  should	  not	  lead,	  therefore,	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   he	   has	   secured,	   or	   is	   about	   to	   secure,	   a	  Stalin-­‐type	  prominence.185	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  misunderstood	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  USSR	  was	  in	  a	  vulnerable	  situation	  post-­‐Stalin,	  which	  allowed	  for	  Khrushchev	  to	  gain	  so	  much	  power	  and	  rule	  as	  an	  individual.	  Stalin	  had	  eliminated	  the	  collective	  leadership	  aspect	  of	  communist	  ideology,	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  Khrushchev	  to	  keep	  strong	  individual	  power.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  did	  not	  necessarily	  comprehend	  this	  and	  wanted	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  “collective	  leadership”	  would	  prevail.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	  “Paper	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Division	  of	  Research	  for	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Office	  of	  Intelligence	  Research,	  Washington,	  January	  11,	  1956,”	  in	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Soviet	  Union;	  Eastern	  
Mediterranean,	  volume	  XXIV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1990),	  38.	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   An	  announcement	  of	  the	  Soviet	  press	  informed	  the	  United	  States	  of	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  Twentieth	  Party	  Congress.	  That	  being	  said,	  as	  of	  February	  8,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  anticipating	  Khrushchev’s	  denouncement	  of	  Stalin.	  In	  fact,	  all	  the	  United	  States	  predicted	  was	  the	  announcement	  of	  Khrushchev	  as	  the	  party	  leader.	  They	  were	  not	  expecting	  any	  surprises.186	  Based	  on	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  climate	  in	  January,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  blindsided	  by	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  The	  shock	  of	  the	  speech	  positioned	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  state	  of	  catch	  up.	  The	  U.S.	  frantically	  tried	  to	  construct	  a	  policy	  in	  reaction	  to	  their	  new	  knowledge	  of	  the	  speech,	  unsure	  of	  how	  to	  adjust	  their	  policy	  to	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  situation	  Unaware	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  to	  the	  Twentieth	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  maintained	  their	  foreign	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  reassess	  the	  situation	  and	  reevaluate	  their	  policy	  completely	  unaware	  of	  the	  developing	  events.	  In	  a	  progress	  report	  submitted	  by	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  in	  Washington	  on	  February	  29,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  believed	  that	  the	  psychological	  warfare	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  was	  bolstering	  the	  passive	  resistance	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  Eastern	  bloc.187	  The	  progress	  report	  described:	  	  It	   is	   believed	   that	   the	   strategic	   controls	   on	   East-­‐West	   trade	   have	   had	   an	  effect	   in	   limiting	   the	   satellite	   contribution	   to	   the	   Soviet	   bloc	   economy	   and	  war	   potential.	   These	   controls	   are	   regarded	   as	   a	   factor	   in	   retarding	  technological	  advance	  in	  the	  industry	  of	  the	  satellite	  areas	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  industry	   for	   the	   most	   part	   has	   been	   obliged	   to	   rely	   on	   equipment	   and	  processes	   which	   are	   becoming	   antiquated.	   The	   new	   communist	   domestic	  propaganda	   line	   stressing	   the	   need	   to	   learn	   technological	   know-­‐how	   from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  “Policy	  Information	  Statement	  for	  the	  United	  States	  Information	  Agency:	  20th	  Congress	  of	  the	  CPSU,	  Washington,	  February	  8,	  1956,”	  in	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Soviet	  Union;	  Eastern	  
Mediterranean,	  volume	  XXIV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1990),	  57.	  187	  “Progress	  Report	  Submitted	  by	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  Council,	  Washington,	  February	  29,	  1956,”	  in	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Eastern	  Europe,	  volume	  XXV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1990),	  122.	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the	   West	   bears	   witness	   to	   the	   unsatisfactory	   condition	   of	   satellite	  technology.188	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  thus	  exploiting	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  Soviet	  economic	  control	  of	  the	  satellite	  countries.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  played	  up	  the	  technological	  disadvantages	  within	  the	  satellite	  countries	  and	  blamed	  them	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism.	  Additionally,	  The	  U.S.	  was	  encouraging	  the	  resistance	  as	  well	  as	  trying	  to	  tarnish	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  instigate	  anti-­‐Soviet	  feelings	  within	  Eastern	  Europe	  through	  ways	  such	  as	  radio	  broadcasts.	  If	  the	  United	  States	  could	  find	  individuals	  unhappy	  under	  the	  Soviet	  yolk,	  they	  could	  try	  to	  prove	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Soviet	  ideology.	  The	  Western	  world	  was	  not	  even	  aware	  of	  the	  speech	  until	  a	  week	  or	  so	  later.	  On	  March	  6,	  1956,	  an	  Intelligence	  Report	  was	  prepared	  by	  the	  Division	  of	  Research	  for	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  within	  the	  Office	  of	  Intelligence	  Research	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Twentieth	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  (CPSU).	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  finally	  caught	  wind	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  denunciation	  of	  Stalin.	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  to	  mean	  that:	  	  The	  Congress	  has	  now	  marked	  a	  further	  distinctive	  step	  as	  the	  rulers	  took	  to	  open	  attack.	  Their	  criticism	  centered	  chiefly	  on	  the	  ill-­‐effects	  of	  one-­‐man	  rule,	  with	  its	  glorification	  of	  an	  all-­‐wise	   leader.	  Beyond	  this,	  however,	  while	  they	  neither	   completely	   buried	   Stalin	   nor	   brought	   into	   question	   his	   basic	   state	  policies,	   they	   ranged	   critically	   over	   many	   fields,	   including	   economic	  development,	  ideology,	  law	  and	  foreign	  affairs.189	  	  	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  interpreted	  this	  as	  a	  continued	  innovation	  of	  the	  20th	  CPSU,	  by	  diminishing	  Stalin	  and	  refocusing	  on	  Lenin.	  While	  the	  20th	  CPSU	  had	  been	  slowly	  working	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  “Progress	  Report,	  February	  29,	  1956,”	  in	  FRUS,	  1955-­‐1957,	  volume	  XXV,	  122.	  	  189	  “Intelligence	  Report	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Division	  of	  Research	  for	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  Office	  of	  Intelligence	  Research:	  The	  Twentieth	  Congress	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Washington,	  March	  6,	  1956,”	  in	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Soviet	  Union;	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  Mediterranean,	  volume	  XXIV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  1990),	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to	  reduce	  the	  legacy	  of	  Stalin,	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  went	  a	  step	  further,	  with	  an	  open	  attack	  on	  Stalin’s	  reign.	  Despite	  Khrushchev’s	  denigration	  of	  Stalin,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  Khrushchev	  had	  failed	  to	  completely	  bury	  the	  legacy	  of	  Stalin.	  This	  could	  either	  be	  attributed	  to	  U.S.	  paranoia	  regarding	  Stalin	  and	  communism	  or	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  looking	  to	  the	  Stalinistic	  leaders	  that	  remained	  in	  power	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  	  The	  report	  also	  presented	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Soviet	  policy	  towards	  the	  U.S.	  at	  this	  point.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  understood	  that	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  Soviets	  was	  preventability	  and	  peaceful	  coexistence	  rather	  than	  nuclear	  war.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  communism	  would	  inevitably	  be	  victorious	  over	  capitalism.190	  Both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  wanted	  to	  avoid	  war,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  both	  believed	  that	  their	  respective	  ideology	  would	  win.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  March	  10,	  1956,	  that	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  Charles	  E.	  Bohlen	  first	  heard	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  About	  a	  week	  later,	  March	  16,	  Bohlen	  sent	  a	  telegram	  from	  Moscow	  reporting	  that	  Josip	  Broz	  Tito,	  the	  president	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  had	  possession	  of	  a	  detailed	  summary	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.191	  It	  took	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  two	  weeks	  to	  hear	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  U.S.	  still	  had	  yet	  to	  obtain	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech,	  incredibly	  limiting	  their	  analysis	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  thus	  blindly	  creating	  foreign	  policy	  regarding	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Although	  the	  U.S.	  heard	  about	  the	  speech,	  they	  were	  still	  in	  the	  dark	  about	  specifics,	  and	  how	  they	  fit	  into	  the	  picture.	  192	  	  They	  were	  constantly	  behind	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  because	  of	  their	  lack	  of	  intelligence	  regarding	  the	  speech.	  Their	  intelligence	  was	  drastically	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  “Intelligence	  Report,	  March	  6,	  1956,”	  in	  FRUS,	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  XXIV,	  64.	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  John	  P.	  Glennon,	  “Editorial	  Note,”	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  Foreign	  Relations	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delayed	  and	  as	  a	  result	  their	  policy	  was	  misinformed	  and	  late.	  All	  of	  their	  policy	  was	  reactive	  and	  shallow	  because	  they	  did	  not	  have	  all	  of	  the	  information.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  trying	  to	  form	  a	  policy	  regarding	  an	  event	  that	  they	  did	  not	  know	  about	  fully.	  	  A	  week	  later,	  on	  March	  22,	  the	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  Council	  held	  their	  280th	  Meeting,	  in	  which	  they	  focused	  on	  Khrushchev’s	  recent	  speech.	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  grappled	  with	  the	  attack	  on	  Stalin	  and	  what	  it	  meant	  for	  U.S.	  security.	  One	  member	  called	  Joseph	  Stalin	  the	  “‘Trojan	  corpse,’	  which	  was	  to	  be	  introduced	  inside	  the	  defenses	  of	  the	  free	  world.”193	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  United	  States	  feared	  that	  the	  legacy	  of	  Stalin	  could	  stealthily	  infiltrate	  the	  free	  world	  and	  break	  down	  its	  defenses,	  like	  the	  Trojan	  horse	  of	  Troy.	  Interestingly,	  the	  U.S.	  feared	  the	  memory	  of	  Stalin,	  but	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev	  were	  both	  trying	  to	  diminish	  his	  legacy.	  The	  U.S.	  preoccupation	  with	  Stalin’s	  legacy,	  despite	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  reflects	  their	  paranoia	  of	  communism	  spreading	  into	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  greater	  “free	  world.”	  This	  speaks	  to	  the	  failure	  of	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  to	  fully	  understand	  the	  developments	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  fixation	  on	  Stalin,	  despite	  Khrushchev’s	  denunciation,	  raises	  questions	  regarding	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community.	  An	  obsessive	  fear	  of	  communism	  consumed	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  and	  debilitated	  them	  from	  properly	  analyzing	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  without	  intense	  bias	  and	  thereby	  hindering	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  Soviet	  communist	  ideology.	  	  	   Despite	  not	  fully	  understanding	  Khrushchev’s	  denouncement	  of	  Stalin,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  clearly	  understood	  his	  rationale	  for	  excluding	  foreign	  delegates	  from	  attending	  the	  February	  25th	  session.	  Khrushchev	  wanted	  time	  before	  the	  speech	  would	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inevitably	  leak.	  Allen	  Dulles194,	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA),	  understood	  the	  speech	  as	  Khrushchev’s	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  Stalin’s	  lingering	  legacy	  and	  further	  asserting	  his	  own	  power.	  	  However,	  Director	  Dulles	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  CIA	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  explained	  exactly	  why	  Khrushchev	  decided	  to	  unquestionably	  attack	  Stalin.	  The	  CIA	  not	  only	  questioned	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  attack,	  but	  also	  its	  timing.	  Speculations	  ranged	  from	  the	  trend	  of	  self-­‐criticism	  within	  communism,	  the	  hope	  to	  gain	  respectability	  among	  Western	  power,	  Khrushchev’s	  personality,	  or	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  drunk.195	  The	  wide	  range	  of	  proposed	  reasons	  for	  the	  speech	  exemplifies	  the	  confusion	  the	  speech	  presented	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  They	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  interpret	  this	  condemnation	  of	  Stalin.	  The	  U.S.	  did	  conclude	  that	  Khrushchev	  most	  likely	  had	  ulterior	  political	  motives,	  although	  they	  could	  not	  necessarily	  decipher	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  raised	  more	  questions	  and	  confusion	  all	  over	  the	  world	  and	  not	  just	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  satellites.	  The	  U.S.	  in	  particular	  was	  extremely	  confused	  because	  they	  did	  not	  know	  whether	  to	  trust	  Khrushchev,	  despite	  the	  initial	  temptation	  to	  believe	  him.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Allen	  Dulles	  was	  the	  grandson	  of	  John	  Watson	  Foster,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  under	  President	  Benjamin	  Harrison.	  His	  brother	  was	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  under	  President	  Eisenhower.	  Allen	  Dulles	  graduated	  from	  Princeton	  University	  where	  he	  immediately	  went	  into	  diplomatic	  service	  abroad	  in	  Europe.	  In	  1922,	  he	  was	  appointed	  as	  chief	  of	  Division	  of	  Near	  Eastern	  Affairs.	  After	  that	  he	  received	  his	  law	  degree	  from	  George	  Washington	  University	  where	  he	  worked	  at	  a	  law	  firm	  with	  his	  brother	  John.	  In	  1927	  Allen	  became	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations	  and	  became	  the	  secretary	  of	  the	  Council	  in	  1933.	  Allen	  further	  served	  as	  an	  adviser	  to	  the	  delegation	  on	  arms	  limitation	  at	  the	  League	  of	  Nations.	  With	  President	  Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt’s	  creation	  of	  the	  American	  Intelligence	  System	  known	  as	  the	  Office	  of	  Strategic	  Services	  (OSS),	  Allen	  was	  placed	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Office,	  which	  then	  led	  to	  his	  transfer	  to	  Berne	  where	  he	  became	  the	  Swiss	  Director	  of	  OSS.	  When	  President	  Harry	  Truman	  dissolve	  the	  OSS	  and	  then	  created	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  (CIA)	  in	  1947,	  Allen	  joined	  the	  agency	  and	  became	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  the	  organization,	  which	  then	  led	  to	  his	  appointment	  as	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  CIA	  under	  President	  Dwight	  Eisenhower.	  For	  more	  see:	  “Allen	  Dulles,”	  Spartacus	  Educational,	  last	  modified	  June	  2013,	  http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAdullesA.htm?menu=ColdWar.	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   Despite	  the	  confusion	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  motives,	  Director	  Dulles	  and	  the	  CIA	  recognized	  the	  obvious	  potential	  problems	  that	  Khrushchev	  created	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  council	  questioned	  which	  policies	  under	  Stalin	  would	  be	  retained	  or	  changed	  as	  well	  as	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  since	  many	  of	  the	  leaders	  were	  Stalinists.	  Director	  Dulles	  understood	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  trying	  to	  make	  a	  break	  from	  the	  past,	  but	  failed	  to	  fully	  map	  out	  a	  plan	  for	  the	  future,	  creating	  an	  opportunity	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  exploit.	  Despite	  the	  constant	  fixation	  on	  Stalin’s	  legacy,	  Director	  Dulles	  was	  able	  to	  stay	  focused	  and	  interpret	  the	  little	  intelligence	  he	  had	  to	  the	  best	  of	  his	  ability.	  	  The	  meeting	  concluded	  with	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles	  conveying	  that	  they	  thought	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  the	  shockwaves	  it	  would	  create	  would	  be	  beneficial	  to	  the	  United	  States.196	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  repercussions	  from	  the	  speech	  could	  lead	  to	  cracks	  within	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  More	  importantly,	  these	  cracks	  could	  lead	  to	  liberation	  of	  the	  satellite	  countries,	  the	  eventual	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policy.	  	  	   Reacting	  to	  the	  recent	  speech,	  Eisenhower	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  Winston	  Churchill,	  on	  March	  29,	  discussing	  the	  recent	  Soviet	  developments.	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  his	  confusion	  of	  the	  new	  “sweet	  kind”	  nature	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  exhibited	  at	  the	  Geneva	  conference	  and	  now	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  He	  wrote	  with	  suspicion,	  “It	  is	  amazing	  that	  so	  many	  people	  continue	  to	  believe,	  wholly	  or	  in	  part,	  the	  propaganda	  with	  which	  the	  Soviets	  cover	  the	  world.	  It	  seems	  to	  make	  no	  difference	  in	  many	  regions	  how	  often	  the	  Soviets	  reverse	  themselves	  or	  how	  often	  they	  are	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guilt	  of	  self-­‐contradiction.”197	  Eisenhower	  recognized	  the	  contradicting	  nature	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism	  and	  attributed	  it	  to	  propaganda	  efforts	  conflicting	  with	  desires.	  He	  realized	  that	  by	  denouncing	  Stalin,	  Khrushchev	  was	  positioning	  himself	  in	  unchartered	  territory.	  The	  usual	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev	  was	  exemplified	  through	  Eisenhower’s	  letter	  to	  Churchill.	  	  	   The	  following	  day,	  Eisenhower	  wrote	  a	  diary	  entry	  reflecting	  on	  a	  conversation	  regarding	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  guided	  missile	  field	  and	  the	  United	  States’	  nuclear	  power.	  He	  reflected;	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	   if	  our	  calculations	  are	  anywhere	  near	  correct,	   there	   is	  no	  question	  that	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  hours	  we	  could	  inflict	  very	  great,	  even	  decisive,	  damage	  upon	  the	  productive	  power	  of	  the	  Soviet	  union	  and	  its	  satellites.	  The	  guided	  missile	  is	  therefore	  merely	  another,	  or	  auxiliary,	  method	  of	  delivering	  over	  the	  Soviet	  union	  the	  kind	  of	  destructive	  force	  that	  is	  represented	  in	  the	  hydrogen	  bomb.	  Until	  we	  found	  the	  way	  to	  make	  a	  bomb	  of	  megaton	  size	  and	  put	   it	   in	  a	  small	  package,	  capable	  of	  being	  transported	  by	  ballistic	  methods,	  the	  ballistic	  missile	  was	  not	  even	  a	  serious	  threat.	  I	  further	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  ballistic	  missile	  and	  its	  early	  production	  will	  have	  greater	  effect	  on	  world	  psychological	   reaction	  because	  people	   see	   it	   as	   the	   “ultimate”	  weapon,	   and	  have	  a	  picture	  of	  guided	  missiles	  raining	  out	  of	  the	  skies	  in	  almost	  uncounted	  numbers,	  it	  is	  extremely	  important	  that	  the	  Soviets	  do	  not	  get	  ahead	  of	  us	  in	  the	  general	  development	  of	  these	  weapons.198	  	  	  The	  intense	  planning	  of	  the	  nuclear	  weapons	  demonstrated	  the	  U.S.’s	  fear	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  a	  world	  superpower.	  The	  U.S.	  took	  comfort	  knowing	  that	  they	  could	  destroy	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  minutes	  with	  their	  nuclear	  weapons.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  felt	  secure	  that	  their	  nuclear	  power	  was	  stronger	  than	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  was	  and	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Eisenhower	  wanted	  to	  make	  sure	  it	  stayed	  that	  way.	  Eisenhower’s	  diary	  entry	  echoes	  his	  conference	  with	  Secretary	  Dulles	  about	  the	  security	  	  of	  having	  a	  strong	  nuclear	  force.	  	  The	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  continued	  to	  monitor	  “The	  Desecration	  of	  Stalin.”	  As	  of	  March	  30,	  the	  U.S.	  perceived	  the	  public	  criticism	  of	  Stalin	  by	  Khrushchev	  as	  an	  event	  that	  sent	  psychological	  shock	  waves	  throughout	  the	  world,	  but	  the	  final	  outcome	  could	  not	  yet	  be	  predicted.	  The	  U.S.	  could	  not	  fully	  calculate	  the	  implications	  because	  they	  did	  not	  know	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Khrushchev	  denounced	  Stalin.	  In	  fact,	  all	  of	  their	  information	  was	  alleged	  information	  regarding	  the	  speech.	  The	  CIA	  extrapolated	  that	  the	  speech	  caused	  confusion,	  anger,	  and	  disbelief	  throughout	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  satellite	  countries.199	  	  The	  United	  States	  realized	  that	  Khrushchev	  must	  have	  fielded	  a	  risk	  analysis	  before	  making	  this	  speech	  and	  came	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  reap	  more	  benefits	  than	  harm	  through	  this	  speech.	  Khrushchev	  must	  have	  believed	  that	  breaking	  away	  from	  Stalin	  would	  portray	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  a	  more	  favorable	  light	  when	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  which	  seemed	  better	  than	  the	  confusion	  that	  would	  inevitably	  arise.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  Khrushchev	  might	  have	  hoped	  that	  by	  diminishing	  Stalin’s	  legacy	  that	  it	  would	  help	  to	  further	  secure	  his	  power.	  	  	  The	  essential	  risk	  Khrushchev	  took	  by	  attacking	  Stalin	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  psychological	  repercussions.	  Stalinists	  existed	  within	  the	  CPSU	  and	  important	  leadership	  roles	  in	  the	  satellite	  governments.	  Furthermore,	  the	  rest	  of	  these	  members	  and	  citizens	  had	  been	  trained	  to	  listen	  and	  worship	  Stalin	  and	  his	  beliefs.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  denouncement	  of	  Stalin	  angered	  the	  Stalinists	  and	  confused	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  society.	  The	  United	  States	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understood	  this	  implication	  and	  recognized	  that	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  would	  be	  required	  to	  explicitly	  guide	  communism	  towards	  their	  new	  desired	  path.200	  Within	  all	  the	  fear	  and	  paranoia,	  some	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  were	  able	  to	  think	  lucidly	  about	  the	  implications	  that	  Khrushchev	  created	  for	  himself.	  	  	   While	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  have	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech	  yet,	  they	  did	  know	  that	  the	  CPSU	  had	  started	  removing	  some	  of	  the	  public	  symbols	  of	  Stalin,	  such	  as	  statues	  and	  pictures,	  to	  help	  guide	  the	  communists.	  Additionally,	  the	  national	  anthem	  was	  no	  longer	  played	  on	  the	  radio	  because	  of	  the	  segment	  that	  portrays	  Stalin	  in	  a	  favorable	  light.	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  took	  further	  measures	  to	  diminish	  the	  presence	  of	  Stalin	  to	  help	  move	  away	  from	  his	  ideologies	  and	  his	  memory.	  But	  moving	  away	  from	  Stalin	  was	  only	  half	  of	  the	  challenge	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  aftermath	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  something	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  services	  recognized.201	  The	  U.S.	  anxiously	  waited	  to	  see	  where	  Khrushchev	  would	  lead	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  communist	  world,	  leaving	  the	  U.S.	  always	  on	  the	  defensive,	  blatantly	  not	  in	  control	  of	  the	  situation	  because	  they	  were	  reacting	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	   The	  United	  States	  interpreted	  the	  speech	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  new	  climate	  revolving	  around	  this	  new	  leadership.	  After	  Stalin’s	  death	  in	  1953,	  the	  new	  leaders	  wanted	  to	  change	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  Soviet	  society.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Stalin’s	  strict	  regime,	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  the	  new	  leaders:	  Have	  brought	   about	   a	   general	   relaxation	   in	   the	   atmosphere	  of	   tension	   that	  clouded	   Stalin’s	   last	   years.	   They	   have	   shown	   an	   awareness	   of	   the	   need	   of	  Soviet	   elite	   groups	   for	   a	   feeling	   of	   greater	   personal	   security:	   to	   be	   able	   to	  carry	  out	  their	  work	  without	  the	  threat	  of	  police	  terror.	  They	  have	  succeeded	  in	   ending	   one-­‐man	   control	   of	   the	   police	   and	   thus	   reducing	   the	   threat	   of	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capricious	  coercion.	  They	  have	  sought	  to	  decentralize	  certain	  governmental	  and	   economic	   functions,	   distributing	   greater	   responsibility	   to	   the	   lower	  levels	  and	  to	  nits	  outside	  of	  Moscow.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  however,	   they	  have	  maintained	   an	   undiluted	   monopoly	   of	   political	   power,	   reserving	   to	  themselves	  the	  prerogative	  of	  final	  decision.202	  	  Despite	  this	  relaxation	  and	  de-­‐Stalinization	  period,	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  maintained	  unquestionable	  political	  power.	  The	  United	  States	  concluded	  that	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  Soviet	  leadership	  was	  not	  evolving	  into	  a	  totalitarian	  state,	  in	  which	  every	  individual	  is	  subordinate	  to	  the	  government	  because	  of	  the	  government’s	  forceful	  control	  over	  every	  aspect	  of	  his	  or	  her	  lives.203	  	  	   The	  brief	  continued	  by	  acknowledging	  that	  the	  speech	  was	  inevitably	  going	  to	  affect	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  CPSU	  and	  the	  communist	  parties	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  In	  fact,	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  governments	  faced	  the	  same	  problems	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  confusion	  and	  anger,	  in	  addition	  to	  their	  own	  individual	  problems	  such	  as	  managing	  their	  Stalinist	  regimes	  and	  how	  to	  redefine	  their	  relationship	  with	  Moscow.204	  Khrushchev	  created	  many	  problems	  for	  himself	  and	  the	  United	  States	  was	  unsure	  of	  how	  he	  would	  handle	  new	  situations	  that	  might	  arise.	  They	  wished	  to	  gauge	  Khrushchev’s	  reactions	  to	  these	  inevitable	  problems	  as	  a	  test	  of	  his	  sincerity.	  The	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  believe	  that	  Khrushchev’s	  claimed	  new	  direction	  was	  true,	  but	  they	  needed	  to	  see	  actions	  to	  validate	  the	  proposed	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   On	  April	  3,	  a	  memorandum	  was	  sent	  from	  the	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  European	  Affairs	  Jacob	  D.	  Beam205	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Affairs	  Robert	  D.	  Murphy,	  regarding	  the	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Beam	  explained	  that	  the	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign	  was	  advantageous	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  required	  no	  further	  assistance.	  He	  also	  contended	  that	  the	  propaganda	  efforts	  should	  be	  minor	  and	  subtle,	  nothing	  too	  dramatic.	  For	  example,	  he	  supported	  the	  media	  provoking	  criticism	  and	  confusion	  by	  posing	  hypothetical	  questions	  that	  communists	  had	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  but	  not	  suggesting	  a	  full-­‐on	  rebellion.206	  	  Beam	  expressed	  anxiety	  over	  the	  potential	  implications	  that	  the	  U.S.	  could	  entangle	  themselves	  in	  if	  they	  were	  not	  careful	  stating,	  “if	  the	  communists	  show	  that	  the	  US	  gloating	  over	  their	  present	  embarrassment,	  they	  might	  be	  able	  to	  close	  ranks	  and	  also	  discredit	  the	  US	  with	  some	  Socialist	  elements	  who	  would	  dislike	  a	  sensational	  ‘capitalist’	  victory.”207	  Rather	  than	  instigating	  any	  action,	  Beam	  only	  suggested	  further	  fueling	  present	  confusion	  caused	  by	  Khrushchev	  among	  communists.	  	  	   Two	  days	  later,	  April	  5,	  CIA	  Director	  Dulles	  spoke	  at	  the	  281st	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council.	  Director	  Dulles	  commented	  that	  the	  international	  press	  had	  definitely	  help	  to	  play	  up	  the	  anti-­‐Stalin	  campaign	  more	  than	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  probably	  intended,	  which	  was	  beneficial	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  Interestingly,	  Director	  Dulles	  also	  proclaimed	  that	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  Soviet	  leadership’s	  promotion	  of	  “collective	  leadership”	  to	  be	  sincere,	  which	  prevents	  a	  change	  in	  U.S.	  opinion	  and	  to	  the	  constant	  suspicion	  that	  the	  U.S.	  took	  when	  approaching	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Furthermore,	  Director	  Dulles	  predicted	  that	  there	  would	  have	  to	  be	  political	  problems	  and	  dissent	  within	  the	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satellite	  countries	  because	  of	  de-­‐Stalinization.208	  While	  this	  was	  an	  obvious	  implication	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  it	  shows	  that	  Dulles	  was	  able	  to	  interpret	  and	  focus	  on	  what	  the	  speech	  meant	  for	  the	  world	  and	  the	  U.S.	  without	  being	  completely	  consumed	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  communism.	  Despite	  Director	  Dulles	  focus	  on	  the	  implications	  Khrushchev	  created	  for	  himself	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  he	  was	  still	  guilty	  of	  being	  hampered	  by	  his	  fear	  of	  Stalin	  and	  communism	  like	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  makers.	  	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  April	  1956,	  the	  Embassy	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  sent	  two	  corresponding	  telegrams	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  regarding	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  post-­‐20th	  Congress	  period.	  In	  the	  first	  telegram,	  sent	  on	  April	  9,	  Walter	  N.	  Walmsley	  Jr.,	  the	  Minister-­‐Counselor	  at	  the	  Embassy	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  reported	  again	  on	  Khrushchev’s	  criticism	  on	  Stalin	  and	  the	  conscious	  attempt	  to	  destroy	  Stalin’s	  myth.	  Walmsley	  correctly	  attributed	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  myth	  of	  Stalin	  to	  a	  party	  legality.	  Walmsley	  wrote,	  “It	  is	  as	  necessary	  to	  these	  people	  as	  to	  other	  societies	  that	  policy	  be	  based	  upon	  some	  standard	  of	  morality,	  ethics	  or	  faith;	  it	  is	  constitutional	  foundation	  which	  even	  most	  arbitrary	  of	  governments	  seem	  to	  need	  to	  justify	  itself.”209	  Without	  this	  standard	  of	  morality,	  governments	  cannot	  justify	  their	  actions.	  Walmsley’s	  deduction	  reveals	  a	  lot	  about	  the	  United	  States	  understanding	  of	  the	  communist	  system.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  openly	  disagreed	  with	  the	  collectivization	  and	  other	  aspects	  of	  communism,	  they	  expected	  that	  communist	  systems	  would	  uphold	  morality	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  human	  beings	  and	  that	  every	  form	  of	  government	  needed	  to	  answer	  to	  a	  moral	  code.	  Walmsley	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shrewdly	  recognized	  that	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  was	  a	  tribute	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  communist	  system	  did	  care	  about	  party	  legality.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  never	  be	  able	  to	  reconcile	  the	  party	  legality	  with	  the	  implementation	  of	  it.	  Walmsley	  and	  the	  U.S.	  cited	  Khrushchev’s	  condemnation	  of	  Stalin	  as	  evidence	  of	  this.	  	  Walmsley	  continued	  his	  telegram	  by	  trying	  to	  present	  possible	  explanations	  for	  both	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  the	  continued	  effort	  to	  diminish	  the	  legacy	  of	  Stalin	  in	  the	  communist	  world.	  Internal	  reasons	  included	  economic	  problems	  such	  as	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  productivity	  and	  as	  simple	  as	  a	  change	  in	  leadership	  within	  the	  Kremlin.	  For	  external	  factors,	  Walmsley	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  continued	  on	  Stalin’s	  path	  that	  nuclear	  war	  would	  be	  inevitable,	  which	  was	  an	  outcome	  that	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Kremlin	  wanted	  to	  avoid.210	  Walmsley	  insinuated	  that	  Stalin	  became	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  the	  problems	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communist	  system.	  	  Furthermore,	  Walmsley	  offered	  the	  first	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  It	  may	  have	  been	  his	  proximity	  to	  the	  action	  that	  allowed	  for	  him	  to	  speculate	  better	  than	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community	  at	  home.	  Walmsley	  concluded	  his	  first	  telegram	  by	  commenting	  on	  how	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  was	  taking	  great	  caution	  with	  each	  action	  they	  take	  and	  surveying	  the	  repercussions	  before	  making	  their	  next	  move.211	  Walmsley	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  make	  any	  rash	  or	  dramatic	  decisions	  because	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  was	  trying	  to	  guide	  the	  party	  in	  a	  new	  direction	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  overwhelm	  the	  population	  to	  a	  point	  of	  dissent.	  Walmsley	  helped	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  developing	  situation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	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Two	  days	  later,	  April	  11,	  Walmsley	  followed	  up	  with	  his	  second	  telegram.	  Walmsley	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  had	  three	  obvious	  goals:	  the	  promotion	  of	  Leninist	  ideals,	  wider	  support	  from	  the	  population,	  and	  to	  narrow	  the	  gap	  between	  Western	  social	  democracy	  or	  Titoism	  and	  Soviet	  Communism.	  The	  ideology	  of	  Leninism	  was	  to	  replace	  the	  ideology	  of	  Stalinism	  and	  help	  to	  guide	  the	  communist	  party	  a	  new	  direction.	  Walmsley	  reported,	  “By	  disassociating	  themselves	  from	  and	  condemning	  arbitrary	  acts	  of	  Stalin,	  party	  leaders	  probably	  hope	  to	  win	  wider	  active	  support	  from	  key	  groups	  in	  Soviet	  population	  (e.g.	  cultural,	  managerial,	  scientific,	  military).	  They	  seek	  to	  convince	  both	  these	  groups	  and	  ordinary	  citizen	  that	  ‘democratic’	  party	  rule	  has	  replaced	  one	  man	  dictatorship	  forever.”212	  	  Through	  this	  new	  direction,	  the	  Kremlin	  hoped	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  population	  that	  the	  government	  was	  no	  longer	  a	  dictatorship.	  Khrushchev	  attempted	  to	  display	  that	  collective	  leadership	  had	  replaced	  the	  dictatorship;	  a	  move	  that	  the	  leadership	  hoped	  would	  gain	  more	  support	  from	  the	  communist	  population.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Kremlin	  wished	  to	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  Titoism	  and	  Soviet	  Communism	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  closer	  unity	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Yugoslavia	  than	  was	  true.	  Titoism	  was	  the	  form	  of	  socialism	  in	  Yugoslavia	  created	  under	  the	  Yugoslav	  President	  Josip	  Broz	  Tito	  in	  1948.	  It	  was	  an	  official	  split	  from	  Stalinism	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Despite	  this	  division,	  Titoism	  borrowed	  elements	  from	  Stalinism,	  such	  as	  nationalism	  and	  a	  strong	  disciplined	  party	  leadership.	  213	  However,	  the	  third	  factor	  was	  anti-­‐Stalinist	  Communist	  ideology.	  The	  Soviet	  leadership	  wanted	  to	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  further	  reading	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  Macridis,	  “Stalinism	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  the	  Meaning	  of	  Titoism,”	  World	  Politics	  4,	  no.	  2	  (January	  1,	  1952):	  219–238,	  doi:	  10.23.07/2009046.	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improve	  the	  image	  of	  Yugoslavia	  dissenting	  from	  Soviet	  Communism	  because	  it	  made	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism	  look	  weak.214	  Walmsley	  relayed	  these	  conclusions	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  giving	  the	  U.S.	  further	  hope	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  trying	  to	  be	  more	  lenient.	  	  Walmsley	  recognized	  that	  these	  goals	  also	  presented	  further	  problems	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  By	  trying	  to	  gain	  more	  support	  from	  significant	  groups	  within	  the	  population	  such	  as	  cultural	  or	  scientific	  groups,	  the	  leadership	  might	  have	  encouraged	  too	  much	  freedom.	  According	  to	  Walmsley,	  the	  Kremlin	  was	  walking	  a	  fine	  line	  between	  gaining	  support	  and	  allowing	  too	  much	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  a	  freedom	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  take	  down	  the	  communist	  system.215	  Walmsley	  displayed	  great	  insight	  into	  the	  problems	  that	  the	  20th	  Congress	  had	  presented	  itself	  with.	  Through	  his	  knowledge	  and	  analysis	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  better	  understood	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Soviet	  Communism.	  	  On	  May	  8,	  the	  Deputy	  Directory	  for	  Plans	  of	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency,	  Frank	  G.	  Wisner,	  wrote	  a	  memorandum	  to	  Director	  Dulles	  regarding	  the	  views	  of	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  an	  advisor	  to	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration.216	  Prior	  to	  Kennan’s	  opinion,	  the	  U.S.	  viewed	  the	  current	  Soviet	  leadership	  as	  “a	  group	  of	  amiable	  and	  mutually	  cordial	  person,	  welded	  together	  by	  their	  long	  apprenticeship	  under	  Stalin	  who	  have	  found	  a	  workable	  and	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  Ibid.	  	  216	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  graduated	  from	  the	  St.	  John’s	  Military	  Academy	  and	  then	  Princeton	  University.	  In	  1926,	  he	  joined	  the	  Foreign	  Service	  where	  he	  served	  as	  the	  vice-­‐consul	  in	  Geneva.	  Abroad	  he	  began	  his	  training	  as	  an	  expert	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  1929,	  he	  attended	  the	  University	  of	  Berlin	  to	  study	  Russian.	  In	  1933,	  Kennan	  became	  the	  third	  secretary	  at	  the	  embassy	  in	  Moscow.	  In	  1944,	  Kennan	  returned	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  the	  minister-­‐counselor	  and	  the	  chargé	  d’affaires.	  After	  World	  War	  II,	  George	  Marshal	  appointed	  Kennan	  as	  director	  of	  the	  State	  Department’s	  policy-­‐planning	  staff,	  where	  he	  developed	  the	  policy	  of	  containment	  and	  his	  ideas	  where	  embodied	  in	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  European	  Recovery	  Program(ERP).	  In	  1949,	  Kennan	  clashed	  with	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  in	  which	  Kennan	  resigned	  from	  policy	  planning.	  In	  1952,	  President	  Harry	  Truman	  appointed	  him	  as	  the	  U.S.	  ambassador	  in	  Moscow.	  Kennan	  was	  an	  advisor	  to	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration.	  The	  CIA	  was	  in	  constant	  contact	  with	  Kennan	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Despite	  this	  constant	  contact,	  Kennan	  was	  critical	  of	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  NATO.	  For	  more	  see:	  “George	  Kennan,”	  Spartacus	  Educational,	  last	  modified	  June	  2013,	  http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAkennan.htm?menu=ColdWar.	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enduring	  solution	  the	  inherent	  difficulties	  of	  collective	  leadership.”217	  This	  opinion	  demonstrated	  that	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  clearly	  misconstrued	  the	  Soviet	  leadership.	  Kennan	  strongly	  disagreed.	  In	  fact,	  Kennan	  even	  hypothesized,	  “‘that	  the	  members	  of	  the	  present	  leading	  group	  either	  killed	  Stalin,	  in	  1953,	  or	  brought	  about	  his	  death	  as	  a	  side-­‐effect	  of	  an	  effort	  to	  remove	  him	  from	  power.’”218	  Being	  a	  close	  advisor	  to	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration,	  Kennan	  forced	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  to	  be	  skeptical	  of	  the	  positive	  opinion	  of	  the	  new	  Soviet	  leadership	  and	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  their	  actions.	  	  Continuing	  to	  analyze	  the	  speech,	  on	  May	  17,	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board’s	  Special	  Working	  Group	  on	  Stalinism	  presented	  a	  report	  with	  the	  subject	  headline	  of	  “Summary	  of	  U.S.	  Policy	  Guidance	  and	  Actions	  Taken	  to	  Exploit	  the	  Campaign.”	  Besides	  the	  obvious	  appeal	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Stalinist	  campaign	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  U.S.	  also	  saw	  the	  efforts	  as	  a	  distraction	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  their	  military	  efforts,	  thus	  giving	  the	  U.S.	  the	  upper	  hand.219	  Importantly,	  the	  report	  made	  a	  claim	  that	  there	  was	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  public	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  other	  strategies	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  exploit	  the	  opportunities	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  presented	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  U.S.	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  media	  to	  raise	  suspicion	  about	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  leadership.	  Furthermore,	  “publicly,	  U.S.	  media	  are	  adopting	  a	  note	  of	  cautious	  skepticism,	  calling	  upon	  the	  Soviet	  leaders	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  professed	  attachment	  to	  reform	  by	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  in	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  “Report	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correcting	  still	  outstanding	  major	  abuses	  in	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  politics.”220	  The	  U.S.	  exploited	  the	  public	  eye	  to	  put	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  pressuring	  them	  to	  live	  up	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  word.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  U.S.	  discreetly	  worked	  to	  continue	  to	  provoke	  confusion	  created	  by	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  among	  the	  communist	  world.	  The	  U.S.	  presented	  the	  contradictions	  within	  communism	  as	  a	  way	  to	  sustain	  the	  existing	  confusion.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  exploit	  the	  opportunities	  while	  also	  not	  directly	  engaging	  the	  Soviet	  Union.221	  	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  trying	  to	  create	  a	  policy	  and	  plan	  of	  action,	  it	  was	  still	  trying	  to	  react	  to	  something	  that	  they	  did	  not	  fully	  know	  about.	  	  	  	   Finally,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  May,	  the	  U.S.	  finally	  possessed	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech,	  allowing	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  to	  truly	  assess	  the	  situation.	  In	  a	  conference,	  on	  May	  28,	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  his	  opinion	  on	  the	  situation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  his	  goals	  for	  U.S.	  policy.	  While	  Eisenhower	  did	  not	  want	  to	  promote	  communism	  or	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  he	  did	  want	  to	  present	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  take	  actions	  that	  could	  lead	  towards	  a	  peaceful	  resolution	  and	  improve	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations.	  As	  a	  result,	  Eisenhower	  advised	  that	  policy	  makers	  take	  caution	  when	  deciding	  the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  policy.222	  President	  Eisenhower	  also	  wondered	  how	  serious	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  in	  terms	  of	  improving	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations	  and	  was	  anxiously	  waiting	  to	  see	  how	  flexible	  the	  Soviets	  would	  be	  in	  negotiations.223	  Even	  with	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  still	  waiting	  to	  see	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if	  Khrushchev’s	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  actions	  would	  match	  the	  words	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  	  	   On	  June	  16,	  Bohlen	  sent	  a	  telegram	  from	  the	  Embassy	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  reporting	  on	  his	  meeting	  with	  Khrushchev.	  Bohlen	  and	  Khrushchev	  discussed	  the	  tense	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations.	  Khrushchev	  was	  discouraged	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  in	  improving	  the	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations.	  Bohlen	  explained	  that	  as	  long	  as	  key	  points	  of	  contention,	  such	  as	  Germany	  and	  disarmament,	  were	  left	  unresolved	  that	  improvement	  in	  relations	  would	  be	  difficult.	  In	  fact,	  the	  U.S.	  needed	  concrete	  action	  and	  not	  just	  words	  regarding	  these	  issues.224	  Bohlen	  boldly	  said	  to	  Khrushchev:	  	  That	   Soviet	   leaders	   seemed	   believe	   that	   they	   could	   have	   everything	   their	  own	   way	   and	   that	   the	   constant	   assault	   in	   their	   own	   statements	   and	   their	  propaganda	  against	  measures	  such	  as,	  for	  example,	  NATO,	  which	  US	  and	  it’s	  associates	   felt	   to	  be	  vital	   to	  security	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  be	   incompatible	  with	  the	   constantly	   reiterated	   thesis	   of	   desire	   for	   co-­‐existence	   and	   normal	  relations.225	  	  Without	  hesitation,	  Bohlen	  stressed	  to	  Khrushchev	  that	  while	  he	  was	  making	  claims	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  in	  support	  of,	  he	  needed	  to	  back	  up	  his	  words	  with	  actions.	  Furthermore,	  Bohlen	  pushed	  Khrushchev	  to	  be	  more	  open	  to	  compromise,	  otherwise	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations	  would	  not	  improve.	  	  The	  meeting	  between	  Bohlen	  and	  Khrushchev	  continued	  with	  Bohlen	  commenting	  to	  Khrushchev	  that:	  I	   did	   my	   best	   to	   keep	   my	   government	   informed	   but	   despite	   certain	  improvements	   the	   area	   of	   secrecy	  was	   so	   great	   in	   this	   country	   that	   it	  was	  very	  difficult	  for	  an	  Ambassador	  to	  obtain	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  what	  was	  going	  on…that	   middle	   of	   March	   the	   whole	   world	   knew	   that	   he	   had	   mane	   very	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important	  speech	  to	  a	  closed	  session	  of	  Congress	  but	  no	  reliable	  information	  on	  this	  subject	  had	  been	  available	  in	  Moscow.226	  	  Bohlen	  criticized	  Khrushchev	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  treatment	  of	  him	  as	  an	  ambassador.	  He	  claimed	  that	  the	  secrecy	  revolving	  around	  the	  speech	  and	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  debilitating	  to	  his	  work	  as	  an	  ambassador	  and	  further	  strained	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Significantly,	  Bohlen	  reported	  that	  Khrushchev	  seemed	  genuinely	  concerned	  about	  Soviet-­‐U.S.	  relations.227	  At	  this	  point,	  Khrushchev	  had	  yet	  to	  reaffirm	  his	  positive	  and	  appealing	  claims	  with	  actions,	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  move	  forward.	  The	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  improve	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  they	  also	  did	  not	  want	  Soviet	  or	  communist	  expansion.	  Again,	  Khrushchev	  left	  the	  U.S.	  nervously	  waiting	  to	  see	  what	  his	  next	  move	  would	  be.	  	  	   On	  June	  28,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  convened	  for	  its	  289th	  meeting,	  where	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community	  was	  still	  concerned	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  Director	  Dulles	  commented	  that:	  	  He	   believed	   that	   the	   men	   in	   the	   Kremlin	   certainly	   never	   intended	   that	  Khrushchev’s	   speech	   should	  produce	   such	   fair-­‐reaching	   results	   as	   it	   had	   in	  fact	  produced…on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  must	  take	  into	  account	  the	  possibility	  that	   the	   speech	   was	   deliberately	   designed	   to	   confer	   a	   semblance	   of	  respectability	   and	   independence	   on	   the	   Communist	   Parties	   in	   countries	  outside	   the	   Soviet	   bloc,	   with	   the	   ultimate	   objective	   of	   producing	   popular	  front	  governments	  in	  these	  countries.228	  	  	  He	  was	  concerned	  with	  uncovering	  Khrushchev’s	  motives	  for	  making	  the	  speech.	  He	  questioned	  whether	  the	  intention	  was	  to	  place	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  a	  favorable	  light	  in	  the	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public	  eye.	  Despite	  this	  cautionary	  theory,	  Director	  Dulles	  believed	  it	  caused	  greater	  repercussions	  than	  planned,	  thereby	  breaking	  down	  Khrushchev’s	  risk	  analysis.	  	  Secretary	  Dulles	  also	  commented	  on	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  Khrushchev	  as	  the	  new	  leader.	  Interestingly,	  at	  this	  meeting	  Secretary	  Dulles	  argued	  that:	  	  Khrushchev	  was	  the	  most	  dangerous	  person	  to	   lead	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  since	  the	  October	   Revolution.	   He	  was	   not	   a	   coldly	   calculating	   person,	   but	   rather	  one	  who	  reacted	  emotionally.	  He	  was	  obviously	  intoxicated	  much	  of	  the	  time,	  and	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  commit	  irrational	  acts.	  The	  previous	  Soviet	  leaders	  had	  been	  for	  the	  most	  part	  the	  chess-­‐playing	  type.	  Khrushchev	  was	  the	  first	  top	   authority	   in	   the	   USSR	   who	   was	   essentially	   emotional	   and	   perfectly	  capable	  of	  acting	  without	  calculation	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  his	  action.	  Stalin	  always	  calculated	  the	  results	  of	  a	  proposed	  action.	  Bad	  as	  he	  was,	  you	  at	  least	  knew	  what	  you	  were	  up	  against	  in	  dealing	  with	  him.229	  	  	  He	  feared	  Khrushchev	  as	  the	  new	  leader	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  A	  point	  worth	  noting	  is	  that	  this	  was	  not	  the	  first	  mentioning	  of	  Khrushchev	  being	  drunk.	  Khrushchev	  being	  drunk	  was	  even	  a	  possible	  preliminary	  explanation	  for	  why	  the	  speech	  was	  initially	  given.	  The	  reiteration	  of	  Khrushchev	  as	  a	  drunk,	  confirms	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  viewing	  him	  as	  unpredictable.	  Whether	  his	  unpredictability	  was	  attributed	  to	  being	  a	  drunk	  or	  not,	  it	  affirmed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  no	  idea	  what	  to	  expect	  from	  Khrushchev	  as	  a	  leader.	  Furthermore,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  viewed	  Khrushchev	  as	  an	  emotional	  leader,	  which	  he	  viewed	  as	  far	  more	  threatening	  than	  a	  cold-­‐hearted	  and	  calculated	  leader.	  Once	  again,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  analysis	  of	  Khrushchev	  as	  an	  emotional	  leader	  contributes	  to	  the	  fear	  of	  Khrushchev	  because	  of	  his	  capriciousness.	  	  On	  May	  8,	  there	  was	  evidence	  that	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  new	  Soviet	  leadership	  was	  unthreatening.	  There	  must	  have	  been	  some	  confusion	  and	  disagreement	  within	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  and	  government	  over	  the	  opinion	  of	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Kremlin.	  Moreover,	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George	  Kennan	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  government	  and	  intelligence	  agencies	  that	  these	  leaders	  cannot	  be	  viewed	  as	  cordial,	  but	  rather	  as	  evil.	  In	  regards	  to	  these	  men	  being	  evil,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  presented	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  should	  isolate	  them	  or	  try	  to	  force	  them	  to	  change	  their	  criminal	  habits.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  believed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  try	  to	  force	  the	  Soviet	  leaders	  to	  change,	  but	  not	  everyone	  agreed	  with	  him.	  230	  	  Secretary	  Dulles	  carried	  on	  by	  arguing	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  the	  Soviet	  society	  to	  end	  rule	  by	  terror.	  The	  reprimanding	  of	  Stalin	  caused	  Soviet	  communists	  to	  think	  and	  understand	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  Stalin’s	  reign.	  By	  criticizing	  Stalin’s	  rule,	  it	  allowed	  for	  the	  public	  to	  openly	  express	  their	  anger	  in	  regards	  to	  Stalin.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  believed	  this	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  realization	  would	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  population	  from	  ever	  accepting	  another	  reign	  of	  terror.	  That	  being	  said,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  under	  no	  impression	  that	  the	  Soviet	  population’s	  freedom	  of	  expression	  would	  evolve	  to	  denouncing	  communism.231	  Secretary	  Dulles	  understood	  how	  entangled	  communism	  was	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  However,	  he	  did	  have	  optimism	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  not	  face	  another	  Stalinistic	  dictator	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  The	  discussion	  regarding	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  continued	  on	  July	  19,	  when	  Director	  Dulles	  spoke	  at	  the	  291st	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council.	  Director	  Dulles	  commented	  on	  the	  difficult	  situation	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  presented	  itself	  in	  regards	  to	  its	  satellite	  states.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  promoting	  de-­‐Stalinization.	  On	  the	  other,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  not	  reforming	  its	  liberalization	  policy	  for	  the	  satellite	  states.	  The	  de-­‐Stalinization	  efforts	  caused	  an	  increase	  in	  freedom	  of	  expression,	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  independence	  cultivated	  within	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  zero	  intention	  to	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  28,	  1956,”	  in	  FRUS,	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  volume	  XXIV,	  121.	  	  231	  Gleason,	  “Memorandum,	  June	  28,	  1956,”	  in	  FRUS,	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  volume	  XXIV,	  122.	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loosen	  its	  grip	  on	  its	  satellite	  states	  and	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  any	  additional	  riots	  such	  as	  the	  June	  28-­‐29	  Poznań	  Revolt	  in	  Poland.	  232	  	  	  Prior	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  to	  prevent	  the	  expansion	  of	  communism.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  unwilling	  to	  intervene	  militarily	  for	  the	  fear	  of	  engaging	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  war.	  The	  United	  States’	  plan	  was	  to	  contain	  communism.	  To	  help	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  the	  U.S.	  manipulated	  the	  media	  to	  conduct	  psychological	  warfare	  against	  communism	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  aware	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  securement	  of	  his	  position	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  CPSU.	  Before	  his	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  still	  believed	  that	  collective	  leadership	  was	  a	  potential	  option	  for	  governing	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  U.S.	  failed	  to	  recognize	  that	  Stalin	  had	  changed	  the	  direction	  of	  communism	  and	  despite	  Khrushchev	  wanting	  to	  create	  a	  new	  direction,	  he	  still	  believed	  in	  a	  totalitarian	  state	  with	  a	  single	  leader.	  	  After	  the	  speech	  was	  leaked	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  agencies	  and	  the	  government	  analyzed	  the	  reasons	  and	  implications	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  denouncement	  of	  Stalin,	  they	  were	  still	  suspicious	  of	  the	  motives	  of	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  greater	  Soviet	  Union.	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  U.S.	  still	  interpreted	  the	  speech	  as	  a	  chance	  to	  further	  their	  cause	  of	  containing	  and	  eventually	  eliminating	  communism.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  change	  its	  strategy,	  and	  it	  still	  relied	  on	  the	  media	  to	  disrupt	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  their	  satellite	  countries.	  The	  U.S.	  just	  believed	  that	  they	  would	  have	  greater	  success	  with	  their	  strategy	  because	  of	  the	  problems	  that	  Khrushchev	  created	  for	  himself	  by	  attacking	  Stalin.	  United	  States	  policy	  remained	  passive	  and	  purely	  psychological	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  secret	  speech.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  cautious	  and	  distrustful	  of	  the	  speech	  and	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  ‘Editorial	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  in	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  Relations	  of	  the	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  States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Soviet	  Union;	  Eastern	  
Mediterranean,	  volume	  XXIV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	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  Printing	  Office,	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needed	  further	  actions	  to	  validate	  it	  before	  they	  would	  believe	  Khrushchev	  to	  be	  sincere.	  The	  events	  of	  1956	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  see	  Khrushchev’s	  true	  intentions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   88	  
Chapter	  5:	  “When	  They	  Begin	  to	  Crack,	  They	  Can	  Crack	  Fast.	  We	  Have	  to	  Keep	  the	  
Pressure	  On.”:	  United	  States	  Reactions	  to	  the	  Events	  in	  Poland	  	   The	  year	  1956	  kick	  started	  with	  Nikita	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  on	  February	  25,	  which	  left	  the	  U.S.	  government	  baffled	  and	  unsure	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  sincerity	  and	  its	  motives.	  Confused	  and	  in	  the	  dark,	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  tried	  to	  formulate	  a	  policy	  to	  further	  their	  own	  interests.	  While	  they	  liked	  the	  promise	  of	  the	  speech,	  they	  were	  skeptical	  and	  wanted	  to	  wait	  to	  see	  how	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  handle	  problems	  of	  dissent	  that	  would	  inevitably	  arise	  in	  response	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  	  	   Since	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  expansion	  of	  communism	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  intently	  watched	  Eastern	  Europe	  hoping	  that	  communism	  would	  never	  exceed	  the	  current	  line	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain.	  Even	  more	  importantly,	  the	  U.S.	  carefully	  watched	  the	  satellites	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  wishing	  they	  would	  pursue	  independence,	  which	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  their	  communist	  government.	  	  	   After	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  anticipated	  repercussions	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  that	  would	  be	  favorable	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  democracy.	  As	  the	  U.S.	  anxiously	  awaited	  to	  see	  what	  the	  year	  would	  bring,	  they	  could	  never	  have	  anticipated	  the	  events.	  In	  late	  June,	  Poland	  cracked	  first	  within	  the	  satellites	  the	  Poznań	  riot,	  where	  economic	  demands	  evolved	  into	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes.	  The	  anti-­‐Soviet	  chants	  from	  Poznań	  that	  spread	  throughout	  Poland	  excited	  the	  U.S.	  government	  because	  it	  was	  the	  first	  sign	  of	  dissent	  and	  demands	  for	  freedom	  within	  a	  satellite.	  Although	  the	  Polish	  government	  was	  able	  to	  successfully	  calm	  the	  riot	  without	  Soviet	  intervention,	  the	  seeds	  of	  liberation	  and	  discontent	  had	  been	  planted	  nonetheless.	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   Throughout	  the	  summer,	  the	  Poles	  remained	  unhappy,	  despite	  the	  mild	  concessions	  that	  were	  granted	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Poznań	  riots.	  Discussions	  continued	  regarding	  their	  complaints.	  Events	  escalated	  in	  October,	  when	  the	  Polish	  Politburo	  was	  forced	  to	  readmit	  Władysław	  Gomułka,	  a	  figure	  regarded	  with	  great	  suspicion,	  into	  a	  position	  of	  leadership.	  While	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  pleased	  the	  United	  States	  government,	  it	  frightened	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Immediately,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  determine	  if	  they	  would	  accept	  this	  change	  in	  leadership.	  Gomułka	  shrewdly	  navigated	  his	  way	  through	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  calmed	  their	  worries	  regarding	  his	  return	  and	  the	  direction	  he	  planned	  to	  take	  Poland.	  Since	  Gomułka	  promised	  to	  remain	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  interpreted	  the	  situation	  as	  progress.	  As	  the	  events	  unfolded	  in	  Poland,	  the	  U.S.	  continually	  reassessed	  Poland’s	  condition,	  hoping	  for	  liberation	  but	  accepting	  what	  little	  victory	  they	  could.	  	  Before	  the	  exciting	  events	  of	  1956,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  keeping	  a	  finger	  on	  the	  pulse	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  On	  January	  4,	  1955,	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  European	  Affairs,	  Livingston	  T.	  Merchant	  sent	  a	  memorandum	  to	  the	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Herbert	  C.	  Hoover	  Jr.	  concerning	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  possible	  detachment	  of	  a	  satellite	  state	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that,	  “given	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Soviet	  position,	  no	  major	  Soviet	  satellite	  presents	  vulnerabilities	  of	  such	  extent	  that	  their	  exploitation	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  result	  in	  its	  detachment	  from	  the	  Soviet	  bloc.”233	  The	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  believed	  that	  the	  only	  way	  for	  a	  satellite	  to	  be	  freed	  from	  the	  clutches	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  through	  war,	  an	  action	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  willing	  to	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States,	  1955-­‐1957:	  Eastern	  Europe,	  volume	  XXV,	  (Washington	  D.C.,	  U.S.	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pursue.234	  The	  U.S.	  continually	  reassessed	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  grip	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc,	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  there	  would	  be	  liberation	  without	  direct	  U.S.	  involvement.	  To	  the	  United	  States,	  greater	  freedom	  for	  the	  satellites	  meant	  growing	  closer	  to	  an	  end	  of	  communist	  rule.	  Despite	  the	  tight	  hold	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  ideology	  over	  Eastern	  Europe,	  the	  U.S.	  remained	  optimistic	  that	  the	  Free	  World	  would	  prevail	  over	  communism.	  	   Over	  a	  year	  later,	  on	  February	  29,	  1956,	  the	  United	  States	  reassessed	  their	  policy	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  satellites	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Although	  it	  was	  four	  days	  after	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unaware	  of	  this	  development,	  therefore,	  these	  following	  assessments	  do	  not	  reflect	  this	  incident.	  The	  progress	  report	  submitted	  by	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  reiterated	  the	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  of	  eventual	  freedom	  of	  the	  satellites	  from	  Soviet	  control	  and	  freedom	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  government.235	  	  While	  the	  U.S.	  claimed	  they	  wished	  for	  these	  countries	  to	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  choose	  their	  own	  government,	  there	  was	  never	  a	  mention	  of	  the	  goal	  of	  these	  countries	  being	  democratic	  societies.	  Obviously,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  hoping	  that	  even	  free	  of	  Soviet	  domination	  that	  these	  countries	  would	  choose	  communism,	  but	  they	  left	  this	  stipulation	  out.	  There	  are	  two	  plausible	  reasons	  for	  why	  the	  U.S.	  would	  omit	  this	  from	  the	  policy.	  First,	  the	  U.S.	  thought	  it	  was	  obvious	  and	  unnecessary	  to	  clarify	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  democratic	  society	  would	  succeed	  communism.	  The	  other	  is	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  want	  to	  give	  the	  impression	  of	  forcing	  a	  form	  of	  government	  on	  an	  oppressed	  society.	  At	  this	  point,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  independence	  was	  in	  the	  distant	  future,	  so	  they	  focused	  on	  more	  immediate	  goals.	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   These	  goals	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  were	  to	  prevent	  overt	  aggression	  and	  damage	  the	  bad	  relationship	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  their	  corresponding	  satellite	  countries.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  their	  actions	  were	  disrupting	  this	  relationship,	  it	  was	  not	  substantial	  enough	  to	  pressure	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  release	  their	  control.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  not	  predicting	  another	  situation	  like	  the	  Yugoslav-­‐Soviet	  split	  in	  the	  near	  future.236	  	  	   That	  being	  said,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  believe	  that	  their	  psychological	  warfare	  tactics	  were	  contributing	  to	  passive	  resistance	  within	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  The	  mere	  result	  of	  this	  resistance	  was	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  U.S.	  propaganda	  efforts	  working.	  The	  U.S.	  strategically	  used,	  “The	  Voice	  of	  America,”	  “Radio	  Free	  Europe,”	  and	  the	  “Crusade	  for	  Freedom”	  as	  a	  means	  to	  connect	  with	  the	  citizens	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  remind	  them	  of	  so-­‐called	  Free	  World	  ideals.237	  The	  radio	  was	  an	  easy	  way	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  infiltrate	  democratic	  ideas	  as	  well	  as	  negative	  ideas	  about	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  without	  directly	  involving	  themselves	  in	  Soviet-­‐Eastern	  Europe	  relations.	  The	  broadcasts	  helped	  to	  provoke	  anti-­‐Soviet	  ideas	  and	  free	  world	  ideology	  without	  putting	  any	  Americans	  within	  harms	  way,	  or	  implicating	  the	  U.S.	  in	  active	  subversion.	  	   Another	  straightforward	  tactic	  that	  the	  U.S.	  employed	  to	  help	  further	  the	  immediate	  goals	  was	  the	  use	  of	  speeches	  and	  statements	  by	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles.	  Both	  Eisenhower	  and	  Secretary	  Dulles	  made	  public	  proclamations	  that	  confirmed	  their	  position	  of	  refusing	  to	  agree	  to	  anything	  that	  would	  keep	  the	  status	  quo	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  often	  pronounced	  their	  desire	  for	  things	  to	  change.	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  Secretary	  Dulles	  both	  even	  went	  as	  far	  to	  reveal	  the	  goals	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  be	  eventual	  independence	  of	  the	  satellite	  countries.	  The	  report	  revealed	  that	  this	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tactic	  “was	  greatly	  enhanced	  by	  the	  violent	  reaction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  authorities.”238	  In	  other	  words,	  by	  continuing	  to	  crack	  down,	  Soviet	  forces	  were	  driving	  their	  own	  wedge	  between	  themselves	  and	  the	  Bloc	  countries.	  However,	  speeches	  were	  just	  speeches.	  Just	  like	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  only	  willing	  to	  talk	  about	  solutions	  and	  offer	  moral	  support	  through	  radio	  broadcast	  and	  public	  statements	  but	  not	  willing	  to	  back	  it	  up	  with	  real	  action.	  	  The	  U.S.	  recognized	  that	  the	  only	  option	  to	  achieve	  their	  goal	  was	  war,	  which	  neither	  the	  U.S.	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  wanted.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  1956	  was	  just	  over	  ten	  years	  after	  World	  War	  II	  and	  three	  years	  after	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Many	  countries	  were	  still	  recovering	  and	  the	  entire	  world	  did	  not	  want	  a	  third	  world	  war.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  American	  people	  did	  not	  want	  another	  war	  and	  Eisenhower	  was	  nearing	  an	  election	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  risk	  the	  presidency	  with	  breaking	  the	  tenuous	  peace.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  U.S.	  both	  feared	  that	  if	  they	  were	  to	  engage	  militarily	  that	  a	  third	  world	  war	  would	  be	  inevitable	  because	  tensions	  were	  so	  high	  already	  between	  the	  communist	  and	  capitalist	  worlds,	  also	  fearful	  of	  nuclear	  war.	  	   The	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  acknowledged	  the	  difficulty	  in	  creating	  any	  effective	  U.S.	  policy	  that	  could	  result	  in	  concrete	  gains	  in	  the	  280th	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  on	  March	  22.	  The	  challenge	  was	  for	  the	  United	  States’	  policy	  to	  carry	  any	  merit	  and	  weight	  because	  they	  were	  not	  willing	  to	  engage	  militarily.	  Their	  policy	  action	  was	  merely	  psychological	  and	  containment.	  Recognizing	  the	  presented	  challenge,	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  not	  get	  discouraged	  to	  the	  point	  that	  the	  policy	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reflects	  defeat.	  The	  fact	  that	  U.S.	  even	  developed	  such	  seemingly	  hopeless	  policy	  reflected	  the	  extent	  in	  which	  the	  U.S.	  cared	  about	  ending	  communism.	  	  In	  fact,	  Eisenhower	  advised	  that,	  “constant	  searching	  might	  conceivably	  reveal	  possible	  courses	  of	  action	  to	  achieve	  our	  objectives.	  We	  mustn’t	  be	  less	  aggressive	  in	  pursuing	  our	  objectives	  simply	  because	  we	  had	  thus	  far	  not	  achieved	  the	  progress	  we	  would	  like	  to	  see.”239	  CIA	  Director	  Dulles	  echoed	  Eisenhower’s	  encouragement	  by	  pointing	  out	  that	  despite	  achieving	  minimal	  progress	  in	  their	  goals,	  they	  have	  succeeded	  in	  preventing	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  increasing	  their	  control	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  from	  expanding	  into	  any	  new	  country.240	  The	  U.S.	  government	  understood	  the	  intense	  hold	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  communist	  control	  had	  over	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Furthermore,	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  recognized	  the	  problem	  it	  presented	  for	  the	  free	  world	  because	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  total	  control	  of	  their	  satellites.	  United	  States	  leaders	  believed	  that	  the	  liberation	  of	  these	  countries	  was	  important	  enough	  for	  them	  to	  accept	  this	  challenge.	  The	  U.S.	  feared	  communism	  and	  it’s	  spread	  so	  much	  that	  it	  was	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  their	  foreign	  policy	  to	  terminate	  communist	  rule.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  trying	  to	  find	  the	  right	  balance	  between	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  while	  still	  not	  engaging	  in	  war.	  	  	   On	  March	  28,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  sent	  instructions	  to	  the	  Embassy	  in	  Poland	  in	  connection	  with	  American	  relations	  with	  Poland	  and	  Soviet-­‐Poland	  relations.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  very	  unlikely	  for	  Poland	  to	  gain	  independence.	  He	  presented,	  “it	  is	  the	  Department’s	  present	  belief	  that	  until	  or	  unless	  some	  basic	  and	  drastic	  change	  occurs,	  either	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  Soviet	  policies	  or	  in	  the	  power	  relationship	  between	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the	  Free	  World	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc,	  Poland	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  ruled	  by	  men	  whose	  decisions	  are	  based	  primarily	  on	  their	  understanding	  and	  interpretation	  of	  the	  desires	  and	  intentions	  of	  the	  Kremlin.”241	  Secretary	  Dulles	  understood	  that	  Polish	  governmental	  decisions	  were	  made	  with	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  leadership.	  In	  fact,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  even	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  disagree	  with	  a	  British	  Ambassador’s	  opinion	  that	  there	  was	  a	  Polish	  policy	  independent	  of	  Soviet	  influence.	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  its	  proverbial	  hooks	  in	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  Polish	  government.242	  	   Poland	  provided	  the	  U.S.	  with	  a	  particularly	  interesting	  situation,	  different	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  understood	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland	  to	  be	  as	  follows:	  Not	  only	  is	  Poland	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  most	  important	  East	  European	  satellite,	  politically	  and	  strategically,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  closely	  linked	  to	  our	  relations	  with	  the	   USSR	   and	   can	   affect	   and	   influence	   these	   relations	   in	   many	   ways.	   For	  exactly	   this	   reason	   it	   is	   essential	   that	   the	   shadow	   of	   the	   recent	   “thaw”	   in	  Poland	  not	  be	  accepted	  as	  the	  substance	  of	  a	  genuine	  Soviet	  withdrawal.243	  	  The	  U.S.	  not	  only	  viewed	  Poland	  as	  the	  most	  significant	  satellite	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  but	  also	  a	  key	  pawn	  in	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations.	  The	  thaw	  that	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  referring	  to	  was	  the	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  de-­‐Stalinization	  efforts	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  also	  warned	  against	  being	  too	  optimistic	  about	  the	  thaw	  because	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  never	  release	  Poland	  from	  its	  control	  because	  of	  its	  importance	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  Despite	  Soviet	  control	  in	  Poland,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  did	  not	  see	  Poland	  as	  “frozen.”	  By	  that,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  meant	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  should	  not	  give	  up	  hope	  that	  Poland	  may	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eventually	  be	  released	  from	  the	  claws	  of	  communism	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  fact,	  he	  encouraged	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  reflect	  the	  nature	  of	  inspiring	  evolutionary	  change	  in	  Poland.	  He	  wanted	  policy	  that	  galvanized	  any	  signs	  of	  activity	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  Polish	  independence.244	  Secretary	  Dulles	  also	  instructed	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  should	  help	  to	  stimulate	  activities	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  weakening	  of	  Soviet	  hold	  on	  Poland.245	  	  An	  important	  aspect	  of	  indirect	  U.S.	  policy	  that	  Secretary	  Dulles	  mentioned	  in	  his	  instruction	  was	  the	  use	  of	  radio	  broadcasts.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  conceded	  that	  he	  was	  against	  any	  softening	  of	  radio	  broadcasts.	  In	  fact,	  he	  stated,	  “The	  present	  VOA	  [Voice	  of	  America]	  policy	  is	  to	  inform	  and	  encourage	  the	  Polish	  people,	  in	  vigorous,	  expressive	  and	  explicit	  language,	  without	  deliberate	  misrepresentation	  or	  incitement	  to	  open	  and	  fruitless	  resistance.”246	  The	  Department	  of	  State	  remained	  insistent	  on	  applying	  pressure	  on	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  in	  hopes	  that	  with	  pressure,	  cracks	  would	  ensue.	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  believed	  that	  the	  more	  they	  prodded	  and	  broadcasted,	  the	  greater	  possibility	  for	  free	  world	  ideas	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  satellites.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  hoped	  that	  these	  cracks	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  these	  satellites	  breaking	  off	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  becoming	  independent	  countries.	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  regards	  to	  Polish	  independence.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  explained	  that	  U.S.	  policy	  should	  both	  help	  to	  instigate	  any	  activities	  that	  would	  loosen	  the	  Soviet	  grip	  as	  well	  as	  to	  help	  the	  cause	  of	  any	  activities	  that	  occur	  on	  their	  own	  will	  in	  Poland.	  Both	  of	  these	  policies	  were	  passive	  and	  avoided	  the	  U.S.	  from	  having	  to	  directly	  engage	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  left	  the	  U.S.	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waiting	  for	  developments	  and	  forced	  the	  U.S.	  to	  be	  on	  the	  defensive.	  Despite	  the	  U.S.’s	  fear	  of	  communist	  rule,	  the	  fear	  of	  being	  responsible	  for	  another	  world	  war	  was	  greater.	  	  While	  Secretary	  Dulles	  clearly	  understood	  the	  Soviet	  hold	  on	  Polish	  politics,	  he	  seemed	  to	  misconstrue	  the	  situation	  among	  the	  Polish	  population.	  The	  Department	  of	  State	  was	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  Polish	  population	  was	  anti-­‐Communist	  and	  potential	  allies	  of	  the	  free	  world.247	  Secretary	  Dulles	  opinion	  reflects	  the	  U.S.	  tendency	  to	  project	  their	  anti-­‐Communist	  ideas	  upon	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  and	  the	  U.S.	  government	  had	  the	  inclination	  to	  interpret	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  as	  anti-­‐communist,	  which	  was	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  	  A	   few	  months	   later,	   on	  May	   18,	   Joseph	   E.	   Jacobs,	   the	   U.S.	   Ambassador	   to	   Poland,	  reassessed	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland	  and	  reported	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Jacobs	  wrote:	  Great	  changes	  are	  taking	  place	  in	  Poland,	  other	  Soviet	  orbit	  countries	  which	  West	   and	   particularly	   USA	   should	   recognize	   as	   warranting	   adjustments	   in	  their	   policies	   and	   attitudes	   toward	   Poland;	   that	   Poland	   Government	   is	  sincerely	   desirous	   improving	   relations	   with	   USA;	   that	   Poland	   cannot	   and	  should	  not	  sever	  its	  friendly	  ties	  with	  USSR;	  and	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  return	  to	  status	  quo	  ante	  conditions	  in	  Poland.248	  	  	  Jacobs	  welcomed	  the	  progress	  in	  U.S.-­‐Polish	  relations,	  hoping	  that	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  greater	  progress	  in	  the	  future.	  Furthermore,	  Jacobs	  understood	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  de-­‐Stalinization	  program	  on	  Poland	  and	  even	  other	  satellite	  countries.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  Jacobs	  recognized	  that	  it	  was	  improvement,	  he	  also	  understood	  that	  it	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  Poland	  wanted	  to	  end	  its	  friendly	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  proximity	  of	  Jacobs	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contributed	  to	  U.S.	  Intelligence’s	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  gauge	  the	  climate	  of	  Poland	  at	  such	  a	  tense	  time.	  	  A	  week	  later,	  Jacobs	  sent	  a	  more	  thorough	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland	  as	  of	  late	  May	  1956.	  Jacobs	  believed	  that	  Poland	  was	  the	  most	  likely	  satellite	  to	  break	  off,	  but	  he	  did	  not	  predict	  that	  to	  happen	  soon.	  Jacobs	  recognized	  that	  there	  were	  some	  changes	  in	  Poland.	  These	  changes	  were	  all	  shallow,	  most	  major	  Polish	  policies	  had	  actually	  remained	  the	  same.	  Jacobs	  wrote,	  “surface	  changes	  have	  been	  quite	  numerous	  and,	  to	  casual	  observers,	  neutral-­‐minded	  individuals,	  and	  visiting	  correspondents,	  probably	  impressive.”249	  These	  changes	  consisted	  of	  a	  slight	  increase	  of	  Western	  information,	  a	  little	  less	  police	  control,	  more	  contact	  with	  Westerners,	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  criticize	  the	  regime.250	  All	  of	  these	  changes	  were	  significant	  in	  that	  they	  were	  at	  least	  improvement,	  but	  Jacobs	  cautioned	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  curb	  its	  optimism.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  might	  have	  interpreted	  the	  situation	  better	  than	  Jacobs.	  	  On	  June	  28,	  at	  5:55	  PM,	  Director	  Allen	  Dulles	  informed	  Secretary	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  riot	  in	  Poznań.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  commented	  excitedly,	  “When	  they	  begin	  to	  crack,	  they	  can	  crack	  fast.	  We	  have	  to	  keep	  the	  pressure	  on.”251	  The	  Poznań	  riot	  was	  the	  break	  the	  U.S.	  was	  waiting	  for.	  It	  was	  a	  prime	  opportunity	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  promote	  anti-­‐Soviet	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments.	  All	  the	  U.S.	  had	  to	  do	  was	  broadcast	  their	  opinions	  over	  the	  radio	  and	  publicly	  support	  the	  riot.	  The	  Polish	  people	  had	  carried	  out	  all	  the	  actions	  and	  attacks,	  which	  presented	  the	  U.S.	  with	  a	  perfect	  opening	  to	  exploit	  the	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discontent	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  The	  Poznań	  riots	  did	  not	  force	  the	  U.S.	  to	  go	  beyond	  its	  self-­‐imposed	  restraint	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  U.S.	  continued	  discussions	  regarding	  the	  turning	  of	  events	  in	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  psychological	  warfare,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  encouraged	  spreading	  prior	  Soviet	  actions	  in	  its	  foreign	  aid	  programs	  in	  hopes	  that	  it	  would	  force	  the	  Soviets	  to	  either	  confirm	  or	  deny.	  Either	  way,	  it	  would	  further	  damage	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  possibly	  drive	  a	  wedge	  in	  Soviet-­‐Polish	  relations.	  	  Furthermore,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  and	  his	  staff	  reassessed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  their	  economic	  situation.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  commented	  “that	  the	  Soviet	  economy	  is	  overextended:	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  match	  and	  indeed	  surpass	  the	  U.S.	  military	  effort;	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  increase	  their	  capital	  development;	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  develop	  their	  foreign	  aid	  program.	  All	  of	  this	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  bad	  agricultural	  situation.”252	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  took	  confidence	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  U.S.’s	  economic	  situation	  was	  far	  better	  comparative	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Not	  only	  did	  that	  help	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  arms	  race	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  significantly	  hinder	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  when	  confronted	  with	  dissent.	  Due	  to	  the	  poor	  economic	  situation	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  when	  a	  problem	  of	  a	  riot	  or	  revolt	  would	  arise,	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  resources	  to	  completely	  suppress	  it.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  also	  hopeful	  that	  the	  economic	  problem	  would	  distract	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  problems	  of	  dissent	  and	  the	  arms	  race.	  	  The	  most	  interesting	  conclusion	  of	  this	  meeting	  was	  Secretary	  Dulles	  asserting	  that	  if	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  be	  on	  the	  offensive,	  their	  policies	  needed	  to	  take	  more	  risks.	  He	  argued,	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“Nothing	  is	  achieved	  that	  does	  not	  have	  some	  risk	  to	  it	  and	  we	  should	  not	  seek	  to	  make	  all	  our	  programs	  riskless…the	  coordination	  process	  often	  is	  deadening	  in	  this	  regard	  as	  each	  participant	  seeks	  to	  remove	  possible	  dangers.”253	  The	  tone	  of	  the	  policy	  makers	  was	  beginning	  to	  change	  along	  with	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  satellites.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  acknowledged	  the	  slow	  cracking	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  and	  wanted	  to	  switch	  from	  the	  defensive	  to	  the	  offensive,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  was	  what	  Secretary	  Dulles	  wanted	  to	  happen.	  	  	  Only	  days	  after	  the	  riots,	  on	  July	  2,	  Jacobs	  reported	  from	  Warsaw	  about	  the	  events.	  He	  confirmed	  that	  the	  workers	  of	  the	  ZISPO	  factory	  had	  sent	  a	  delegation	  with	  reasonable	  demands	  to	  the	  government	  in	  Warsaw,	  regarding	  the	  poor	  economic	  conditions	  in	  Poland.	  Despite	  the	  justified	  demands,	  the	  delegation	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  threaten	  the	  government	  with	  a	  demonstration	  if	  the	  government	  did	  not	  make	  changes.	  In	  response,	  the	  PZPR	  Politburo	  did	  not	  move	  quick	  enough	  to	  satisfy	  the	  workers	  of	  ZISPO.	  As	  a	  result,	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  June	  28,	  an	  initially	  peaceful	  demonstration	  of	  workers	  had	  begun.	  Their	  voices	  rang	  in	  unison	  demanding	  for	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  delegation.	  Students	  and	  children	  soon	  joined	  the	  crowd,	  curious	  about	  the	  demonstration.254	  	  According	  to	  Jacobs,	  the	  demonstration	  quickly	  escalated	  to	  a	  violent	  mob.	  He	  attributed	  the	  size	  of	  the	  crowd,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  crowd	  was	  emotionally	  and	  nationally	  charged,	  authorities	  shooting	  over	  the	  crowd,	  and	  the	  death	  of	  children	  from	  warning	  shots	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  peaceful	  demonstration	  evolved	  into	  an	  aggressive	  riot.	  Jacobs	  reported:	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When	   crowd	   became	  mob,	  militia,	   troops	   and	   tanks	   appeared	   but	   took	   no	  immediate	  effective	  action.	  Regime	  says	  reason	  was	  orders	  were	  issued	  deal	  peacefully	   with	   crowd;	   contrarily,	   other	   sources	   claim	   many	   militia	   and	  soldiers	   refused	   fight,	   soldiers	   left	   tanks,	   because	   they	   sympathized	   with	  crowd.	   Some	   said	   abandoned	   tanks	   subsequently	   manned	   by	   Russians	   in	  Polish	  uniform.255	  	  The	  mob	  started	  to	  attack	  government	  buildings,	  burned	  documents,	  expressed	  anti-­‐Soviet	  slogans,	  released	  prisoners	  from	  jail,	  and	  tore	  down	  Soviet	  flags.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  the	  Polish	  Politburo	  confirmed	  48	  dead,	  while	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  death	  toll	  was	  much	  higher,	  somewhere	  in	  the	  hundreds.256	  Jacobs	  relayed	  accurate	  information	  regarding	  the	  Poznań	  riot	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  More	  importantly,	  his	  report	  was	  very	  timely,	  allowing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  respond	  in	  a	  diligent	  manner	  to	  exploit	  the	  situation	  in	  their	  favor.	  The	  flow	  of	  information	  was	  so	  quick	  that	  the	  strong	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiment	  was	  still	  prevalent	  in	  Poland	  when	  the	  U.S.	  reacted,	  which	  allowed	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  further	  fuel	  this	  emotion.	  Unlike	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  reacting	  in	  real	  time	  and	  developing	  plans	  of	  action	  for	  events	  of	  which	  they	  were	  fully	  aware.	  	  A	  day	  after	  receiving	  the	  telegram	  from	  Jacobs,	  on	  July	  3,	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  met	  to	  discuss	  further	  U.S.	  action.	  The	  first	  step	  the	  U.S.	  took	  was	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Poznań	  riot	  in	  the	  American	  press.	  The	  U.S.	  highlighted	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Polish	  workers	  were	  discontented	  with	  the	  Communist	  Soviet	  and	  Polish	  regime.	  By	  publishing	  the	  events	  of	  Poznań,	  the	  U.S.	  hoped	  that	  the	  world	  would	  negatively	  judge	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  communist	  system.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  also	  broadcasted	  that	  they	  were	  willing	  to	  provide	  the	  Poles	  with	  food	  to	  help	  relieve	  their	  economic	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distress.257	  Not	  only	  was	  the	  U.S.	  encouraging	  Western	  association,	  but	  also	  their	  offering	  of	  aid	  implied	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  not	  provide	  for	  its	  own	  people.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  acting,	  it	  was	  limited	  relief	  efforts	  and	  publicity	  for	  propaganda	  purposes.	  Again,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  dare	  breach	  its	  limitations	  of	  avoiding	  war.	  The	  U.S.	  government	  helped	  to	  create	  a	  divide	  between	  the	  Poles	  and	  communism	  and	  the	  Soviets	  as	  best	  it	  could	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  passive	  action.	  After	  the	  Poznań	  riots	  in	  the	  end	  of	  June,	  the	  U.S.	  reevaluated	  Soviet	  control	  over	  their	  satellite	  countries.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  recognized	  that	  the	  Soviet	  still	  dominated	  the	  satellites	  unquestionably.	  The	  U.S.	  still	  believed	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  was	  unhappy	  with	  the	  communist	  system	  and	  the	  Soviet	  control.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  understood	  that	  the	  satellite	  countries	  were	  in	  no	  position	  to	  actively	  resist	  Soviet	  domination.	  At	  this	  point	  in	  time,	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  stationed	  all	  throughout	  Eastern	  Europe,	  leaving	  a	  constant	  reminder	  of	  the	  threat	  they	  posed	  and	  that	  the	  Kremlin	  was	  always	  watching.	  	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  understood	  the	  Polish	  nationalist	  movement	  as	  anti-­‐Soviet	  movement,	  and	  was	  encouraged	  that	  these	  nationalist	  attitudes	  would	  eventually	  lead	  to	  independence.	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  argued:	  In	  many	  respects	  it	   is	  the	  strongest	  leverage	  available	  for	  strengthening	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  satellite	  populations,	  sustaining	  their	  spirit	  resistance	  to	  Soviet	  imperialism,	  and	  encouraging	  their	  opposition	  to	  servile	  Communist	  regimes.	  Nationalism	   is,	   however,	   a	   double-­‐edged	   weapon,	   raising	   a	   number	   of	  operational	   problems,	   as	  we	   have	   discovered	   in	   our	   propaganda	  work	   and	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dealings	  with	   the	   refugees.	   Besides	   arousing	   anti-­‐Soviet	   feeling,	   nationalist	  sentiment	  also	  creates	  division	  among	  these	  people	  themselves.	  258	  	  	  As	  a	  standard	  movement,	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  interpreted	  nationalism	  as	  a	  positive	  because	  it	  was	  not	  pro-­‐Soviet.	  Furthermore,	  nationalism	  also	  opened	  the	  possibility	  for	  any	  new	  government	  to	  be	  different	  from	  communism.	  While	  nationalism	  was	  usually	  a	  unifying	  movement,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  also	  feared	  that	  it	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  rift	  between	  the	  different	  populations	  within	  the	  satellites.	  The	  anxiety	  that	  nationalism	  could	  divide	  Poland	  indicated	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  overlook	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  everyone	  in	  Poland	  was	  pro-­‐Poland	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet.	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  that	  it	  would	  be	  inaccurate	  to	  paint	  with	  a	  wide	  brush	  by	  calling	  everyone	  in	  Poland	  rabid	  anti-­‐Soviet.	  Some	  may	  have	  been	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  but	  recognized	  the	  security	  it	  brought.	  After	  World	  War	  II,	  Poland	  gained	  territory	  in	  western	  Germany	  and	  many	  Poles	  recognized	  that	  they	  could	  not	  maintain	  that	  territory	  without	  Soviet	  forces.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  Poles	  did	  not	  want	  to	  end	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  while	  others	  may	  have	  welcomed	  the	  socialist	  system	  but	  with	  desired	  reforms.	  Therefore,	  the	  nationalist	  movement	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  create	  a	  divide	  within	  Poland	  between	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  Poles	  and	  the	  pragmatic	  Poles	  who	  wanted	  reform	  but	  not	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Soviet-­‐Polish	  relationship.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  believe	  that	  Polish	  nationalism	  was	  a	  positive	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  Despite	  this	  understanding,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  may	  have	  misinterpreted	  the	  grievances	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  While	  the	  satellite	  populations	  were	  very	  unhappy,	  they	  were	  mostly	  angered	  over	  their	  leaders	  of	  their	  governments	  or	  economic	  conditions.	  These	  grievances	  only	  evolved	  into	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiment	  when	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demonstrations	  escalated.	  	  The	  U.S.	  may	  have	  been	  reading	  too	  much	  into	  grievances	  and	  may	  have	  projected	  their	  own	  optimism	  onto	  the	  situation	  to	  twist	  the	  reality.	  It	  was	  possible	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  have	  approached	  the	  protests	  more	  cautiously,	  understanding	  how	  easy	  it	  was	  to	  misinterpret	  complaints	  within	  a	  satellite	  as	  anti-­‐Soviet.	  	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  took	  the	  time	  to	  pause	  and	  analyze	  the	  post-­‐Stalin	  leadership	  and	  change	  in	  their	  approach	  to	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  saw	  the	  new	  Soviet	  leadership	  alter	  its	  view	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  from	  a	  single	  unit	  to	  individual	  satellites.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  began	  to	  deal	  with	  problems	  of	  each	  state	  separately.	  Additionally,	  the	  U.S.	  knew	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  promoting	  socialist	  legality,	  tourism,	  and	  encouraging	  cultural	  relations.	  The	  change	  in	  opinion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  leadership	  reflects	  the	  handling	  of	  Poznań.	  Khrushchev’s	  decision	  to	  not	  immediately	  intercede	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  riots	  helped	  to	  develop	  the	  image	  of	  progression	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  greater	  trust	  in	  the	  provincial	  governments.	  	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  continued	  the	  report	  with	  the	  economic	  changes	  between	  Soviet-­‐Polish	  relations.	  The	  council	  commented:	  In	   the	   economic	   sphere	   the	   USSR	   has	   gradually	   cut	   down	   its	   direct	  participation	   in	   the	   satellite	   economies	   by	   liquidating	   all	   but	   a	   few	   of	   its	  holdings	  of	   satellite	   industrial	  properties	  both	   in	  and	  outside	  of	   the	  Soviet-­‐satellite	   joint	   companies.	   The	   satellites	   have	   been	   allowed	   to	   relax	   their	  previous	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  heavy	   industrial	  development	   and	  devote	  more	  resources	   to	  agriculture.	  They	  have	  been	  encouraged	  both	   to	  develop	  more	  economic	   interdependence	   through	   coordination	   of	   planning	   and	  development	   of	   regional	   specialization	   among	   themselves,	   and	   to	   expand	  trade	  with	  the	  free	  world.259	  	  	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  acknowledged	  further	  changes	  that	  developed	  in	  the	  Soviet’s	  policy	  towards	  the	  satellites.	  They	  construed	  that	  the	  new	  approach	  was	  the	  Soviets	  attempt	  to	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boost	  confidence	  in	  their	  control	  and	  communism.260	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  see	  this	  economic	  loosening	  as	  the	  Soviets	  releasing	  their	  control	  but	  rather	  a	  confidence	  in	  their	  re-­‐affirmed	  control	  over	  Poland.	  While	  at	  first	  glance	  it	  only	  appears	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  granting	  further	  economic	  independence,	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  grant	  this	  freedom	  unless	  it	  was	  confident	  in	  its	  control	  over	  the	  satellite.	  	  	  The	  National	  Security	  Council	  continued	  their	  analysis	  of	  the	  developments	  within	  Eastern	  Europe	  by	  analyzing	  the	  effects	  of	  Titoism	  and	  the	  changes	  in	  Yugoslav-­‐Soviet	  relations.	  The	  study	  reported	  that;	  the	  denigration	   of	   Stalin	   and	  Moscow’s	   acceptance	  of	  Titoism	  have	   created	  difficulties	   in	  Soviet	  relations	  with	  the	  satellites;	  they	  have	  raised	  questions	  as	   to	   the	   infallibility	   of	   Soviet	   leadership	   among	   important	   elements	   of	   the	  satellite	   Communist	   parties;	   they	   have	   aroused	   varying	   degrees	   latent	  popular	   aspiration	   for	   relaxation	   of	   oppression,	   restoration	   of	   national	  independence,	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  governments	  responsive	  to	  popular	  will.261	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  implications	  of	  Yugoslavia’s	  new	  independence	  on	  the	  other	  satellites.	  Titoism	  brought	  hope	  to	  the	  satellites	  that	  they	  might	  gain	  independence	  someday,	  and	  that	  day	  may	  be	  sooner	  than	  they	  ever	  imagined.	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  were	  obviously	  satisfied	  with	  the	  liberation	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  but	  more	  importantly	  with	  the	  repercussions	  it	  presented	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  
	   In	  September,	  months	  after	  the	  Poznań	  riots,	  Jacobs	  sent	  an	  evaluation	  of	  the	  Polish	  government’s	  response	  to	  the	  uprising.	  	  He	  credited	  the	  Polish	  government	  with	  recognizing	  the	  discrepancy	  that	  had	  occurred	  between	  the	  government	  and	  the	  people	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and	  contributed	  to	  Poznań.	  262	  	  The	  Polish	  government	  reacted	  by	  conceding	  to	  simple	  demands	  from	  the	  workers	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  relieve	  some	  of	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  workers	  and	  to	  calm	  their	  anger.	  Jacobs	  criticized	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  for	  promising	  things	  before	  actually	  implementing	  them.263	  	  	   Jacobs	  continued	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  effects	  of	  Poznań	  on	  the	  Polish	  leadership,	  claiming	  that	  the	  “Moscow	  stooges”	  were	  still	  powerful	  in	  Polish	  politics.	  He	  reported	  that	  there	  were	  rumors	  that	  the	  riots	  caused	  a	  schism	  among	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  regarding	  liberalization.	  He	  admits	  that	  this	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  confirmed,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  very	  possible.264	  This	  potential	  divide	  within	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  stall	  in	  the	  liberalization	  plans,	  something	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  desire.	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  that	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Polish	  government	  managed	  their	  own	  affairs	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Poznań	  riots,	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  still	  prepared	  to	  mobilize.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  was	  still	  under	  Soviet	  influence,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  their	  actions	  would	  reflect	  Soviet	  interests	  as	  well.	  Despite	  this,	  Polish	  politics	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  an	  incredible	  drastic	  change.	  	  	   In	  the	  summer,	  Władysław	  Gomułka,	  the	  controversial	  leader	  in	  Poland,	  began	  his	  return	  to	  the	  Polish	  Politburo.	  However,	  Gomułka	  did	  not	  officially	  return	  until	  October.	  Gomułka’s	  return	  was	  so	  dramatic	  that	  it	  raised	  questions	  among	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  Specifically,	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community	  was	  aware	  that,	  immediately	  after	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Polish	  Communist	  Party	  convened	  Friday	  morning,	  a	  Soviet	  delegation	  had	  landed	  in	  Warsaw.	  The	  Soviet	  delegation	  consisted	  of	  Khrushchev,	  Mikoyan,	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Kaganovich,	  and	  Molotov.	  Discussions	  commenced	  immediately	  between	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  and	  the	  Polish	  Politburo,	  including	  Gomułka.	  The	  topic	  of	  the	  discussions	  was	  cooperation	  between	  Poland	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.265	  	  	   Thanks	  to	  the	  United	  Press,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  granted	  greater	  accessibility	  to	  information	  beyond	  Jacobs	  and	  the	  Research	  Division’s	  knowledge.	  The	  United	  Press	  reported	  that	  Gomułka	  had	  been	  named	  as	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Party,	  thereby	  replacing	  Ochab,	  and	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  mobilized	  troops	  from	  East	  Germany	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  Poland.	  Other	  international	  papers	  confirmed	  the	  Soviet	  mobilization	  of	  troops	  and	  tanks	  into	  Poland.	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  concluded:	  On	   the	   basis	   of	   present	   information,	   a	   picture	   emerges	   of	   increased	   Soviet	  concern	  over	  the	  trend	  of	  developments	  in	  Poland,	  a	  sudden	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  Warsaw,	   a	   possibly	   heated	   discussion	   with	   Polish	   Communist	   leaders,	   an	  agreement	  to	  continue	  discussion	  in	  Moscow	  presumably	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  permitting	  the	  entire	  Soviet	  Presidium	  to	  participate,	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  party	   leadership	  under	  Gomułka,	  and	  a	  wave	  of	  popular	   reaction	   in	  Poland	  against	   the	   USSR.	   The	   size	   and	   composition	   of	   the	   Soviet	   delegation	  obviously	   underlines	   the	   seriousness	   of	  Moscow’s	   concern	   and,	   if	   Yugoslav	  reports	  of	   a	   split	   in	   the	  Soviet	  party	  Presidium	  are	   true,	  marks	  an	  effort	   to	  display	  unity	  of	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  before	  the	  Poles.266	  	  The	  U.S.	  interpreted	  the	  mobilization	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  Soviet	  anxiety	  over	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  and	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  feelings	  arising	  in	  Poland.	  The	  U.S.	  knew	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  allow	  Poland	  to	  be	  independent.	  The	  anxiety	  exhibited	  by	  the	  Soviets	  proved	  to	  the	  U.S.	  the	  drastic	  change	  of	  climate	  within	  Poland.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  did	  take	  note	  of	  the	  different	  approach	  exhibited	  by	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Kremlin.	  Rather	  than	  exerting	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force	  to	  secure	  Polish	  loyalty,	  Khrushchev	  negotiated	  diplomatically,	  though	  aggressively,	  with	  the	  Polish	  government.	  	  	   On	  that	  same	  day,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  discussed	  the	  unfolding	  events	  in	  Poland.	  Robert	  D.	  Murphy,	  the	  Deputy	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Political	  Affairs,	  stressed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  deeply	  interested	  in	  the	  outcome	  of	  Poland.	  Deputy	  Murphy	  used	  news	  report	  to	  give	  details	  regarding	  the	  discussions	  between	  the	  Polish	  Politburo	  and	  the	  Soviet	  delegation.	  According	  to	  the	  news	  reports,	  Khrushchev	  leveraged	  the	  Soviet	  defense	  of	  Poland	  against	  the	  Germans	  in	  the	  discussions,	  something	  that	  Poland	  was	  very	  invested	  in.	  Reportedly,	  Khrushchev	  asserted	  that	  he	  would	  “never	  permit	  Polish	  leaders	  to	  turn	  their	  country	  over	  to	  ‘American	  imperialists.’”267	  Deputy	  Murphy	  also	  reported	  that	  Khrushchev	  made	  other	  threats,	  confirming	  the	  aggressive	  approach	  Khrushchev	  took	  in	  these	  discussions	  with	  the	  Polish	  leadership.268	  	  The	  assertiveness	  of	  Khrushchev	  embodied	  his	  panic	  about	  the	  future	  of	  Poland	  being	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  controversial	  Gomułka.	  	   Interestingly,	  Deputy	  Murphy	  criticized	  Khrushchev’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  plans	  to	  take	  control	  of	  Poland.	  Deputy	  Murphy	  claimed,	  “Poland’s	  destiny	  is	  for	  the	  people	  of	  Poland	  alone	  to	  decide.”269	  	  While	  he	  may	  have	  believed	  that	  this	  was	  true,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  did	  not	  hide	  their	  desire	  for	  Poland	  to	  become	  a	  democratic	  country.	  The	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	  eliminate	  Soviet	  control	  over	  Poland.	  However,	  they	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  once	  Soviet	  power	  was	  relinquished	  that	  Poland	  would	  inevitably	  choose	  a	  more	  democratic	  system	  and	  eliminate	  their	  communist	  system.	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   The	  conversation	  continued	  when	  Henryk	  Jaroszek,	  the	  Counselor	  of	  the	  Polish	  Embassy,	  cautioned	  that	  the	  source	  of	  the	  U.S.	  information	  was	  the	  news,	  and	  reporters	  usually	  dramatized	  situations.	  That	  being	  said,	  he	  did	  commend	  them	  for	  being	  so	  prompt	  with	  their	  reports	  since	  they	  had	  direct	  quotes.	  Although	  he	  attended	  the	  meeting,	  the	  Polish	  Ambassador,	  Romuald	  Spasowski,	  could	  not	  confirm	  any	  of	  these	  reports.	  Spasowski	  was	  confident	  that	  Gomułka	  had	  been	  reelected	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Polish	  Communist	  Party,	  but	  he	  was	  unsure	  whether	  or	  not	  Gomułka	  was	  appointed	  as	  First	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Party.	  Furthermore,	  as	  far	  as	  Spasowski	  knew	  Marshal	  Rokossowski	  was	  still	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Politburo.	  Spasowski	  did	  report	  that	  elections	  were	  to	  be	  held	  that	  day	  or	  the	  following	  day	  so	  the	  status	  of	  these	  positions	  could	  change.270	  The	  U.S.	  received	  an	  influx	  of	  information	  in	  a	  very	  timely	  manner	  thanks	  to	  international	  news	  reports.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Polish	  Ambassador	  could	  neither	  confirm	  nor	  deny	  most	  of	  the	  claims.	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  number	  of	  different	  news	  reporting	  the	  same	  information	  helped	  to	  validate	  the	  stories	  being	  reported.	  	  	   A	  few	  days	  later,	  on	  October	  23,	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  convened	  to	  further	  discuss	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland.	  The	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  understood	  that	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  readmitted	  Gomułka	  as	  a	  way	  to	  appease	  the	  residual	  discontent	  from	  the	  Poznań	  riots.	  With	  the	  new	  leadership	  of	  Gomułka,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  saw	  an	  opportunity	  to	  help	  Poland	  gain	  independence	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  new	  plan	  of	  action	  under	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  discreetly	  inform	  the	  Polish	  government	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  willing	  to	  provide	  economic	  aid	  to	  Poland	  if	  it	  continues	  its	  position	  of	  increased	  independence	  from	  Moscow.	  Shrewdly,	  the	  U.S.	  cautioned	  that	  they	  should	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inform	  the	  Polish	  leadership	  that	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  insist	  on	  a	  complete	  break	  from	  Moscow,	  merely	  just	  that	  Poland	  remain	  on	  the	  track	  of	  increasing	  its	  independence.	  271	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  also	  emphasized	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  stress	  to	  Poland	  that	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  replace	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  the	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  Lastly,	  the	  U.S.	  decided	  that	  drafting	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  would	  be	  a	  good	  bargaining	  chip	  to	  prevent	  or	  at	  least	  hinder	  Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Poland.272	  	  	   The	  following	  day	  Philip	  H.	  Trezise	  of	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  presented	  further	  thoughts	  on	  Poland.	  Trezise	  commented,	  “We	  are	  much	  too	  prone	  to	  forget	  that	  Communists	  are	  human	  too.	  It	  must	  have	  been	  difficult	  in	  Poland	  to	  be	  the	  agent	  of	  a	  regime	  subservient	  to	  the	  Russians	  and	  responsible	  for	  a	  miserable	  economic	  situation	  as	  well.”273	  Trezise	  recognized	  how	  easily	  Americans	  dehumanized	  communists	  in	  their	  fight	  against	  the	  Soviet	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  He	  was	  probably	  one	  of	  a	  few	  people	  who	  paused	  to	  step	  back	  and	  remember	  that	  the	  Poles	  were	  people,	  not	  just	  communists	  who	  needed	  to	  be	  shown	  reform.	  Trezise	  also	  used	  this	  mentality	  to	  help	  explain	  the	  emotions	  of	  the	  Poles	  and	  the	  hardships	  that	  they	  must	  have	  experienced	  under	  the	  tight	  grip	  of	  Soviet	  control.274	  	  	   Trezise	  offered	  an	  interesting	  interpretation	  of	  Gomułka	  as	  a	  Polish	  politician.	  He	  understood	  Gomułka	  to	  be	  an	  anti-­‐Stalinist,	  yet	  a	  nationalist-­‐Communist,	  thereby	  inferring	  that	  Gomułka	  would	  not	  be	  moving	  Poland	  away	  from	  a	  communist	  system.	  That	  being	  said,	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Trezise	  had	  confidence	  that	  eventually	  Poland	  would	  succeed	  in	  releasing	  itself	  from	  the	  grasp	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.275	  	   That	  same	  day,	  on	  October	  24,	  a	  new	  policy	  note	  regarding	  the	  developments	  in	  Poland	  was	  produced.	  The	  U.S.	  decided	  that	  it	  should	  broadcast	  the	  reports	  of	  the	  events	  in	  Poland	  to	  help	  inform,	  and	  potentially	  transform	  Eastern	  Europe.	  However,	  they	  also	  made	  the	  conscious	  decision	  to	  not	  make	  the	  effort	  to	  directly	  encourage	  revolt.	  	  Importantly,	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  believed	  that	  the	  broadcasts:	  Should	   emphasize	   that	  we	   regard	   the	   present	   situation	   as	   between	   Poland	  and	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   as	   a	   test	   of	   Soviet	   intentions	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  promises	  made	  by	   the	  Soviet	   leadership	  at	   the	  20th	  party	  Congress	  and	   the	  discussion	   last	   June	   with	   President	   Tito	   of	   Yugoslavia	   to	   recognize	   the	  principle	   various	   roads	   to	   socialism.	  Without	   speculating	   on	   the	   course	   of	  future	   developments,	   we	   should	   indicate	   that	   the	   outside	   world	   will	   be	  watching	   to	   see	  whether	   the	   Soviet	   Union	  will	   intervene	   in	   internal	   Polish	  affairs.	  276	  	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  regarding	  how	  the	  Soviet	  handled	  this	  tense	  situation	  with	  Poland	  as	  a	  test	  to	  see	  if	  Khrushchev	  would	  uphold	  his	  speech	  from	  February	  and	  to	  see	  if	  Khrushchev	  would	  uphold	  his	  theory	  that	  there	  are	  different	  roads	  to	  socialism.	  	  	   The	  events	  in	  Poland	  were	  the	  first	  problems	  of	  dissent	  that	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  faced	  after	  his	  speech	  in	  February.	  This	  conflict	  was	  the	  exact	  test	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  waiting	  for	  to	  decide	  if	  he	  was	  sincere	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  move	  away	  from	  terror	  tactics	  to	  uphold	  communism.	  The	  events	  of	  Poland	  in	  June	  and	  October	  helped	  to	  flush	  out	  the	  confusion	  from	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  that	  clouded	  over	  the	  world.	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   While	  the	  U.S.	  favored	  the	  Poznań	  riot	  and	  wanted	  to	  further	  its	  cause,	  it	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  offer	  any	  concrete	  support.	  The	  U.S.	  saw	  that	  their	  hands	  were	  tied	  and	  their	  options	  were	  limited.	  If	  they	  offered	  concrete	  support,	  that	  would	  further	  strain	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations	  and	  place	  the	  U.S.	  in	  a	  position	  of	  further	  direct	  opposition.	  If	  conflict	  began,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  have	  been	  implicated.	  Even	  more	  drastically,	  if	  the	  U.S.	  sent	  military	  reinforcements,	  then	  the	  event	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  war	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  potentially	  a	  total	  war	  or	  nuclear	  war,	  an	  outcome	  that	  the	  U.S.	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  avoid.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  U.S.	  greatly	  wanted	  the	  liberation	  of	  Poland,	  in	  hopes	  that	  once	  a	  satellite	  gained	  independence	  the	  rest	  would	  follow	  shortly.	  To	  help	  fuel	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes,	  the	  U.S.	  exploited	  their	  limited	  options	  of	  the	  media.	  The	  U.S.	  prolonged	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiments	  through	  radio	  broadcasts	  that	  encouraged	  anti-­‐Soviet	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  opinions	  while	  also	  promoting	  the	  independence	  of	  Poland.	  Through	  moral	  support,	  the	  U.S.	  maintained	  its	  psychological	  warfare	  policy	  against	  communism.	  	  Despite	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  Poznań	  riot	  by	  the	  Polish	  government,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  hopeful	  to	  see	  that	  the	  Soviets	  did	  not	  intervene.	  The	  U.S.	  recognized	  that	  the	  Soviets	  allowed	  the	  Poles	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  own	  internal	  problems	  internally	  without	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  While	  the	  Soviets	  were	  on	  edge	  and	  ready	  to	  step	  in	  at	  any	  moment,	  they	  refrained	  from	  any	  activity,	  beyond	  sending	  an	  official	  delegation.	  The	  lack	  of	  Soviet	  involvement	  in	  the	  resolution	  of	  Poznań	  helped	  validate	  Khrushchev’s	  new	  direction	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  makers.	  Although	  the	  actual	  outcome	  was	  not	  exactly	  what	  the	  U.S.	  hoped	  for,	  it	  was	  progress	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  Furthermore,	  it	  contributed	  to	  the	  United	  States’	  understanding	  of	  Khrushchev	  as	  a	  leader.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  government	  feared	  Khrushchev	  as	  emotional	  and	  volatile,	  his	  handling	  of	  Poznań	  portrayed	  that	  he	  was	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trying	  to	  change	  the	  management	  of	  the	  satellites	  and	  truly	  wanted	  to	  redirect	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism	  away	  from	  associations	  with	  the	  Stalin-­‐era.	  The	  U.S.	  began	  to	  have	  a	  little	  bit	  more	  trust	  in	  Khrushchev’s	  management	  of	  discordance.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Gomułka	  understood	  his	  limitations	  of	  negotiations.	  	  Even	  more	  telling,	  were	  the	  negotiations	  conducted	  between	  Gomułka	  and	  the	  Soviet	  delegation	  itself.	  Rather	  than	  immediately	  interceding	  in	  the	  dealings	  of	  the	  Polish	  Politburo	  after	  the	  re-­‐admittance	  of	  Gomułka,	  the	  Kremlin	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  convene	  discussions.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  Gomułka	  political	  astuteness,	  the	  delegation’s	  concerns	  were	  eased	  and	  they	  decided	  to	  allow	  the	  decisions	  made	  to	  remain	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Polish	  government	  pledged	  to	  remain	  an	  ally	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism.	  Once	  again,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  demonstrated,	  intentional	  or	  otherwise,	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  that	  they	  were	  diverging	  from	  Stalin’s	  path	  and	  willing	  to	  resolve	  problems	  diplomatically	  rather	  than	  viciously	  through	  terror	  and	  violence.	  Khrushchev’s	  handling	  of	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  helped	  confirm	  his	  claims,	  a	  further	  sign	  that	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  see	  before	  truly	  trusting	  the	  claims	  in	  his	  speech.	  	  As	  of	  October	  1956,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  much	  more	  trusting	  of	  Khrushchev.	  While	  their	  paranoia	  and	  skepticism	  remained,	  the	  events	  in	  Poland	  helped	  to	  curb	  them,	  at	  least	  temporarily.	  The	  events	  in	  Poland	  did	  not	  prepare	  them	  for	  what	  was	  about	  to	  transpire	  in	  the	  end	  of	  October	  in	  Hungary.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  Poland	  was	  a	  precedent	  for	  how	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  conduct	  problems	  of	  dissent	  within	  a	  satellite.	  However,	  Khrushchev	  destroyed	  the	  little	  trust	  that	  he	  had	  built	  up	  with	  the	  crushing	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	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Chapter	  6:	  We	  Were	  Caught	  With	  Our	  Hands	  Tied:	  United	  States	  Reactions	  to	  the	  
Hungarian	  Revolt	  
	  	   After	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt,	  and	  the	  Polish	  October,	  United	  States	  policy	  was	  incoherent	  and	  confused.	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  presented	  the	  U.S.	  with	  potential	  optimism	  but	  the	  U.S.	  approached	  it	  with	  suspicion.	  The	  Poznań	  Revolt	  validated	  the	  U.S.’s	  opinion	  that	  there	  was	  discontent	  within	  the	  satellites	  and	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  gave	  the	  U.S.	  confidence	  that	  Khrushchev	  was	  genuinely	  trying	  to	  implement	  a	  new	  Soviet	  strategy.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  always	  skeptical	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  position	  that	  U.S.	  was	  confronted	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  Once	  again,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  hopeful	  that	  a	  satellite	  would	  be	  able	  to	  break	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  sending	  resounding	  cracks	  through	  Eastern	  Europe,	  beginning	  the	  inevitable	  decline	  of	  communism.	  United	  States	  policy	  continued	  to	  be	  marked	  by	  confusion	  of	  how	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  going	  to	  react.	  	  The	  ripples	  that	  started	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  began	  with	  the	  resignation	  of	  Mátyás	  Rákosi	  and	  the	  appointment	  of	  Ernő	  Gerő	  as	  the	  new	  CC	  First	  Secretary	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Legation	  in	  Hungary	  reported	  back	  to	  Washington	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  July,	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  tried	  to	  claim	  that	  Rákosi’s	  resignation	  was	  due	  to	  poor	  health	  and	  his	  failure	  to	  uphold	  the	  socialist	  legality.	  While	  this	  may	  have	  been	  true,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  convinced.	  The	  Department	  of	  State	  claimed	  that	  the	  main	  cause	  for	  the	  change	  in	  leadership	  was	  extremely	  low	  party	  support.	  Even	  more	  importantly,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  recognized	  that	  the	  removal	  of	  Rákosi	  was	  a	  symbolic	  move;	  they	  did	  not	  expect	  much	  change	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  Gerő.	  The	  U.S.	  still	  believed	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that	  despite	  the	  Hungarian	  population’s	  initial	  disappointment	  with	  Gerő	  being	  the	  replacement,	  they	  would	  appreciate	  the	  removal	  of	  Rákosi.277	  	   Later	  that	  night,	  the	  U.S.	  Hungarian	  Legation	  followed	  up	  their	  initial	  report	  with	  more	  information	  regarding	  the	  appointment	  of	  Gerő.	  The	  Legation	  relayed	  that	  the	  replacement	  of	  Rákosi	  created	  a	  mild	  sense	  of	  relief	  among	  the	  Hungarian	  population.	  However,	  the	  Legation	  pointed	  out	  that	  Gerő	  was	  an	  old	  pro-­‐Russian	  Stalinist,	  which	  helped	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  supported	  him,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  make	  sense.278	  Khrushchev	  was	  trying	  to	  direct	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  away	  from	  Stalin	  and	  his	  ideology,	  thus	  making	  it	  questionable	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  appointment	  of	  Gerő	  correctly.	  The	  confusion	  of	  Gerő	  as	  Rákosi’s	  replacement	  demonstrates	  the	  constant	  misperception	  among	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community.	  There	  was	  either	  still	  a	  misunderstanding	  over	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  or	  a	  lack	  of	  belief	  in	  Khrushchev’s	  words,	  which	  caused	  them	  to	  completely	  dismiss	  it.	  	  	   About	  a	  month	  later,	  on	  August	  30,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  received	  an	  updated	  assessment	  of	  the	  political	  climate	  in	  Hungary	  since	  the	  removal	  of	  Rákosi.	  The	  dispatch	  was	  full	  of	  optimism	  concerning	  the	  Hungarian	  situation.	  N.	  Spencer	  Barnes,	  the	  Counselor	  of	  the	  Mission	  in	  Hungary,	  reported	  positively	  that	  János	  Kádár	  seemed	  to	  exert	  a	  considerable	  amount	  of	  influence	  on	  Gerő.	  Furthermore,	  Barnes	  was	  happy	  that	  there	  was	  developing	  support	  for	  Imre	  Nagy.	  The	  U.S.	  viewed	  Nagy	  as	  a	  potential	  ally	  and	  a	  leader	  who	  could	  guide	  Hungary	  towards	  independence.	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Barnes	  also	  informed	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  more	  lenient	  towards	  intellectuals.279	  This	  new	  leniency	  developed	  from	  the	  emergence	  of	  discussions	  about	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  The	  satellites	  were	  granted	  limited	  liberty	  to	  clarify	  the	  speech,	  which	  they	  used	  as	  leverage	  to	  gain	  other	  freedoms	  and	  demands	  from	  the	  country.	  Khrushchev	  wanted	  to	  promote	  confidence	  in	  the	  communist	  system	  by	  encouraging	  a	  happy	  population,	  explaining	  the	  acceptance	  of	  these	  limited	  freedoms.	  Barnes	  recognized	  Khrushchev’s	  strategy,	  but	  also	  alluded	  to	  this	  as	  evidence	  that	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  had	  some	  validity.	  Barnes	  even	  claimed	  that	  the	  “regime	  had	  adorned	  itself	  with	  a	  new	  halo	  of	  democracy,	  progressiveness	  and	  freedom.”280	  He	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  an	  increased	  openness	  to	  contact	  Westerners	  that	  did	  not	  exist	  before.	  Barnes	  believed	  that	  the	  progress	  was	  further	  than	  anticipated	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  Rákosi.281	  Quicker	  than	  envisioned,	  Hungary	  began	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  satellite	  that	  could	  remove	  itself	  from	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  watched	  closely	  and	  waited	  patiently.	  	  Barnes	  sent	  another	  telegram	  reporting	  the	  turn	  of	  events	  in	  Hungary	  on	  October	  23.	  According	  to	  Barnes,	  there	  had	  been	  two	  meetings	  held	  since	  October	  16	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  first	  one	  was	  in	  Jokai	  Theater	  of	  Gyor,	  which	  was	  attended	  by	  one	  thousand	  people.	  Gyula	  Hay,	  a	  Hungarian	  writer,	  conducted	  the	  meeting.	  The	  meeting	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  times	  Hungarians	  could	  express	  their	  grievances	  openly	  without	  fear	  of	  the	  ramifications.	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Hungarians	  complained	  about	  Soviet	  military	  bases	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Rákosi’s	  policies.282	  Through	  Barnes,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  able	  to	  track	  the	  progression	  of	  events	  in	  Hungary.	  Optimism	  towards	  Hungary	  continued	  with	  the	  practice	  of	  free	  speech	  in	  these	  meetings.	  	  The	  other	  meeting	  was	  held	  on	  October	  22	  in	  the	  Aula	  of	  Technical	  University,	  where	  four	  to	  five	  thousand	  students	  attended.	  Again,	  this	  meeting	  consisted	  of	  Hungarians	  expressing	  their	  grievances.	  283	  Students	  passionately	  called	  for	  changes	  in	  Hungary,	  including	  the	  return	  of	  Nagy,	  reorganization	  of	  the	  economic	  system,	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  press,	  and	  a	  non-­‐interfering	  economic	  and	  political	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.284	  The	  ability	  to	  openly	  express	  their	  complaints	  helped	  to	  shape	  the	  notorious	  sixteen	  points.	  Hours	  later,	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  received	  another	  telegram	  with	  an	  update	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  frantic	  tone	  in	  Barnes	  telegram	  embodied	  the	  chaotic	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  that	  was	  developing.	  Barnes	  reported	  on	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  demonstrations	  and	  the	  build	  up	  of	  the	  crowds.	  The	  three	  main	  meeting	  points	  were	  Parliament,	  Stalin	  Ter,285	  and	  the	  Central	  Office	  Budapest	  Radio	  Brody	  Sandor	  Building.286	  Barnes	  reported	  that	  both	  Nagy	  and	  Gerő’s	  speeches	  were	  not	  received	  well	  by	  the	  crowds.	  Barnes	  said:	  Probably	   around	   10	   p.m.	   fighting	   broke	   out	   in	   radio	   area	   after	   tear	   gas	  and/or	   stink	   bombs	   used	   on	   crowd,	   and	   fighting	   and	   killing	   continued	  between	  students,	  populace	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  AVH	  and	  Army	  troops	  on	  other.	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Students	  seized	  trucks	  and	  are	  moving	  about	  in	  streets.	  Two	  Legation	  officers	  personally	  witnessed	   young	  man	   shot	   in	   face	   lying	   dead	   in	   street,	   covered	  with	   Hungarian	   flag.	   Ambulances	   moving	   about	   carrying	   away	   others.	  Security	   forces	   in	   evidence	   this	   area	   with	   at	   least	   one	   known	   instance	   of	  crowd	   freeing	   arrestee.	   Tanks	   also	   in	   evidence	   radio	   area	   around	   10:45.	  Large	   number	   truck	   loads	   troops	   moved	   in	   area	   around	   10:30.	   No	   Soviet	  forces	  yet	  seen.	  Anonymous	  telephone	  call	  stated	  around	  60	  killed,	  although	  rumors	   in	   area	   reached	  30-­‐40;	   second	   such	   call	   requested	  Legation	   call	   on	  government	   halt	   killing.	   Legation	   also	   received	   second-­‐hand	   report	   that	  Hungarian	  troops	  refused	  fire	  on	  public,	  and	  fire	  initiated	  on	  unarmed	  public	  by	  Russian-­‐speaking	  men	  in	  AVH	  uniforms.287	  	  	  Barnes	  clearly	  wanted	  to	  relay	  as	  much	  information	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible.	  The	  proximity	  of	  the	  Legation	  allowed	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  understand	  the	  escalation	  and	  analyze	  the	  options	  in	  live	  time,	  unlike	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  	  	   The	  following	  day	  the	  U.S.	  received	  another	  telegram	  with	  updates	  about	  Hungary.	  The	  Legation	  suggested	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  submit	  a	  statement	  regarding	  the	  situation.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Legation	  specifically	  stated	  what	  should	  be	  printed:	  US	   considers	   intervention	   Soviet	   forces	   and	   ruthless	   killing	   unarmed	  Hungarians	   as	   yet	   another	   example	   of	   continuing	   occupation	   Hungary	   by	  alien	  and	  enemy	  forces	  for	  their	  own	  purposes	  and	  employment	  these	  troops	  to	  shoot	  down	  Hungarian	  people	  breaks	  every	  moral	   law	  and	  demonstrates	  that	  Hungary	  is	  to	  Soviet	  Russia	  merely	  a	  colonial	  possession,	  the	  demand	  of	  whose	  people	   for	  democratic	   liberty	  warrants	   the	  use	  of	  naked	   force.	  What	  has	   happened	   in	   Hungary	   amounts	   to	   armed	   aggression	   by	   army	   of	   one	  power	   against	   people	   of	   another.	   United	   States	   and	   world	   await	   outcome	  with	  intense	  interest.288	  	  	  The	  Legation	  continued	  by	  urging	  diplomatic	  protest	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Hungary.	  It	  insisted	  protest	  towards	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  demonstrated	  that	  it	  understood	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  an	  entity	  of	  the	  Soviet	  government.	  The	  pleading	  of	  the	  Legation	  demanding	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  make	  statements	  reveals	  the	  horrors	  that	  the	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Legation	  witnessed.	  The	  Legation	  failed	  to	  inspire	  the	  same	  urgency	  in	  the	  U.S.	  government	  at	  home.	  Instead,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  grappled	  to	  understand	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  side	  of	  the	  situation,	  preventing	  the	  U.S.	  from	  acting	  quickly.	  	  	   Later	  that	  day,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles	  and	  Henry	  Cabot	  Lodge	  Jr.,	  the	  U.S.	  Representative	  at	  the	  United	  Nations,	  discussed	  by	  phone	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  talked	  about	  bringing	  the	  conflict	  in	  Hungary	  to	  the	  Security	  Council.	  He	  expressed	  that	  he	  was	  “worried	  that	  it	  will	  be	  said	  that	  here	  are	  the	  great	  moments	  and	  when	  they	  came	  and	  these	  fellows	  were	  ready	  to	  stand	  up	  and	  die,	  we	  were	  caught	  napping	  and	  doing	  nothing.”289	  When	  Lodge	  mentioned	  Poland	  in	  response,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  commented,	  “that	  was	  different	  and	  there	  is	  more	  excuse	  to	  take	  this	  to	  the	  SC.”290	  Secretary	  Dulles	  clearly	  wanted	  to	  help	  the	  Hungarians	  and	  saw	  this	  conflict	  as	  a	  prime	  opportunity	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  intervene	  and	  break	  down	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  obviously	  disturbed	  by	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  but	  also	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  how	  to	  act.	  He	  did	  not	  have	  confidence	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  act	  alone,	  which	  explains	  why	  he	  was	  pleading	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	  More	  importantly,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  had	  the	  foresight	  to	  know	  that	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  world	  would	  be	  embarrassed	  if	  they	  just	  stood	  by	  and	  watched	  as	  Hungarians	  died	  fighting	  for	  liberation	  from	  the	  grasp	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  uncertain	  of	  how	  to	  prevent	  the	  suppression	  of	  Hungarians.	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   That	  same	  day,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  received	  another	  telegram	  with	  a	  suggested	  statement	  for	  President	  Eisenhower	  regarding	  the	  recent	  developments	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  suggested	  statement	  read	  as	  follows:	  The	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  are	  deeply	  shocked	  to	   learn	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  are	  being	  used	  against	   the	   civilian	  population	  of	  Hungary,	   on	   the	   eve	   of	   what	  we	   had	   hoped	  would	   be	   better	   days	   for	   that	  unhappy	  country.	  Gunfire	  cannot	  be	  a	  final	  answer	  to	  the	  legitimate	  demands	  of	   a	   people	   for	   a	   decent	   standard	   of	   living	   and	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   basic	  freedoms	  which	  are	  the	  birth	  right	  of	  the	  people	  of	  Louis	  Kossuth.	  We	  shall	  follow	  with	  deepest	  concern	  the	  tragic	  events	  that	  are	  even	  now	  continuing	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  for	  a	  better	  life	  shall	  not	  be	  denied.291	  	  U.S.	  diplomats	  all	  over	  Eastern	  Europe	  were	  consumed	  by	  the	  events	  in	  Hungary	  and	  concerned	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  people.	  Diplomats	  expressed	  their	  shock	  and	  demanded	  that	  the	  U.S.	  publicly	  condemn	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  continued	  suggestions	  of	  statements	  demonstrate	  how	  the	  U.S.	  was	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  what	  to	  do.	  It	  would	  be	  naïve	  to	  think	  that	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  these	  pleading	  statements	  would	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  acting.	  	  	   The	  following	  day	  the	  Hungarian	  Legation	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  had	  a	  conversation	  concerning	  the	  events	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Legation	  reported	  that	  was	  still	  heavy	  gun	  fire	  and	  Soviet	  tanks	  were	  encompassing	  the	  city.	  In	  fact,	  it	  believed	  that	  there	  were	  now	  even	  more	  Soviet	  troops,	  meaning	  that	  the	  Soviets	  mobilized	  troops	  that	  had	  not	  been	  stationed	  in	  Hungary.	  It	  was	  also	  reported	  that	  much	  of	  the	  fighting	  was	  conducted	  by	  the	  Soviet	  troops.	  Even	  more	  dramatic,	  the	  Legation	  informed	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  that	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some	  Hungarian	  troops	  have	  even	  joined	  forces	  with	  the	  insurgents.292	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  deep	  tension	  between	  Hungarians	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Unions	  by	  the	  force	  being	  exerted	  by	  both	  sides.	  Furthermore,	  the	  defecting	  of	  Hungarian	  troops	  attested	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  control	  within	  Hungarian	  government	  and	  military.	  	  	   The	  Department	  of	  State	  stayed	  on	  the	  phone	  with	  the	  American	  Legation	  in	  Budapest	  for	  hours,	  receiving	  live	  updates	  as	  the	  events	  unfolded	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Legation	  notified	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  of	  the	  radio	  announcement,	  which	  stated	  that	  János	  Kádár	  had	  replaced	  Gerő,	  expressing	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  at	  a	  time	  when	  stability	  was	  desperately	  needed.	  The	  Legation	  commented	  on	  the	  scene	  that,	  “numerous	  ties	  we	  thought	  this	  whole	  mess	  was	  over	  but	  it	  starts	  up	  very	  suddenly	  without	  any	  warning	  as	  you	  can	  well	  imagine.”293	  In	  fact,	  the	  Legation	  was	  placed	  in	  danger	  while	  in	  Budapest:	  Earlier	   this	  morning	   I	   had	   the	   printer	   on	   floor	   typing	   from	   prone	   position	  with	  many	  more	  typing	  errors	  than	  appearing	  o	  this	  later	  transmission...was	  afraid	   of	   bullets	   coming	   in	   the	  window	   since	   this	   Telex	   room	   is	   facing	   the	  crowd	  and	  would	  have	  more	  protection	  on	  floor.	  Fortunately	  no	  shells	  or	  the	  like	   came	   this	  direction…Have	  also	  been	   informed	   that	  my	  apartment	   is	   all	  shot	  up,	  windows	  broken	  and	  fire	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  empty	  apartment	  adjacent	  from	  mine.294	  	  	  The	  dedication	  of	  the	  Legation	  reporting	  to	  the	  U.S.	  speaks	  to	  the	  importance	  and	  emphasis	  placed	  on	  this	  event	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  world	  and	  U.S.	  relations.	  The	  U.S.	  Legation	  in	  Hungary	  was	  morally	  appalled	  by	  the	  development	  of	  events	  between	  Hungarians	  and	  Russians.	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   The	  Department	  of	  State	  inquired	  about	  the	  situation	  of	  Nagy,	  optimistically	  hoping	  that	  the	  situation	  could	  result	  in	  him	  leading	  the	  Hungarian	  government.	  The	  Legation	  responded:	  This	   is	  a	  battle	  situation	  and	  we	  have	  no	   idea	  what	   is	  going	  to	  happen.	  Our	  impression	  yesterday	  was	   that	   in	  view	  of	  he	   [him]	  being	  blamed	   for	  calling	  Soviet	  troops,	  that	  he	  lost	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  popularity;	  where	  he	  stands	  today	  and	  how	  the	  people	  would	  view	  a	  further	  retreat	  from	  Kadar	  to	  Nagy,	  we	  do	  not	  know.	  We	  presume	  Nagy	  is	  to	  all	  intents	  and	  purpose	  Premier.	  Should	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  calling	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  now	  be	  placed	  on	  Gerő	  and	  he	  made	  a	  scapegoat	  for	  all	  this	  is	  going	  on	  now,	  and	  if	  he	  made	  further	  concessions,	  he	  might	  have	  a	  chance.	  But	  we	  do	  know	  enough	  to	  anything	  very	  certainly.295	  	  This	  influx	  of	  live	  information	  was	  crucial	  for	  U.S.	  Intelligence.	  The	  proximity	  of	  the	  Legation	  to	  the	  situation	  also	  helped	  to	  inform	  the	  U.S.	  government	  with	  valuable	  information.	  The	  information	  and	  the	  turn	  of	  events	  were	  too	  rapid	  to	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  ever	  truly	  pause	  and	  assess	  the	  situation	  to	  formulate	  a	  policy.	  Every	  time	  the	  U.S.	  tried	  to	  develop	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  regarding	  the	  situation,	  the	  Legation	  sent	  a	  telegram	  reporting	  new	  developments,	  disrupting	  the	  previous	  plan	  of	  action.	  While	  the	  information	  was	  helpful	  to	  keep	  the	  U.S.	  informed,	  the	  proximity	  and	  constant	  flow	  of	  information	  also	  crippled	  the	  U.S.	  from	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  devise	  a	  plan	  of	  action	  and	  policy	  towards	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Every	  hour	  the	  U.S.	  was	  receiving	  new	  updates	  that	  changed	  the	  political	  climate	  within	  Hungary.	  	  	   The	  Legation	  continued	  to	  report	  live.	  In	  fact,	  Barnes	  reported	  to	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  “In	  speech	  just	  delivered	  on	  radio,	  Imre	  Nagy	  has	  promised,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  arms	  laid	  down,	  Soviet	  troops	  now	  fighting	  will	  be	  withdrawn	  to	  former	  position	  in	  Hungary	  and	  that	  negotiations	  will	  be	  started	  to	  have	  all	  Soviet	  troops	  withdrawn.”296	  The	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Legation	  reported	  crowds	  gathering	  outside	  their	  building	  and	  calling	  for	  the	  removal	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  and	  calling	  upon	  the	  United	  States	  for	  help.	  While	  they	  claimed	  that	  the	  crowds	  never	  got	  violent,	  there	  was	  still	  some	  fear	  among	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Legation.297	  	  	   The	  revolt	  in	  Hungary	  had	  finally	  calmed	  down	  enough	  to	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  pause	  and	  assess	  the	  situation	  and	  decide	  what	  they	  should	  do	  in	  response	  to	  the	  revolt	  and	  violence.	  Three	  days	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  in	  Hungary,	  on	  October	  26,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  held	  its	  301st	  Meeting.	  Director	  Dulles	  prefaced	  that	  while	  it	  was	  too	  early	  to	  draw	  any	  conclusions,	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  create	  speculations.298	  Naturally,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  was	  inclined	  to	  compare	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  with	  the	  prior	  events	  of	  Poland	  that	  year.	  	  Director	  Dulles	  proposed	  that	  “Soviet	  intervention	  in	  Hungary	  may	  have	  been	  due	  to	  Soviet	  unwillingness	  to	  submit	  to	  a	  second	  humiliation	  after	  Poland.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  had	  from	  the	  outset	  exhibited	  much	  clearer	  anti-­‐Soviet	  and	  anti-­‐Communist	  bias	  than	  had	  the	  Polish	  disorders.”299	  Director	  Dulles	  comprehended	  the	  difficult	  and	  embarrassing	  situation	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  placed	  themselves	  in	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  and	  its	  repercussions.	  Khrushchev	  arrogantly	  attempted	  to	  allow	  greater	  freedom	  within	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  to	  prove	  the	  security	  of	  the	  communist	  system,	  however,	  it	  immediately	  backfired.	  It	  became	  clear	  that	  force	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  insure	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  control	  and	  communist	  control	  in	  Hungary.	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Furthermore,	  Director	  Dulles	  recognized	  “that	  the	  revolt	  in	  Hungary	  constituted	  the	  most	  serious	  threat	  yet	  to	  be	  posed	  to	  continued	  Soviet	  control	  of	  the	  satellites.	  It	  confronted	  Moscow	  with	  a	  very	  harsh	  dilemma:	  Either	  to	  revert	  to	  a	  harsh	  Stalinist	  policy,	  or	  to	  permit	  democratization	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  satellites	  to	  a	  point	  in	  which	  risked	  the	  complete	  loss	  of	  Soviet	  control	  of	  the	  satellites.”300	  The	  influx	  of	  information	  from	  the	  Legation	  in	  Budapest	  obviously	  contributed	  to	  Director	  Dulles	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation.	  Based	  on	  the	  rapid	  response	  from	  the	  Legation,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  was	  able	  to	  react	  to	  events	  while	  they	  were	  still	  unfolding,	  something	  very	  different	  from	  their	  reaction	  to	  Khrushchev’s	  secret	  speech	  back	  in	  February.	  	  	   The	  meeting	  continued	  and	  Director	  Dulles	  anticipated	  “that	  the	  Soviet	  leaders	  in	  Moscow	  would	  try	  to	  convey	  an	  outward	  impression	  of	  continued	  unity	  of	  belief	  and	  action.”301	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  his	  fear	  that,	  “In	  view	  of	  the	  serious	  deterioration	  of	  their	  position	  in	  the	  satellites,	  might	  they	  not	  be	  tempted	  to	  resort	  to	  very	  extreme	  measures	  and	  even	  to	  precipitate	  global	  war?”302	  	  While	  President	  Eisenhower	  and	  the	  U.S.	  government	  stood	  firmly	  against	  engaging	  in	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  confidence	  in	  the	  Soviets	  feeling	  the	  same	  based	  on	  recent	  developments.	  It	  took	  the	  revolt	  in	  Hungary	  to	  shake	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  confidence	  that	  war	  could	  be	  avoided.	  Now,	  with	  Hungary	  revolting	  right	  after	  the	  events	  in	  Poland,	  the	  U.S.	  feared	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  panic	  and	  act	  desperately,	  potentially	  leading	  to	  another	  world	  war.	  The	  United	  States’	  opinion	  and	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  had	  drastically	  changed.	  Their	  confidence	  in	  Khrushchev	  and	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the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  avoid	  war	  had	  been	  deflated,	  which	  caused	  the	  U.S.	  to	  be	  at	  a	  standstill	  even	  more	  than	  before.	  The	  U.S.	  options	  to	  react	  to	  the	  events	  became	  more	  limited	  with	  this	  turn	  of	  opinion.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  never	  wanted	  to	  engage	  military	  it	  definitely	  would	  not	  even	  consider	  acting	  in	  any	  way	  that	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  war	  or	  directly	  engage	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  fear	  of	  them	  acting	  irrationally.	  The	  fate	  of	  the	  Hungarians	  changed	  without	  the	  potential	  promise	  of	  military	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  	  	   Governor	  Harold	  Stassen303,	  who	  was	  in	  attendance	  at	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  meeting:	  Wondered	  if	  it	  would	  not	  be	  prudent	  to	  try	  to	  get	  some	  message	  to	  marshal	  Zhukov	   indicating	   that	   the	   achievement	   of	   freedom	   in	   the	   Soviet	   satellites	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  as	  posing	  any	  real	  threat	  to	  the	  national	   security	  of	   the	  USSR.	  We	  should	  make	  clear	   that	   this	  development	  would	  not	  impel	  the	  Western	  powers	  to	  make	  any	  warlike	  move	  against	  the	  Soviet	  Union.304	  	  	  Despite	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressing	  his	  concern	  previously,	  he	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  Governor	  Stassen.	  	  	   The	  301st	  meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  documented	  a	  change	  in	  opinion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  their	  opinion	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  Director	  Dulles	  understood	  the	  Soviet	  and	  communist	  embarrassment	  of	  two	  satellites	  revolting	  within	  months	  of	  each	  other.	  Despite	  this	  understanding,	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  was	  still	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  how	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  react.	  The	  U.S.	  now	  feared	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  do	  anything	  in	  its	  power	  to	  prevent	  Hungary	  from	  seceding,	  including	  actions	  that	  would	  risk	  another	  world	  war.	  The	  U.S.	  lost	  its	  confidence	  and	  grew	  wearier	  over	  how	  this	  revolt	  would	  end.	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   On	  October	  27,	  the	  Legation	  in	  Budapest	  sent	  another	  telegram	  updating	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  They	  informed	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  that	  the	  revolt	  had	  spread	  from	  outside	  of	  Budapest	  into	  Szeged,	  Pecs,	  Miskolc,	  Debrecen,	  Komarom,	  Magyarovar,	  Gyor,	  and	  much	  of	  Trans-­‐Danubia.305	  The	  spread	  of	  the	  uprisings	  revealed	  the	  Hungarian	  and	  Soviet	  failure	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  the	  Hungarian	  population.	  In	  response	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  control,	  the	  Legation	  reported	  that,	  	  It	   can	   be	   summed	   up	   in	   proposition	   that	   Soviets	   under	   legal	   cover	   of	  Hungarian	   Communist	   Government	   will	   engage	   in	   ruthless	   suppression	   if	  insurgents	  don’t	  surrender;	  and	  insurgents	  have	  complete	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	   government	   carrying	   out	   promised	   concessions	   if	   they	   do	   capitulate.	  Insurgents	  thus	  faced	  with	  following	  narrow	  range	  of	  alternatives.	  (A)	  Fight	  to	  end	  and	  die	  and	  in	  process	  se	  many	  of	  unarmed	  population	  also	  suffer;	  (B)	  fight	  and	  die	  in	  hope	  hold	  out	  long	  enough	  for	  some	  outside	  intervention	  or	  pressure	  to	  modify	  regime	  and	  Soviet	  intention	  and/or	  capability	  of	  ruthless	  suppression;	   (C)	   accept	   government’s	   acting	   in	   good	   faith	   in	   promised	  concessions,	  and	  surrender.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  Legation	  expected	  the	  Soviets	  to	  use	  Stalinistic	  force	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt,	  thus	  validating	  President	  Eisenhower’s	  fear	  from	  the	  301st	  National	  Security	  Council	  meeting	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  risk	  the	  potential	  of	  general	  war	  to	  maintain	  control	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Legation	  kept	  the	  U.S.	  government	  very	  well	  informed.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  members	  recognized	  the	  political	  and	  moral	  predicament	  that	  they	  were	  faced	  with.	  The	  Legation	  advocated	  for	  U.S.	  material	  support	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  their	  limitations	  to	  avoid	  war.	  	  	   At	  a	  loss	  of	  how	  to	  proceed,	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  continued	  to	  make	  statements	  exposing	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	  On	  October	  27,	  Secretary	  Dulles	  addressed	  the	  Dallas	  Council	  on	  World	  Affairs	  where	  he	  said:	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The	  Polish	  people	  now	   loosen	   the	  Soviet	  grip	  upon	   the	   land	   they	   love.	  And	  the	   heroic	   people	   of	   Hungary	   challenge	   the	   murderous	   fire	   of	   Red	   Army	  tanks.	   These	   patriots	   value	   liberty	   more	   than	   life	   itself.	   And	   all	   who	  peacefully	  enjoy	  liberty	  have	  a	  solemn	  duty	  to	  seek,	  by	  all	  truly	  helpful	  means,	  that	   those	  who	  now	  die	   for	   freedom	  will	  not	  have	  died	   in	  vain.	   It	   is	   in	   this	  spirit	   that	   the	   United	   States	   and	   others	   have	   today	   acted	   to	   bring	   the	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council.	  The	  weakness	  of	  Soviet	   imperialism	   is	   being	   made	   manifest.	   Its	   weakness	   is	   not	   military	  weakness	  nor	  lack	  of	  material	  power.	  It	  is	  weak	  because	  it	  seeks	  to	  sustain	  an	  unnatural	   tyranny	   by	   suppressing	   human	   aspirations	   which	   cannot	  indefinitely	   be	   suppressed	   and	   by	   concealing	   truths	   which	   cannot	  indefinitely	  be	  hidden.306	  	  Secretary	  Dulles	  expressed	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  exploited	  the	  opportunity	  to	  inform	  many	  important	  people	  on	  the	  situation	  thereby	  hoping	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  Hungary.	  	   The	  U.S.	  government	  continued	  its	  assessment	  of	  its	  role	  within	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	  On	  October	  29,	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Soviet	  and	  Related	  Problems	  convened	  for	  their	  40th	  meeting.	  The	  Committee	  was	  concerned	  over	  what	  they	  should	  be	  broadcasting	  over	  the	  radio	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  people.	  Jacob	  D.	  Beam,	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  European	  Affairs,	  expressed	  that	  their	  first	  priority	  was	  to	  get	  the	  Soviets	  out	  of	  Hungary.	  After	  that,	  they	  wanted	  to	  reassure	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  was	  still	  a	  puppet	  of	  Soviet	  control	  and	  to	  brace	  themselves	  for	  disappointment	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  demands.307	  Beam	  further	  argued	  that	  the	  most	  U.S.	  broadcasts	  could	  do	  for	  the	  insurgents	  was	  to	  keep	  them	  informed.308	  It	  was	  very	  apparent	  that	  during	  this	  meeting	  there	  was	  disagreement	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  should	  verbally	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support	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  and	  to	  encourage	  them	  to	  keep	  fighting.	  The	  argument	  against	  the	  broadcasts	  was	  the	  moral	  implications	  that	  would	  present	  itself	  if	  the	  revolt	  failed.	  The	  fear	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  encourage	  the	  Hungarians	  to	  continue	  fighting,	  while	  knowing	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  going	  to	  militarily	  intervene.	  	   Later	  that	  night	  Barnes	  reported	  from	  Budapest	  regarding	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  Barnes	  stated	  that	  the,	  “Soviets	  have	  Budapest	  under	  control	  with	  three	  Soviet	  mechanized	  divisions,	  although	  there	  are	  a	  few	  hard	  core	  resistance	  centers	  still	  in	  city	  proper.	  Soviet	  units	  at	  moment	  sitting	  in	  concentrations	  various	  key	  areas	  and	  blocking	  bridges.	  Appear	  in	  defensive	  posture.”309	  He	  was	  unsure	  of	  what	  the	  Soviet’s	  next	  move	  would	  be.	  In	  another	  telegram	  later	  that	  night,	  Barnes	  insisted	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  would	  not	  survive	  much	  longer	  without	  Western	  support,	  both	  negotiating	  assistance	  and	  military	  support,	  either	  supplies	  or	  men.310	  	  	   The	  following	  day,	  on	  October	  30,	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate311	  produced	  a	  report	  assessing	  the	  “Probable	  Developments	  in	  East	  Europe	  and	  Implications	  for	  Soviet	  Policy.”312	  The	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  viewed	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  situation	  as	  follows:	  Soviet	  policy	  is	  now	  confronted	  with	  serious	  dilemmas:	  (a)	  the	  need	  to	  make	  some	   accommodation	   with	   the	   increasing	   pressures	   of	   nationalism	   in	   the	  Satellites	  without	  losing	  the	  essential	  minimum	  of	  control	  over	  them;	  (b)	  the	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difficulty	   of	   using	   Soviet	   armed	   might	   to	   put	   down	   nationalist	   and	   anti-­‐Communist	  revolt	  in	  the	  face	  of	  world	  opinion.313	  	  The	  U.S.	  clearly	  comprehended	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev’s	  predicament.	  This	  dilemma	  left	  the	  U.S.	  confused	  on	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  move,	  thereby	  preventing	  the	  U.S.	  from	  creating	  a	  policy	  in	  anticipation	  of	  what	  would	  occur.	  	  	   The	  report	  continued	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  in	  each	  satellite	  independently.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  recognized	  that	  the	  government	  in	  Poland	  still	  remained	  communist.	  The	  Polish	  regime	  seemed	  to	  have	  reduced	  Soviet	  influence,	  thereby	  inching	  closer	  to	  independence.	  Furthermore,	  the	  regime	  promised	  to	  begin	  to	  introduce	  democratic	  governmental	  features,	  to	  improve	  living	  standards,	  and	  to	  stop	  coercive	  collectivization.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Polish	  leadership,	  “pledged	  to	  maintain	  the	  alliance	  with	  the	  USSR,	  including	  the	  retention	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  in	  Poland	  as	  long	  as	  NATO	  forces	  remain	  in	  Germany,	  but	  reserving	  the	  right	  to	  choose	  whether	  or	  not	  Soviet	  specialists	  and	  military	  advisors	  will	  remain	  in	  the	  Polish	  army.”314	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  delicate	  balance	  that	  Gomułka	  was	  playing	  with.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Gomułka	  had	  to	  appease	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  some	  liberty	  in	  making	  decisions.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  if	  he	  acted	  with	  too	  much	  freedom,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  intervene.	  	  	   While	  the	  U.S.	  expressed	  optimism	  towards	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland,	  they	  did	  not	  seem	  as	  confident	  about	  the	  developments	  in	  Hungary.	  The	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  criticized	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  for	  responding	  too	  slowly	  to	  the	  demands	  thereby	  only	  further	  fueling	  the	  demands	  and	  making	  the	  problem	  worse.	  Furthermore,	  they	  feared	  that	  “it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  any	  Hungarian	  government	  will	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  a	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compromise	  between	  Soviet	  security	  requirements	  and	  Hungarian	  nationalist	  sentiment.”315	  A	  week	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  violence	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiment,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unsure	  of	  what	  the	  future	  held	  for	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   The	  report	  assessed	  what	  the	  recent	  developments	  in	  both	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  would	  mean	  for	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Western	  world.	  The	  U.S.	  anticipated	  an	  increase	  in	  trade	  between	  the	  West	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  satellites	  economic	  dependence	  on	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  it	  also	  predicted	  that	  the	  recent	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiments	  would	  lead	  to	  demands	  for	  greater	  economic	  independence.	  In	  addition	  to	  increased	  trading,	  the	  U.S.	  foresaw	  that	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  would	  lean	  on	  Western	  powers	  for	  economic	  credits.316	  	  	   Continuing	  with	  their	  report,	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  turned	  to	  what	  these	  events	  meant	  for	  the	  development	  of	  Soviet	  policy.	  The	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  caught	  off	  guard	  by	  the	  revolt	  in	  Hungary	  and	  have	  been	  hesitating	  to	  create	  a	  plan	  for	  their	  handling	  of	  the	  satellites.	  The	  report	  argued,	  “It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  be	  confident	  on	  this	  matter,	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  Soviet	  leadership	  may	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  confusion,	  and	  until	  basic	  decisions	  are	  made,	  may	  be	  unable	  to	  conduct	  policy	  with	  sureness	  of	  touch.”317	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unable	  to	  formulate	  a	  policy	  because	  they	  did	  not	  know	  and	  could	  not	  predict	  Soviet	  policy.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  further	  understood	  the	  implications	  that	  Khrushchev	  might	  be	  faced	  with,	  “If	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels	  are	  able	  to	  achieve	  a	  substantial	  political	  victory,	  pressures	  for	  policy	  changes	  will	  almost	  certainly	  make	  the	  position	  of	  the	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Khrushchev	  leadership	  increasingly	  difficult.	  The	  position	  of	  advocates	  of	  a	  harder	  line	  may	  be	  strengthened.”318	  Hungary	  presented	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  with	  greater	  problems	  than	  Poland	  did.	  The	  instability	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  resulted	  in	  the	  failure	  of	  appeasing	  the	  rebels.	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  needed	  to	  step	  in	  to	  suppress	  the	  revolt	  before	  it	  erupted	  into	  a	  full-­‐scale	  revolution.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  understood	  all	  of	  these	  problems.	  However,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  understand	  where	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  stood.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  nervous	  waiting	  game	  to	  see	  what	  would	  transpire,	  while	  neither	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  nor	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  reveal	  their	  hand.	  	   Despite	  their	  correct	  understanding	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  dilemma	  with	  the	  satellites,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  interpret	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  likely	  choice	  of	  reactions.	  The	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  claimed:	  It	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   US	   action	   short	   of	   overt	   military	   intervention	   or	  obvious	  preparation	  for	  such	  intervention	  would	  lead	  the	  USSR	  deliberately	  to	  take	  steps	  which	  it	  believed	  would	  materially	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  general	  war.	  The	  Soviet	  leaders	  probably	  recognize	  that	  the	  US	  nuclear-­‐air	  capability	  remains	   superior	   to	   that	   of	   the	  USSR,	   and	  have	  probably	   concluded	   that	   at	  present	   the	   USSR,	   even	   if	   it	   launched	   a	   surprise	   attack,	   would	   receive	  unacceptable	  damage	  in	  a	  nuclear	  exchange	  with	  the	  US.319	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  overly	  confident	  in	  their	  superiority	  in	  their	  nuclear	  weapons	  and	  knowledge.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  believed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  more	  afraid	  of	  starting	  a	  general	  war	  than	  losing	  their	  satellites.	  The	  United	  States	  arrogantly	  trusted	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  feared	  their	  superior	  nuclear	  power,	  which	  would	  prevent	  the	  Soviets	  from	  acting	  too	  rash	  or	  forceful.	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The	  U.S.	  confidence	  shifted	  once	  again.	  Before,	  they	  were	  confident	  in	  the	  Soviet’s	  fear	  of	  general	  war.	  When	  that	  dissipated,	  the	  U.S.	  took	  confidence	  in	  their	  nuclear	  power	  and	  the	  threat	  it	  posed	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  desperately	  looking	  for	  reasons	  why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  use	  brutal	  force,	  rather	  than	  recognizing	  why	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  cruelly	  suppress	  the	  Hungarians.	  This	  strategy	  allowed	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  to	  find	  an	  excuse	  to	  provide	  military	  support.	  	  	   On	  the	  same	  day	  as	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate’s	  report,	  Barnes	  sent	  a	  telegram	  updating	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State.	  Barnes	  regarded	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  as	  a	  “highly	  unstable	  stalemate	  which	  could	  very	  well	  result	  in	  application	  iron	  fist	  by	  Soviets.”320	  Barnes	  opinion	  of	  the	  situation	  drastically	  contrasted	  with	  that	  of	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate’s	  opinion.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  was	  optimistically	  anticipating	  that	  Khrushchev	  would	  stand	  by	  his	  word	  and	  not	  slam	  down	  the	  Stalinistic	  iron	  fist	  to	  end	  the	  revolt.	  However,	  Barnes	  interpreted	  the	  situation	  very	  differently,	  presenting	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  U.S.	  government	  was	  neglectfully	  misinterpreting	  the	  Legation’s	  information.	  	  The	  American	  Legation	  attributed	  the	  stalemate	  between	  the	  Hungarian	  insurgents	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  shrewd	  leadership.	  As	  of	  now,	  Barnes	  claimed	  that	  Nagy	  proved	  himself	  to	  lack	  the	  leadership	  capacity	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  rebels.321	  	  	   Twenty-­‐eight	  minutes	  after	  Barnes	  telegram,	  Nagy	  announced	  the	  return	  to	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system,	  which	  included	  the	  revival	  of	  the	  Smallholder	  Party,	  the	  Social	  Democrats,	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and	  the	  National	  Peasant	  Party.	  An	  inner	  cabinet	  was	  created,	  which	  had	  representation	  of	  these	  parties.	  Nagy	  further	  announced	  that	  negotiations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  about	  troop	  withdrawal	  were	  to	  begin	  shortly.322	  	  	  	   On	  the	  same	  day,	  October	  30,	  the	  Soviet	  Central	  Committee	  passed	  the	  “Declaration	  on	  the	  Basis	  of	  the	  Development	  and	  Further	  Strengthening	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Cooperation	  Between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Other	  Socialist	  States.”323	  The	  Declaration	  read:	  The	   Soviet	   Government	   and	   all	   the	   Soviet	   people	   deeply	   regret	   that	   the	  development	   of	   events	   in	  Hungary	  has	   led	   to	   bloodshed.	  On	   the	   request	   of	  the	  Hungarian	  People’s	  Government	  the	  Soviet	  government	  consented	  to	  the	  entry	  into	  Budapest	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Army	  units	  to	  assist	  the	  Hungarian	  People’s	  Army	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  authorities	  to	  establish	  order	  in	  the	  town.	  Believing	  that	   the	   further	   presence	   of	   Soviet	   Army	   units	   in	   Hungary	   can	   serve	   as	   a	  cause	  for	  even	  greater	  deterioration	  of	  the	  situation,	  the	  Soviet	  Government	  has	  given	  instructions	  to	  its	  military	  command	  to	  withdraw	  the	  Soviet	  Army	  units	   from	   Budapest	   as	   soon	   as	   this	   is	   recognized	   as	   necessary	   by	   the	  Hungarian	  Government.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  Soviet	  Government	  is	  ready	  to	  enter	   into	   relevant	   negotiations	   with	   the	   Government	   of	   the	   Hungarian	  People’s	   Republic	   and	   other	   participants	   of	   the	   Warsaw	   treaty	   on	   the	  question	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  Soviet	  troops	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  Hungary.324	  	  	  The	  recent	  developments	  of	  Soviet	  actions	  changed	  the	  tone	  of	  discussions	  among	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  announced	  its	  willingness	  to	  negotiate	  with	  the	  Hungarian	  government,	  validating	  the	  United	  States’	  naiveté	  regarding	  what	  the	  Soviets	  would	  not	  do.	  	  	   Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles	  circulated	  a	  telegram	  to	  all	  diplomatic	  missions	  an	  hour	  and	  a	  half	  after	  Nagy’s	  announcement.	  He	  claimed	  that	  it	  appeared	  that	  Nagy	  had	  control	  of	  Budapest.325	  Secretary	  Dulles	  also	  reported	  that	  the	  rebels	  seemed	  to	  have	  divided	  into	  groups:	  “National	  Communists	  fighting	  Soviet	  troops	  and	  opposing	  government	  as	  long	  as	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it	  uses	  them,	  and	  anti-­‐Communists	  with	  more	  sweeping	  aims	  in	  direction	  of	  democracy.”326	  Dulles	  presented	  the,	  “question	  whether	  Soviets	  willing	  to	  allow	  stabilization	  under	  Nagy	  Government	  committed	  to	  withdrawal	  their	  troops	  (with	  all	  that	  implies	  for	  other	  satellite	  countries)	  or	  whether	  they	  must	  proceed	  to	  reestablish	  complete	  control	  over	  country	  in	  role	  of	  alien	  occupier	  (which	  implies	  huge	  military	  burden	  for	  future	  and	  nullifies	  present	  world	  posture).”327	  Secretary	  Dulles	  expressed	  the	  everlasting	  confusion	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government	  regarding	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  He	  articulated	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  was	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  military	  exerting	  force	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  people.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  lacked	  to	  provide	  a	  path	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  	  On	  October	  31,	  the	  Planning	  Board	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  drafted	  a	  policy	  statement.	  The	  report	  started	  by	  stating,	  “our	  initial	  objective	  toward	  the	  Eastern	  European	  satellite	  area	  has	  been	  to	  encourage,	  as	  a	  first	  step	  toward	  eventual	  full	  national	  independence	  and	  freedom,	  the	  emergence	  of	  ‘national’	  communist	  governments.”328	  After	  this,	  the	  Board	  assessed	  the	  achievements	  of	  this	  objective	  after	  the	  recent	  events	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  still	  promoting	  the	  same	  goals	  as	  before,	  they	  were	  just	  more	  prevalent	  because	  of	  the	  recent	  developments.	  Despite	  these	  goals	  being	  dominant,	  there	  was	  still	  an	  uncertainty	  over	  how	  to	  accomplish	  these	  goals.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  recognized	  that	  Hungary	  presented	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  for	  the	  U.S.	  but	  they	  were	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  how	  to	  exploit	  it.	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Naturally,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  consistently	  comparing	  what	  happened	  in	  Poland	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Hungary,	  in	  hopes	  that	  it	  would	  further	  their	  understanding	  of	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  U.S.	  felt	  confident	  in	  Gomułka	  leading	  Poland	  and	  further	  achieving	  this	  goal.	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  like	  the	  pledged	  Polish	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  Planning	  Board	  compared	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland	  to	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Hungary:	  In	  Poland,	  as	  in	  Hungary,	  recent	  developments	  have	  revealed	  the	  strong	  anti-­‐Russian	  and	  anti-­‐communist	   sentiments	  of	   the	  population.	  Unlike	  Hungary,	  the	   existence	   of	   strong	   leadership	   in	   Poland	   at	   a	   critical	  moment,	   fear	   of	   a	  reunified	  Germany	  with	  irredentist,	  claims	  and	  the	  timely	  promise	  of	  reforms,	  together	  with	   an	   assertion	   of	   ‘national	   independence’	   linked	  with	   a	   closely	  calculated	   defiance	   of	   Russian	   pressure,	   evidently	   has	   served	   to	   enable	   a	  reconstituted	  Polish	   communist	   government	   to	   set	   forth	   on	   its	   new	   course	  with	  the	  acquiescence,	  it	  not	  support,	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  Poles…In	  Hungary,	  a	  nationalist	  movement,	  similar	   to	   that	   in	  Poland,	  was	  triggered	   into	  national	  revolt	   by	   the	   intervention	   of	   Soviet	   troops	   called	   in	   by	   the	   Hungarian	  Government	  in	  the	  first	  hours	  of	  its	  difficulty.329	  	  The	  U.S.	  clearly	  understood	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  circumstances	  in	  Poland	  and	  those	  in	  Hungary.	  It	  was	  understood	  that	  if	  Nagy	  had	  been	  smarter	  and	  more	  careful	  then	  the	  revolt	  in	  Hungary	  would	  not	  have	  resulted	  in	  this	  terrible	  bloodshed.	  The	  U.S.	  could	  not	  forecast	  the	  future	  of	  Hungary.	  Both	  presented	  likeable	  situations	  to	  the	  U.S.	  because	  of	  the	  publicity	  of	  the	  events	  and	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  expressed.	  	  	   Based	  on	  the	  reaction	  to	  the	  events	  in	  Poland	  and	  the	  current	  response	  to	  the	  ongoing	  events	  in	  Hungary,	  the	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  Council	  concluded	  that	  “at	  least	  in	  those	  countries	  where	  Soviet	  troops	  are	  stationed,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  willing	  to	  use	  its	  armed	  forces	  to	  prevent	  the	  coming	  into	  power	  of	  a	  non-­‐communist	  government,	  or	  to	  prevent	  a	  communist	  government	  from	  altering	  a	  policy	  of	  close	  military	  and	  political	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alliance	  with	  the	  USSR.”330	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  troops	  throughout	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  and	  as	  long	  as	  those	  were	  present,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  be	  able	  to	  maintain	  communist	  control	  in	  its	  satellites.	  In	  regards	  to	  U.S.	  policy,	  they	  maintained	  their	  main	  objective	  of	  hoping	  to	  encourage	  non-­‐communist	  governments	  in	  both	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  wished	  to	  prevent	  Soviet	  force	  to	  be	  used	  on	  Hungarian	  civilians.	  	  	   Director	  Dulles	  of	  the	  CIA	  discussed	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Hungary	  on	  the	  first	  of	  November.	  Director	  Dulles	  proclaimed,	  “nevertheless,	  the	  impossible	  had	  happened,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  power	  of	  public	  opinion,	  armed	  force	  could	  not	  effectively	  be	  used.	  Approximately	  80%	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Army	  had	  defected	  to	  the	  rebels	  and	  provided	  the	  rebels	  with	  arms.	  Soviet	  troops	  themselves	  had	  had	  no	  stomach	  for	  shooting	  down	  Hungarians,	  except	  in	  Budapest.”331	  A	  newfound	  optimism	  existed	  among	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  events	  in	  Hungary.	  Director	  Dulles	  doubted	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  going	  to	  use	  force.	  The	  constant	  contradicting	  opinions	  of	  people	  reveal	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  what	  the	  U.S.	  move	  should	  be.	  	   On	  November	  2,	  Eisenhower	  allocated	  $20	  million	  to	  be	  used	  for	  food	  and	  other	  emergency	  relief	  resources	  for	  the	  Hungarian	  people.332	  The	  slowing	  of	  events	  allowed	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  assess	  the	  situation	  better	  and	  then	  decide	  to	  take	  some	  form	  of	  action.	  However,	  the	  support	  was	  only	  monetary	  for	  fear	  of	  implicating	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Soviet	  tensions	  and	  for	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fear	  of	  war.	  President	  Eisenhower	  was	  tiptoeing	  the	  line	  between	  support	  and	  avoiding	  the	  situation.	  	  	   Again	  on	  November	  2,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles	  produced	  a	  circular	  telegram	  for	  certain	  diplomatic	  missions.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  interpreted	  the	  Soviet	  Declaration	  from	  October	  30	  as	  the	  Soviets	  feeling	  that:	  Nationalist	  and	  anti-­‐Sov	  feeling	  has	  reached	  danger	  point	  where	  losses	  must	  be	  cut	  by	  accepting	  high	  degree	  independence	  satellites,	  but	  within	  ‘socialist’	  framework.	  Sovs	  probably	  hope	  maintain	  their	  influence	  through	  (1)	  national	  communist	   leaders’	   ideological	   identification	   with	   Sovs	   and	   their	   need	   for	  ultimate	   support	   against	   anti-­‐communism;	   (2)	   growing	   degree	   economic	  integration,	  even	  though	  trade	  will	  be	  on	  terms	  more	  favorable	  to	  satellites	  and	  Sovs	  will	  have	  to	  give	  some	  economic	  aid;	  (30	  and,	  at	  least	  in	  Poland	  and	  Czechoslovakia,	  fear	  of	  German	  resurgence.333	  	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  confident	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  insurgents	  had	  successfully	  pushed	  the	  Soviets	  out	  of	  Hungary	  and	  forced	  them	  to	  negotiate.	  The	  interpretation	  was	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  planned	  to	  cut	  its	  losses	  and	  try	  to	  maintain	  a	  socialist	  government	  in	  Hungary	  through	  negotiations.	  Secretary	  Dulles	  concluded	  this	  based	  on	  the	  Soviet	  declaration,	  which	  means	  that	  he	  trusted	  the	  word	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Secretary	  Dulles	  was	  looking	  to	  Poland	  as	  the	  precedent	  for	  Soviet	  Union	  action,	  creating	  belief	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  actually	  negotiate	  as	  long	  as	  Hungary	  guarantee	  its	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  continuance	  of	  a	  socialist	  government,	  similar	  to	  what	  Gomułka	  did.	  	  	   The	  following	  day,	  November	  3,	  Bohlen	  sent	  a	  telegram	  reporting	  his	  opinion	  on	  the	  tensions	  between	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Bohlen	  believed	  that:	  Soviet	   may	   not	   proceed	   immediately	   to	   use	   of	   force	   but,	   depending	   upon	  attitude	   Hungarian	   government,	   may	   seek	   through	   mixed	   commission	   or	  other	  device	   to	  soften	  up	  Nagy	  and	  Hungarian	  Communists	  with	   ‘promises’	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concerning	  troop	  withdrawal	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  rebels	  to	  surrender	  arms.	  If,	  however,	  Nagy,	  stands	  firm	  it	   looks	  at	  this	  moment	  as	  though	  Soviet	  troops	  would	  go	  into	  action.334	  	  Bohlen	  shrewdly	  gauged	  the	  tense	  situation	  between	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Again,	  he	  presented	  a	  varying	  of	  opinions	  between	  the	  ambassadors	  and	  diplomats	  against	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  intelligence	  at	  home.	  This	  contrast	  speaks	  to	  the	  value	  of	  proximity	  of	  the	  ambassadors	  and	  diplomats	  and	  maybe	  even	  the	  blind	  optimism	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  	  	   That	  same	  day,	  November	  3,	  Lodge	  discussed	  with	  the	  Hungarian	  Representative	  János	  Szabó	  about	  current	  information	  regarding	  Nagy	  and	  Hungary.	  Lodge	  stated:	  We	  are	  still	  disturbed	  by	   the	  wide	  differences	  between	  Soviet	  Union	  words	  about	   troop	   withdrawals	   and	   Soviet	   Union	   actions,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   news	  reports.	  We	  believe,	   accordingly,	   that	   adjournment	   for	   a	   day	   or	   two	  would	  give	   a	   real	   opportunity	   to	   the	   Hungarian	   Government	   to	   carry	   out	   its	  announced	  desire	  to	  arrange	  for	  an	  orderly	  and	  immediate	  evacuation	  of	  all	  Soviet	  troops.	  But,	  clearly,	  the	  Security	  Council	  must	  keep	  this	  matter	  under	  urgent	  consideration.335	  	  Lodge	  acknowledged	  the	  important	  disparity	  between	  the	  pledges	  of	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   The	  Soviet	  Union	  disparity	  continued	  on	  November	  3,	  when	  Edward	  T.	  Wailes,	  the	  Minister	  to	  Hungary,	  reported	  that,	  “firing	  in	  suburbs	  started	  at	  exactly	  0500	  local	  time.	  Guns	  are	  heavy	  caliber	  and	  to	  date	  firing	  appears	  to	  be	  going	  out	  from	  city	  rather	  than	  [garble].”336	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  claimed	  that	  they	  were	  withdrawing	  their	  troops,	  but	  that	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was	  not	  the	  case	  early	  November.	  The	  American	  Legation	  in	  Budapest	  relayed	  a	  message	  from	  Hungarian	  government,	  which	  a	  portion	  read	  as	  follows:	  The	   subjugation	   of	   Hungary,	   however,	   would	   not	   only	   signify	   renewal	   of	  oppression	   in	   this	   country	   but	   it	   would	   also	   stop	   the	   liberation	   trend[s]	  which	   have	   started	   so	   hopefully	   in	   the	   other	   East	   European	   countries;	   it	  would	  also	  bankrupt	  the	  ten	  year	  old	  American	  liberation	  policy	  which	  was	  pursued	  with	  so	  much	   firmness	  and	  wisdom.	   It	  would	  create	  a	  crisis	   in	   the	  confidence	   of	   all	   the	   East	   European	   people	   in	   the	   USA	   and	   [the	   other	  lands]…we	  are	  not	  in	  the	  position	  to	  further	  pursue	  these	  suggestions	  but	  we	  strongly	  emphasize	   that	   in	   this	  moment	   the	   fate	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	   the	  entire	   world	   depends	   on	   the	   action	   of	   the	   President;	   the	   next	   few	   critical	  days	   will	   determine	   whether	   we	   enter	   a	   path	   of	   peace	   and	   liberation	   or	  whether	  we	  shall	  increase	  the	  appetite	  of	  aggression	  and	  proceed	  to	  a	  certain	  world	  catastrophe.337	  	  The	  Hungarian	  government	  appealed	  to	  both	  the	  fear	  and	  morality	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  in	  hopes	  to	  involve	  the	  U.S.	  in	  helping	  them	  prevent	  Soviet	  troops	  from	  mobilizing.	  The	  message	  also	  conveyed	  the	  realization	  that	  the	  Hungarian	  government	  cannot	  defeat	  the	  Soviet	  troops	  without	  help.	  In	  fact,	  they	  see	  their	  future	  being	  the	  inevitable	  Soviet	  oppression	  unless	  President	  Eisenhower	  acts.	  	  	   At	  3	  a.m.	  on	  November	  4,	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  held	  its	  754th	  meeting,	  where	  Lodge	  pleaded	  to	  the	  council,	  “If	  ever	  there	  was	  a	  time	  when	  the	  action	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  could	  literally	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  life	  and	  death	  for	  a	  whole	  nation,	  this	  is	  that	  time.	  If	  ever	  there	  was	  a	  question	  which	  clearly	  raised	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  peace,	  this	  is	  the	  question.”338	  The	  U.S.	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  act	  to	  help	  the	  Hungarian	  people,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  go	  in	  alone.	  A	  point	  worth	  noting	  was	  that	  1956	  was	  an	  election	  year,	  which	  meant	  that	  President	  Eisenhower	  was	  facing	  reelection	  on	  November	  6,	  1956.	  While	  the	  U.S.	  government	  wanted	  to	  help	  the	  Hungarians,	  the	  U.S.	  people	  did	  not	  want	  to	  send	  any	  more	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troops	  into	  a	  war	  after	  just	  finishing	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  World	  War	  II	  where	  many	  Americans	  lost	  their	  lives.	  If	  President	  Eisenhower	  sent	  troops	  to	  Hungary	  to	  support	  the	  revolt,	  it	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  he	  would	  not	  have	  won	  reelection.	  For	  fear	  of	  losing	  reelection,	  President	  Eisenhower	  was	  not	  willing	  to	  militarily	  engage	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  fear,	  they	  turned	  to	  the	  support	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  hopes	  that	  it	  would	  not	  just	  be	  American	  troops.	  The	  other	  motivation	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  was	  to	  prevent	  the	  military	  action	  from	  evolving	  into	  a	  war	  but	  rather	  a	  quick,	  yet	  forceful	  suppression	  of	  Soviet	  oppression	  because	  of	  the	  sheer	  number	  they	  could	  accumulate.	  Furthermore,	  the	  U.S.	  could	  not	  turn	  to	  its	  usual	  allies	  of	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  because	  of	  their	  entanglement	  in	  the	  Suez	  crisis	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Worse,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  abandoned	  their	  allies	  in	  this	  time	  of	  need	  and	  refused	  to	  support	  them	  in	  the	  Suez	  crisis.339	  	  	  Simultaneously,	  while	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  were	  revolting,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  involved	  with	  the	  British	  and	  French	  at	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  The	  crisis	  began	  when	  the	  Egyptian	  president	  decided	  to	  nationalize	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  in	  July	  1956.	  340	  In	  response,	  Israel	  invaded	  	  the	  canal	  zone.	  Additionally,	  British	  and	  French	  forces	  invaded	  the	  Canal	  for	  the	  immediate	  reason	  of	  protecting	  the	  communication	  lines.341	  Heightening	  tensions	  even	  more,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  threatened	  to	  intervene	  as	  well,	  further	  raising	  the	  specter	  for	  another	  world	  war.	  However,	  control	  of	  Suez	  had	  further	  implications.	  It	  was	  an	  ideological	  war,	  similar	  to	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Defending	  Suez	  was	  symbolic	  of	  defending	  Europe	  from	  communism.	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Later	  on	  in	  the	  morning	  of	  November	  4,	  Wailes	  reported	  that	  “as	  late	  as	  ten	  o’clock	  the	  Hungarians	  were	  negotiating	  with	  the	  Soviets	  and	  have	  also	  heard	  this	  morning	  that	  Hungarian	  delegation	  has	  not	  returned.”342	  At	  the	  start	  of	  November	  4,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  still	  hopeful	  that	  the	  situation	  could	  be	  resolved	  through	  negotiations.	  The	  lack	  of	  return	  of	  the	  delegation	  started	  to	  diminish	  this	  faith.	  	  	   In	  the	  afternoon	  of	  November	  4,	  President	  Eisenhower	  sent	  a	  message	  to	  Marshal	  Bulganin,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Minister	  of	  the	  USSR.	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  disappointment	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union:	  “We	  have	  been	  inexpressibly	  shocked	  by	  the	  apparent	  reversal	  of	  this	  policy.	  It	  is	  especially	  shocking	  that	  this	  renewed	  application	  of	  force	  against	  the	  Hungarian	  Government	  and	  people	  took	  place	  while	  negotiations	  were	  going	  on	  between	  your	  representatives	  and	  those	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Government	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  forces.”343	  Eisenhower	  further	  pleaded,	  “I	  urge	  in	  the	  name	  of	  humanity	  and	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  peace	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  take	  action	  to	  withdraw	  Soviet	  forces	  from	  Hungary	  immediately	  and	  to	  permit	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  to	  enjoy	  and	  exercise	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  affirmed	  for	  all	  peoples	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter.”344	  President	  Eisenhower	  desperately	  tried	  pleading	  and	  negotiating	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  hopes	  to	  end	  this	  dire	  situation	  diplomatically	  and	  to	  prevent	  any	  more	  deaths.	  	  	   Eisenhower	  continued	  his	  pleading	  by	  sending	  a	  letter	  to	  Nikolai	  Bulganin,	  premier	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  in	  response	  to	  recent	  Soviet	  intervention	  despite	  its	  declaration	  on	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October	  30	  claiming	  a	  non-­‐intervention	  policy.	  He	  professed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  Soviet	  Declaration	  of	  October	  30	  to	  be	  “an	  act	  of	  high	  statesmanship.”	  345	  Eisenhower	  voiced	  his	  disappointment:	  We	  have	  been	  inexpressibly	  shocked	  by	  the	  apparent	  reversal	  of	  this	  policy.	  It	   is	   especially	   shocking	   that	   this	   renewed	   application	   of	   force	   against	   the	  Hungarian	  Government	  and	  people	  took	  place	  while	  negotiations	  were	  going	  on	  between	  your	  representatives	  and	  those	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Government	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	   forces…I	  urge	   in	   the	  name	  of	  humanity	  and	   in	   the	  cause	   of	   peace	   that	   the	   Soviet	  Union	   take	   action	   to	  withdraw	  Soviet	   forces	  from	  Hungary	  immediately	  and	  to	  permit	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  to	  enjoy	  and	  exercise	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  freedoms	  affirmed	  for	  all	  peoples	  in	  the	  United	  Nations	  Charter.346	  	  He	  expressed	  his	  surprise	  over	  the	  Soviet	  intervention,	  despite	  his	  skepticism	  that	  he	  demonstrated	  towards	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  in	  February.	  The	  inconsistency	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  trust	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev	  is	  perplexing	  and	  demonstrates	  the	  United	  States’	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  On	  November	  6,	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Soviet	  and	  Related	  Problems	  met	  to	  discuss	  Hungary.	  Beam	  reported	  that	  the	  measures	  taken	  to	  help	  Hungary	  were	  as	  followed:	  	  (1)	  RFE	  is	  broadcasting	  appeals	  to	  the	  Soviet	  troops	  and	  will	  soon	  distribute	  pamphlets	   urging	   them	  not	   to	   fire	   on	  Hungarians,	   (2)	  we	  plan	   to	  press	   for	  distribution	  of	  relief	  in	  Hungary	  through	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross,	  (3)	  we	  have	  tightened	  up	  on	  U.S.	  passports,	  and	  (4)	  an	  effort	  is	  being	  made	  to	  take	  administrative	   action	   to	   make	   it	   easier	   for	   satellite	   refugees	   to	   enter	   the	  United	  States.347	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Beam	  explained	  the	  efforts	  the	  U.S.	  were	  currently	  taking	  in	  hopes	  to	  help	  liberate	  Hungary,	  but	  the	  efforts	  were	  all	  reactive.	  The	  U.S.	  Legation	  in	  Hungary	  anticipated	  these	  events	  and	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  take	  action	  to	  prevent	  or	  intervene.	  Now,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  merely	  trying	  to	  put	  a	  band-­‐aid	  on	  the	  situation	  to	  try	  to	  stop	  the	  bleeding.	  	  	   Beam	  then	  gave	  an	  oral	  report,	  on	  November	  7,	  to	  the	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  regarding	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  He	  asserted	  that:	  It	  is	  not	  recommended	  that	  we	  revive	  the	  cold	  war	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  intensity	  of	  the	   late	  Stalin	  period.	  We	  shall	   certainly	   take	  some	  steps,	  and	  very	  definite	  ones,	   to	   register	  our	   revulsion	  against	   the	   Soviet	   attack	  on	  Hungary.	  These	  will	   include	   a	   suspension	   of	   the	   exchange	   of	   official	   delegations	   under	   the	  East-­‐West	   contacts	   program	   and	   also	   non-­‐attendance	   at	   Soviet	   social	  functions.	  We	  would	  also	  view	  sympathetically	  steps	  such	  as	  are	  now	  being	  undertaken	  by	   labor	   organizations	   in	   various	   countries	   to	   refuse	   to	  handle	  Soviet	  ships	  and	  goods.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  would	  not	  wish	  to	  jeopardize	  some	   of	   the	   gains,	   small	   as	   they	   may	   be,	   resulting	   from	   the	   Geneva	  conferences.	  Thus,	  we	  would	  like	  the	  Amerika	  magazine	  exchange	  to	  continue	  and	  we	  should	  be	  willing	  to	  go	  ahead	  with	  limited	  cooperation	  with	  the	  USSR	  in	  the	  International	  Geophysical	  Year.	  Unless	  Soviet	  actions	  become	  generally	  more	  threatening,	  it	  would	  seem	  best	  to	  refrain	  from	  drastic	  measures	  such	  as	  blocking	  Soviet	  assets,	  intensifying	  trade	  embargoes,	  etc.348	  	  Beam	  did	  not	  want	  the	  U.S.	  to	  revert	  back	  to	  previous	  relations	  that	  existed	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Stalin.	  Despite	  the	  force	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Beam	  believed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  witnessed	  some	  improvements,	  such	  as	  concessions	  and	  negotiations	  agreed	  upon	  at	  the	  Geneva	  conference	  and	  the	  situation	  in	  Poland.	  Beam	  advised	  against	  intensifying	  any	  tension	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  despite	  the	  inhumane	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  people.	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   On	  November	  8,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  convened	  for	  their	  303rd	  meeting,	  where	  CIA	  Director	  Dulles	  reported	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Hungary.	  First,	  he	  commented	  on	  the	  brutal	  Soviet	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarians.	  Director	  Dulles	  analyzed	  the	  situation	  of	  János	  Kádár,	  he	  described,	  “Kádár	  as	  a	  potential	  Gomułka	  if	  his	  hands	  had	  not	  been	  so	  deeply	  stained	  by	  the	  blood	  of	  his	  own	  countrymen	  and	  if	  he	  had	  not	  acted	  in	  collaboration	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  Even	  so,	  he	  may	  yet	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  Hungarian	  Gomułka.”349	  That	  being	  said,	  Director	  Dulles	  proclaimed	  that	  he	  did	  not	  trust	  Kádár.	  	   Director	  Dulles	  asserted	  that	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  reached	  an	  all	  time	  low	  in	  the	  Western	  world	  with	  its	  recent	  violence	  on	  the	  Hungarian	  people.	  He	  also	  predicted	  that,	  “the	  rebellion	  in	  Hungary	  would	  be	  extinguished	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  days,	  if	  not	  of	  hour.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Soviets	  would	  be	  faced	  with	  a	  problem	  in	  Hungary	  for	  many,	  many	  years	  to	  come.”350	  In	  other	  words,	  Director	  Dulles	  was	  suggesting	  that	  while	  the	  Soviets	  succeeded	  in	  suppressing	  the	  satellite	  once	  again,	  it	  would	  create	  further	  problems	  for	  them	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  could	  not	  appease	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  while	  still	  maintaining	  control,	  implying	  that	  there	  will	  be	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  until	  Hungary	  gained	  independence.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  always	  be	  working	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  Hungary.	  	  	   Interestingly,	  at	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  Meeting,	  Herbert	  Hoover,	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  believed	  that	  if	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French	  had	  not	  been	  entangled	  in	  the	  Suez	  Crisis	  then	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  never	  have	  acted	  with	  such	  aggression	  towards	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Hungary.351	  Secretary	  Hoover	  was	  suggesting	  that	  the	  fear	  of	  the	  Western	  powers	  was	  so	  great	  that	  it	  would	  have	  kept	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  check	  if	  they	  were	  not	  preoccupied.	  Once	  again,	  Secretary	  Hoover	  expressed	  the	  self-­‐confidence	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Furthermore,	  the	  confidence	  that	  the	  U.S.	  held	  in	  regards	  to	  its	  partnerships	  with	  the	  British	  and	  the	  French.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Suez	  crisis,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  believed	  that	  they	  would	  be	  granted	  greater	  leniency	  by	  the	  Western	  world	  because	  they	  were	  preoccupied,	  a	  belief	  that	  resulted	  to	  be	  true.	  	  	   In	  a	  later	  meeting	  between	  the	  Bipartisan	  Legislative	  Leaders	  on	  November	  9,	  Director	  Dulles	  echoed	  his	  previous	  claim	  in	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  meeting.	  He	  “concluded	  that	  Russia	  had	  lost	  a	  satellite	  and	  gained	  a	  conquered	  province,	  that	  in	  the	  outside	  world	  the	  myth	  of	  sweet	  reasonableness	  of	  communism	  has	  been	  destroyed	  with	  a	  resultant	  denunciation	  of	  it	  by	  former	  Party	  members	  and	  that	  the	  Soviets	  now	  realize	  that	  satellite	  armies	  are	  not	  at	  all	  trustworthy.”352	  According	  to	  Director	  Dulles,	  the	  Soviet	  force	  proved	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  the	  weakness	  of	  communism	  and	  its	  inability	  to	  negotiate.	  The	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  proved	  to	  the	  U.S.	  that	  communism	  would	  not	  succeed	  and	  had	  a	  pending	  imminent	  defeat.	  	  	  	   On	  November	  13,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  II,	  Counselor	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  reported	  to	  the	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  State	  regarding	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  President	  and	  Colonel	  Goodpaster.	  MacArthur	  relayed	  that:	  The	  President	   expressed	   concern	   over	   reports	  which	   seem	   to	   indicate	   that	  many	   European	   people	   had	   the	   impression	   that	   the	   US	   had	   incited	   the	  Hungarians	  to	  rebellion.	  He	  said	  this	  concerned	  him	  and	  we	  should	  devote	  all	  our	  efforts	  to	  correcting	  this	  impression.	  He	  said	  it	  has	  never	  been	  out	  policy	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to	  incite	  captive	  peoples	  to	  insurrection,	  but	  we	  have	  always	  stood	  ready	  to	  assist	  in	  their	  peaceful	  liberation	  through	  giving	  strong	  moral	  support	  to	  the	  captive	  peoples.353	  	  President	  Eisenhower	  expressed	  concern	  over	  the	  image	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world.	  Furthermore,	  he	  presented	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  efforts	  to	  help	  suppressed	  people.	  	  He	  acknowledged	  that	  all	  the	  U.S.	  could	  offer	  was	  moral	  support	  to	  assist	  in	  peaceful	  liberation,	  indirectly	  stating	  that	  if	  a	  liberation	  operation	  turns	  violent	  that	  the	  U.S.	  cannot	  assist	  militarily.	  	  	   The	  focus	  of	  discussions	  began	  to	  shift	  from	  the	  atrocity	  of	  the	  Soviet	  aggression	  to	  how	  the	  Western	  world	  should	  “punish”	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Additionally,	  the	  U.S.	  stopped	  focusing	  on	  what	  could	  have	  been	  done	  to	  help	  the	  Hungarians	  liberate	  themselves,	  but	  now	  how	  the	  world	  could	  absorb	  all	  the	  Hungarian	  refugees	  and	  provide	  the	  necessary	  resources	  and	  aid	  for	  the	  Hungarians.	  The	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  assessed	  the	  events	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Hungary	  to	  determine	  what	  action	  should	  be	  taken.	  George	  W.	  Perkins,	  the	  Permanent	  Representative	  to	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  Council,	  reported	  that	  NATO	  urged	  “respective	  governments	  to:	  (a)	  coordinate	  efforts	  in	  UN	  to	  exert	  maximum	  pressure	  on	  Russia,	  (b)	  give	  asylum	  to	  Hungarian	  refugees	  and	  provide	  supplies	  to	  Red	  Cross	  for	  Hungarian	  relief	  and	  (c)	  ban	  all	  cultural	  and	  sport	  activities	  with	  Russia.	  Regarding	  latter,	  asked	  what	  governments	  doing	  about	  Olympic	  Games.”354	  NATO	  attempted	  to	  coordinate	  with	  the	  governments	  to	  provide	  a	  united	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punishment	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  However,	  these	  punishments	  were	  merely	  reactive	  and	  did	  not	  help	  the	  Hungarians	  to	  liberate	  themselves.	  	  	   Bohlen	  reported	  from	  Moscow	  on	  November	  14,	  that	  he	  believed	  that,	  “Soviet	  policy	  will	  clearly	  be	  to	  promote	  national	  Communism	  in	  Hungary	  and	  will	  endeavor	  while	  insuring	  maintenance	  Communist	  system	  to	  produce	  developments	  somewhat	  along	  Polish	  line.”355	  Bohlen	  interpreted	  that	  the	  Soviets	  would	  appease	  the	  Hungarians	  in	  some	  way	  in	  hopes	  to	  prevent	  another	  disruption	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  	  	   The	  U.S.	  government	  concerned	  itself	  with	  what	  form	  of	  economic	  aid	  that	  it	  should	  offer	  for	  both	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  It	  was	  suggested	  to	  sell	  agricultural	  surpluses	  to	  both	  Poland	  and	  Hungary,	  granting	  food	  relief	  to	  Hungarians	  in	  need,	  and	  emergency	  relief	  money	  for	  Hungarians.356	  While	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unwillingly	  to	  support	  the	  Hungarian	  insurgents	  militarily,	  they	  believed	  in	  supporting	  the	  Hungarians	  economically	  in	  the	  aftermath.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  upset	  the	  revolt	  failed	  and	  clearly	  felt	  remorse	  for	  all	  the	  deaths	  of	  the	  Hungarians,	  which	  caused	  them	  to	  want	  to	  help	  the	  Hungarians	  in	  their	  aftermath	  struggle.	  An	  important	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  willing	  to	  help	  because	  it	  did	  not	  involve	  the	  U.S.	  military	  nor	  did	  the	  aid	  directly	  engage	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   On	  November	  19,	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  produced	  a	  report	  regarding	  the	  reevaluation	  of	  U.S.	  policies,	  objectives,	  and	  courses	  of	  actions	  based	  on	  the	  recent	  events	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  report	  reiterated	  the	  initial	  objective,	  which	  was:	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A	   first	   step	   toward	   eventual	   full	   national	   independence	   and	   freedom,	   the	  emergence	  of	   ‘national’	   communist	   governments.	  While	   these	   governments	  might	   continue	   to	  be	   in	   close	  political	   and	  military	   alliance	  with	   the	   Soviet	  Union,	   they	  would	  be	  able	   to	  exercise	   to	  a	  much	  greater	  degree	  than	   in	   the	  past	  independent	  authority	  and	  control	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  their	  own	  affairs,	  primarily	  confined	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  to	  their	  internal	  affairs.357	  	  The	  report	  continued	  by	  assessing	  the	  success	  of	  these	  objectives	  in	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  after	  the	  tense	  events	  of	  the	  past	  six	  months.	  The	  goals	  of	  the	  U.S.	  have	  not	  changed	  because	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  still	  remain	  under	  the	  control	  of	  both	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  communist	  system.	  Despite	  the	  revolts	  in	  both	  countries,	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  U.S.	  they	  were	  essentially	  back	  where	  they	  started	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  	  	   The	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  Council	  saw	  Poland	  as	  a	  country	  in	  progress	  of	  achieving	  these	  objectives.	  In	  regards	  to	  Hungary,	  the	  council	  did	  not	  portray	  the	  same	  optimism.	  The	  report	  read	  as	  follows:	  The	  Soviet	  Government	  renewed	  on	  November	  4	   its	  efforts	   to	  suppress	   the	  Hungarian	  revolt	  by	  installing	  a	  new	  puppet	  regime	  headed	  by	  Kadar,	  and	  by	  the	  employment	  of	   greatly	   increased	  Soviet	   armed	   force.	   Soviet	   reaction	   to	  UN	   actions	   and	   to	   the	   President’s	   appeal	   to	  Bulganin	   on	  November	   4	   have	  made	   clear	   Soviet	   determination	   to	  maintain	   its	   position	   there	   by	   force	   of	  arms.	   The	   Kadar	   regime	   has	   reverted	   to	   a	   program	   of	   modest	   reform	  promises	  including	  a	  promise	  to	  negotiate	  in	  the	  future	  for	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  while	  making	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  political	  and	  military	  alliance	  with	  the	  USSR	  must	  be	  maintained.358	  	  	  	  The	  report	  assessed	  the	  Hungarian	  situation	  well.	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  hold	  on	  Hungary	  and	  that	  they	  would	  not	  let	  go	  unless	  there	  were	  extenuating	  circumstances.	  They	  gained	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  satellites	  to	  the	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Soviet	  Union	  after	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  not	  going	  to	  give	  up	  any	  satellite	  easily	  because	  of	  their	  desired	  goal	  to	  have	  communism	  rule	  the	  world.	  	  	   United	  States	  Intelligence	  concluded	  that	  the	  maintenance	  of	  control	  over	  the	  satellites	  was	  greatly	  attributed	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  in	  the	  area.	  In	  other	  words,	  Soviet	  troops	  were	  stationed	  all	  throughout	  Eastern	  Europe,	  ready	  to	  mobilize	  at	  any	  moment	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  uprising.359	  A	  conclusion	  that	  was	  not	  explicitly	  stated	  was	  that	  the	  U.S.	  believed	  that	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  Soviet	  troops,	  both	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  Soviet	  bloc.	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  conclusion	  regarding	  U.S.	  action	  remained	  unchanged	  from	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  from	  October	  30.	  United	  States	  Intelligence	  still	  believed	  that	  unless	  the	  U.S.	  took	  military	  action	  themselves,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  risk	  another	  total	  war.360	  However,	  they	  did	  believe	  that	  “Soviet	  suspicions	  of	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  present	  circumstances	  which	  involve	  Soviet	  troop	  movements	  and	  alerts	  probably	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  series	  of	  actions	  and	  counter-­‐actions	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  war.”361	  The	  U.S.	  formulated	  a	  new	  opinion	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  It	  may	  now	  be	  interpreted	  that	  if	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  to	  exert	  force	  on	  their	  satellites,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  not	  engage	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  on	  its	  own.	  The	  U.S.	  maintained	  a	  general	  understanding	  that	  Eastern	  Europe	  belonged	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism.	  	  On	  November	  27,	  the	  Special	  National	  Intelligence	  Estimate	  reevaluated	  Soviet-­‐Satellite	  relations.	  The	  report	  concluded,	  “Given	  the	  vital	  character	  of	  the	  interests	  involved,	  the	  Soviet	  leaders	  will	  not	  seriously	  consider	  abdicating	  their	  dominant	  position	  in	  Eastern	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Europe.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  scale,	  a	  full-­‐blown	  return	  to	  the	  extremes	  of	  Stalinist	  rule	  is	  highly	  unlikely.”362	  The	  U.S.	  now	  truly	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  do	  anything	  to	  keep	  control	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  including	  excessive	  force.	  However,	  when	  the	  satellites	  were	  under	  control	  they	  would	  maintain	  a	  loosen	  grip.	  	  Furthermore,	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  agreed	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  been	  grappling	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  governance	  since	  the	  death	  of	  Stalin.	  The	  U.S.	  recognized	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  relaxation	  of	  terror	  was	  to	  gain	  popular	  support	  without	  lack	  of	  discipline.	  The	  U.S.	  also	  acknowledged,	  “it	  was	  easier	  to	  satisfy	  both	  of	  these	  conflicting	  goals	  in	  the	  USSR	  than	  in	  the	  Satellites,	  where	  Communist	  authority	  was	  less	  securely	  established	  and	  where,	  particularly	  in	  Hungary	  and	  Poland,	  Communist	  leaders	  had	  to	  contend	  with	  traditions	  of	  intense	  nationalism	  and	  a	  rise	  in	  popular	  expectations,	  particularly	  among	  the	  youth.”363	  The	  U.S.	  understood	  that	  the	  satellites	  had	  conflicting	  interests	  that	  presented	  problems	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Within	  the	  satellites	  there	  were	  conflicting	  communist	  movements	  and	  nationalist	  movements,	  explaining	  the	  revolts	  and	  problems	  of	  dissent.	  These	  conflicting	  ideologies	  were	  not	  present	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  because	  Soviet	  nationalism	  was	  deeply	  entangled	  communism.	  	  The	  report	  continued	  to	  assess	  the	  potential	  effects	  of	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt,	  the	  return	  of	  Gomułka,	  and	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  had	  upon	  Soviet	  policy.	  The	  contradictory	  pressures	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  faced	  caused	  the	  U.S.	  to	  be	  uncertain	  of	  the	  way	  Soviet	  policy	  would	  fall.	  United	  States	  confusion	  remained	  prevalent	  in	  the	  report.	  It	  was	  unclear	  whether	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  would	  return	  to	  a	  harder	  line	  or	  if	  it	  would	  maintain	  its	  relaxed	  state	  and	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  27,	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  in	  Foreign	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  of	  the	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  States,	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  Eastern	  Europe,	  volume	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  U.S.	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  1990),	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believed	  that	  its	  suppression	  of	  Hungary	  was	  an	  example	  of	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  any	  satellite	  raised	  trouble.364	  That	  being	  said,	  the	  U.S.	  anticipated	  the	  Soviet	  leadership	  to	  follow	  a	  course	  of	  “continuation	  of	  the	  present	  course	  of	  expediency,	  involving	  shifts	  between	  conciliation	  and	  repression.”365	  While	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  better	  able	  to	  anticipate,	  there	  was	  still	  an	  air	  of	  confusion.	  	  The	  U.S.	  reactions	  started	  with	  going	  toe-­‐to-­‐toe	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  hopes	  that	  Khrushchev	  would	  not	  call	  the	  United	  States’	  bluff.	  However,	  the	  year	  concluded	  with	  the	  United	  States’	  concern	  whether	  the	  world	  thought	  the	  U.S.	  had	  initiated	  the	  revolt	  and	  thereby	  caused	  the	  deaths	  of	  thousands	  of	  Hungarians.	  Confusion	  froze	  U.S.	  policy	  and	  prevented	  them	  from	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  decide	  on	  action	  to	  help	  Hungary	  in	  the	  moment.	  United	  States	  foreign	  policy	  was	  walking	  a	  tight	  rope	  because	  when	  military	  intervention	  is	  ruled	  out,	  what	  options	  are	  left.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  formulate	  a	  coherent	  foreign	  policy	  when	  the	  options	  were	  limited	  and	  unattractive.	  Constrained	  by	  the	  fear	  of	  war,	  the	  U.S.	  was	  left	  with	  a	  policy	  of	  psychological	  warfare.	  However,	  when	  this	  leads	  to	  uprisings	  and	  bloodshed	  and	  the	  U.S.	  cannot	  intervene,	  it	  leaves	  the	  U.S.	  in	  an	  embarrassing	  situation.	  	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  wanted	  to	  base	  their	  policy	  off	  of	  what	  they	  anticipated	  the	  Soviet’s	  policy	  and	  actions	  to	  be.	  However,	  the	  U.S.	  government	  could	  never	  determine	  what	  that	  would	  be.	  All	  the	  U.S.	  ever	  gathered	  was	  multiple	  possibilities	  that	  would	  have	  lead	  to	  very	  different	  possibilities,	  halting	  U.S.	  action	  and	  policy	  making	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  revolt	  was	  brutally	  suppressed	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  that	  the	  U.S.	  was	  finally	  able	  to	  decide	  policy	  regarding	  Hungary	  and	  the	  Soviet	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Union.	  The	  U.S.	  policy	  included	  punishments	  coordinated	  by	  NATO	  and	  economic	  aid	  for	  Poland	  and	  Hungary.	  	  While	  the	  U.S.	  correctly	  attributed	  the	  differences	  between	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  to	  explain	  the	  different	  reactions	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  it	  still	  created	  confusion.	  The	  U.S.	  could	  not	  predict	  the	  Soviet	  actions	  and	  future	  of	  Soviet	  policy.	  Although	  it	  might	  have	  been	  speculated	  that	  the	  year	  of	  1956	  would	  allow	  the	  U.S.	  to	  evolve	  their	  opinion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Khrushchev,	  it	  only	  created	  puzzlement	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  similar	  to	  how	  Khrushchev’s	  Secret	  Speech	  created	  confusion	  within	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Khrushchev’s	  capricious	  nature	  paired	  with	  the	  differing	  circumstances	  within	  Poland	  and	  Hungary,	  led	  to	  unpredictable	  reactions	  from	  the	  United	  States	  standpoint.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  left	  desperately	  trying	  to	  grasp	  an	  understanding	  of	  Khrushchev	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  policy.	  The	  lack	  of	  understanding	  and	  the	  fear	  of	  war	  prevented	  the	  United	  States	  from	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  act.	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Conclusion:	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  1957,	  the	  United	  States	  government	  produced	  a	  report	  reflecting	  on	  the	  past	  year	  and	  reevaluating	  the	  Soviet	  satellites.	  The	  report	  believed:	  The	   long-­‐latent	   conflict	   between	   Soviet	   interest	   and	   Satellite	   aspirations	  exploded	   in	   crisis	   last	   fall	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   progressive	   weakening	   of	  ideological	  authority	  and	  loosening	  of	  police	  controls	  following	  the	  death	  of	  Stalin…tensions	  between	   the	  Satellite	  populations	  and	   their	   regimes	  during	  the	   next	   several	   years	   probably	   will	   be	   higher	   than	   prior	   to	   the	   events	   in	  Poland	   and	  Hungary,	   and	   the	   unity	   of	   Satellite	   parties	  will	   be	   subjected	   to	  greater	   strains.	   Soviet	   policy	   is	   likely	   to	   reduce	   these	   tensions	   in	   Eastern	  Europe,	  or	  even	  to	  restore	  the	  degree	  of	  acquiescence	  prevailing	  earlier.366	  	  The	  United	  States	  understood	  the	  value	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  placed	  on	  its	  satellites.	  While	  they	  did	  see	  the	  year	  of	  1956	  as	  a	  year	  of	  slight	  progress,	  they	  also	  did	  not	  expect	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  release	  its	  control	  within	  the	  year,	  despite	  the	  discontent	  within	  the	  satellites.	  	  The	  United	  States	  entered	  the	  year	  1956	  not	  knowing	  what	  would	  unfold.	  The	  change	  in	  leadership	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  left	  the	  door	  for	  change	  open,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  never	  anticipated	  Nikita	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  or	  Poland	  and	  Hungary	  to	  begin	  to	  crack	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  The	  uncertainty,	  along	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  intelligence	  regarding	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  left	  the	  United	  States	  unprepared	  to	  react.	  1956	  was	  a	  trying	  year	  for	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  superpowers	  fluctuated	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  1956.	  The	  year	  that	  started	  out	  with	  the	  promise	  that	  the	  cold	  tensions	  might	  thaw	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  ended	  with	  a	  hard	  freeze.	  	  	   Khrushchev’s	  speech	  on	  February	  24	  rocked	  the	  world	  with	  its	  implications	  over	  its	  control	  of	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  potential	  optimism	  for	  the	  change	  in	  leadership	  style.	  It	  gave	  the	  U.S.	  false	  promise	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  headed	  in	  a	  new	  direction.	  The	  brutal	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suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  secured	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  position	  as	  a	  power	  hungry	  superpower	  willing	  to	  use	  deadly	  force	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  its	  holdings	  in	  Eastern	  Europe.	  The	  political	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  year	  forced	  the	  United	  States	  to	  consistently	  reevaluate	  their	  policy	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  their	  understanding	  of	  communism.	  	  Despite	  the	  disparity	  of	  the	  events	  on	  1956,	  the	  United	  States	  articulated	  its	  goals	  clearly,	  which	  was	  to	  eliminate	  communism.	  It	  was	  evident	  that	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  their	  policy	  to	  promote	  “free	  world”	  ideology	  and	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  independence	  of	  Eastern	  European	  countries.	  Their	  policy	  was	  also	  meant	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  communist	  rule.	  While	  they	  expressed	  their	  goals	  well,	  they	  were	  consistently	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  how	  to	  achieve	  them.	  Militaristic	  efforts	  were	  the	  only	  plausible	  way	  of	  being	  able	  to	  immediately	  achieve	  their	  goals	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  unwilling	  to	  involve	  their	  military,	  which	  drastically	  limited	  their	  options.	  The	  varying	  quality	  of	  intelligence	  also	  influenced	  the	  United	  States’	  policy.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  in	  February,	  the	  U.S.	  struggled	  to	  formulate	  a	  policy	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge.	  Initially,	  they	  were	  unaware	  of	  the	  speech	  until	  about	  a	  month	  later,	  preventing	  the	  formulation	  of	  a	  policy.	  Even	  at	  this	  point,	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  have	  an	  official	  copy,	  crippling	  their	  ability	  to	  properly	  understand	  the	  speech’s	  implication.	  When	  the	  U.S.	  did	  finally	  get	  a	  copy	  in	  May,	  they	  still	  grappled	  to	  understand	  Khrushchev’s	  motives.	  United	  States	  policy	  started	  off	  the	  year	  without	  proper	  information	  regarding	  the	  events,	  causing	  them	  to	  be	  constantly	  be	  behind.	  	  	   When	  the	  U.S.	  did	  finally	  formulate	  a	  policy	  regarding	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  it	  embodied	  typical	  suspicion	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  communism.	  The	  U.S.	  approached	  the	  speech	  with	  skeptical	  optimism.	  They	  saw	  the	  speech	  as	  being	  positive,	  but	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they	  also	  recognized	  that	  it	  was	  just	  that,	  a	  speech.	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  decided	  to	  wait	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  validate	  Khrushchev’s	  claims	  through	  action,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  did	  not	  have	  to	  wait	  long.	  	   Unlike	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech,	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt	  within	  hours	  of	  it	  happening.	  The	  quick	  relaying	  of	  information	  allowed	  the	  U.S.	  to	  react	  more	  appropriately	  than	  they	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  The	  U.S.	  saw	  the	  revolt	  in	  Poland	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  further	  their	  long-­‐term	  goal	  of	  eventual	  liberation	  of	  the	  Soviet	  satellites	  within	  the	  constraints	  of	  their	  anti-­‐military	  policy.	  United	  States	  policy	  makers	  decided	  to	  invoke	  and	  prolong	  the	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes	  that	  evolved	  from	  the	  Poznań	  Revolt	  to	  fuel	  the	  unrest	  within	  Poland.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  U.S.	  used	  psychological	  warfare	  to	  help	  instill	  Polish	  nationalism.	  Furthermore,	  the	  revolt	  offered	  the	  U.S.	  the	  chance	  to	  observe	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  handling	  of	  the	  situation	  to	  either	  validate	  or	  negate	  Khrushchev’s	  words.	  The	  lack	  of	  Soviet	  intervention	  made	  Khrushchev’s	  new	  plan	  and	  direction	  seem	  genuine.	  	  The	  events	  of	  the	  Polish	  October	  were	  also	  reported	  with	  accuracy	  and	  speed,	  granting	  the	  U.S.	  the	  ability	  to	  reconfigure	  its	  policy	  and	  plan	  of	  action	  applicably.	  The	  return	  of	  Gomułka	  provided	  the	  U.S.	  Intelligence	  community	  another	  instance	  to	  test	  Khrushchev’s	  sincerity.	  Khrushchev	  again	  proved	  himself	  and	  managed	  the	  change	  of	  leadership	  diplomatically,	  thereby	  further	  confirming	  the	  new	  direction	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  U.S.	  gained	  confidence	  in	  the	  thaw	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc.	  	  	   Similar	  to	  the	  events	  in	  Poland,	  U.S.	  policy	  makers	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  within	  hours	  of	  it	  erupting.	  However,	  the	  constant	  evolution	  of	  events	  prevented	  the	  U.S.	  from	  ever	  being	  able	  to	  truly	  pause	  and	  formulate	  a	  policy.	  Each	  plan	  was	  stalled	  by	  a	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new	  development	  occurring	  in	  the	  situation.	  	  In	  dealing	  with	  this	  debilitating	  feature,	  the	  United	  States’	  strategy	  was	  again	  psychological	  warfare.	  The	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  encourage	  the	  protestors	  and	  their	  anti-­‐Soviet	  attitudes,	  in	  hopes	  that	  they	  would	  gain	  independence,	  while	  still	  not	  involving	  themselves	  militarily.	  	  	   Unlike	  the	  events	  in	  Poland,	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  Revolt	  conflicted	  with	  Khrushchev’s	  speech.	  Khrushchev	  denounced	  Stalin	  for	  his	  reign	  of	  terror	  and	  unnecessary	  force	  and	  brutality.	  However,	  he	  exhibited	  exactly	  that	  with	  the	  oppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  insurgents.	  The	  quelling	  confirmed	  the	  United	  States	  fears	  that	  Khrushchev’s	  speech	  would	  not	  be	  genuine.	  The	  United	  States	  suspicion	  regarding	  the	  new	  direction	  was	  validated	  by	  the	  suppression	  of	  the	  Hungarians.	  	  Throughout	  the	  year,	  the	  United	  States	  constantly	  had	  conflicting	  opinions	  and	  views	  within	  the	  Intelligence	  community.	  Some	  people	  were	  confident	  in	  the	  new	  leadership	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  while	  others	  maintained	  their	  distrust	  of	  any	  communist	  leader.	  Some	  policy	  makers	  gained	  confidence	  from	  the	  events	  of	  Poland	  and	  used	  it	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  change	  in	  nature	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  while	  others	  watched	  with	  skepticism.	  Regardless,	  they	  all	  understood	  the	  oppression	  of	  the	  Hungarian	  people	  as	  a	  horrific	  act.	  	  	   The	  United	  States’	  theme	  of	  inconsistency	  in	  this	  time	  period	  demonstrated	  its	  wavering	  trust	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  United	  States	  trusted	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  only	  when	  it	  worked	  in	  their	  favor.	  For	  example,	  when	  Khrushchev	  made	  his	  speech,	  there	  were	  mixed	  opinions	  of	  trust	  and	  suspicion.	  Those	  inclined	  to	  trust	  the	  speech	  were	  seduced	  by	  the	  appeal	  of	  Khrushchev’s	  words,	  while	  those	  who	  were	  suspicious	  looked	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  validate	  their	  argument.	  Another	  instance	  when	  the	  U.S.	  deviated	  from	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their	  constant	  skepticism	  towards	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  when	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  said	  that	  they	  were	  removing	  their	  troops	  from	  Hungary.	  This	  was	  a	  grave	  mistake	  in	  trust	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	   The	  U.S.	  was	  playing	  the	  constant	  waiting	  game	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  They	  were	  always	  on	  the	  defensive	  and	  always	  reacting	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Neither	  party	  was	  particularly	  in	  control	  of	  the	  whole	  situation.	  The	  Cold	  War	  was	  a	  volatile	  time	  where	  both	  superpowers	  were	  constantly	  waiting	  to	  react	  to	  the	  other;	  uncertain	  of	  what	  would	  come	  next.	  	  	   The	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  result	  largely	  of	  the	  historical	  circumstances	  of	  the	  time.	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  Suez	  Crisis,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Presidential	  Election	  of	  1956	  all	  played	  dramatic	  roles	  in	  determining	  the	  relationship	  between	  Khrushchev	  and	  President	  Eisenhower.	  The	  battle	  between	  the	  “free	  world”	  and	  communism	  would	  persist	  past	  1956.	  This	  year,	  however,	  influenced	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  relations	  and	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  drastically.	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